MODE OF REWARDING PUBLIC OFFICERS.
IN commenting upon certain amendments made by the House of Commons on the Chancery Regulations Bill, Lord BROUGHAM volunteered some observations respecting the best mode ofremune-. rating the officers of his Court. He was in favour of' paying them- partly by salaries and partly by fees.
" He thought that the stimulus of receiving fees would be more likely to int.. sure the proper degree of attention, and the ready discharge of the duties of the officers, than would the payment entirely by fixed salaries."
The officers whom Lord BROUGHAM more particularly objects toga} by, fixed salaries, are the clerks to-the Registrars. and Mase eat-sirs Chancery. The Globe says, they are persons . . . " to whom, from their position and the nature of their business, no .effectual stimulus can.be.applied, other than some.rewaill proportioned to the ninount.of business.whiab passes through their hands. They have to forward multaneouslv the business, sac of fifty or a hundreds. tits in Equity, of the com- partitive • weightof each of which, or of the labour of the whole, no one but themselves can judge. How much of such hasiness a man can well get through, nonce-ti,priorfcan say : there can be no task-work,. for each job-differs mate- rially in-magnitude and difficulty. If a man-employed. in such business is paid by a salary,,he has no-motive whatever but pure conscientiousness to do his d•tty with activity, and he must hive the highest conceivable degree of conscientient nets to task -his activity to the uttermost."
Now if the Masters in Chancery and the Registrars attended closely to their duties, they would constantly keep a check upon their clerks. II',. indeed, the Masters are themselves ignorant of the duties which their subordinates ought to perform, then, be the payments to the latter made in whatever way you please, the pro- bability is, that they will be inefficient .servants. The one thing needful, first of all, is an active and intelligent man of business at the head of the office or department. He should then tell his clerks, as a merchant or banker would do—"If you perform the duties of your situation with diligence and efficiency, you shall re- main in it ; if you do not, you shall be dismissed.' That would be a sufficient stimulus to keep most men likely to obtain situa- tions worth from 3001. to 1,000/: per annum, attentive to their business. That would make it their interest to be good servants, fully as much as any mode of payment by fees.
But it will be said that. it is impossible for a Master in Chan- cery to ascertain whether his clerks are faithful and attentive or the reverse. Then the plain reply is—" Your system is a mise- rable one; it is radically defective." How does a banker, who has 'fifiy clerks, exercise a vigilant control over them all ? How was it that the Duke of WELLINGTON effected such an alteration for the better in all the Government offices ? Why should that which is possible everywhere else be impossible in the office of a Chan- cery laws er alone?
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