SIR JOHN FISHER.
LTO THE EDITOR OF THE " SPROTATORr]
Sya,—The object of my last letter (August 17th) was to show that the exceptional position gained for himself by Sir John Fisher had exceptional warrant. Will you allow me space for an equally brief and general defence of the changes he has made, or some of them? With regard to the general efficiency of the Fleet, it is only necessary to point to the fact that the Opposition in both Houses of Parliament have nothing to say. As regards the House of Lords, some questions recently asked there are traced by the Service to officers now on full pay and active service ; and even Sir John Fisher's enemies consider this method of attack as unfair fighting. As regards the House of Commons, the officer attacking Sir John Fisher has in a measure defeated his own object by the strong personal animus displayed. Let it be granted that the Home Fleet lately assembled at Spithead had defects; that the sending of some of H.M.'s ships to the West Indies is proof that the squsaron in those waters ought not to have been withdrawn ; that Sir John Fisher was much to blame because there were no ships in Port Royal when the earthquake occurred, and that in future he must provide for the presence of a fleet at all earthquakes,—the fact remains that the Navy of to-day is, in all its branches, in such a state of efficiency as never has been approached in its previous history, and that in producing this result economy in expenditure has been effected. The firing returns of to-day mean an increase of fighting strength which cannot be expressed in figures. Without detracting from the credit due to Sir Percy Scott, the fact must not be lost sight of that it was Sir John Fisher who gave him his opportunity. It is, however, against his educational policy, and the amalgamation of the various branches of the Service, that the bitterest attacks have been made. A volume could be written on the subject, but it can be. outlined shortly. Marines were originally put on board ships to protect the officers from the men ; to this day they mess aft between the ship's company and the officers. When corporal punish- ment is inflicted the whole Marine detachment falls in practically round the man who is flogged, and with fixed bayonets. These facts are mentioned merely in support of the general statement, which as it stands is bald, but substantially true. Later, the Royal Marine Artillery were invented as a highly trained body of scientific gunlayers, for whom the manual labour of training the guns, &e., would be performed by the bluejacket. Red Marines are no longer necessary for the protection of officers, Blue Marines are no longer necessary as scientific gunlayers. Stokers are a class of their own. In sailing days they did a certain amount of work aloft, and, when necessary, their friend the bluejacket went to their assistance in the stokehold. Now to point the moral. For years every one has seen the anomalies, for years it has been admitted that there were too many engineer officers in the Service, that their work would be better done by those wearing less gold lace on their sleeves, while their administrative functions would be better carried out by "executive engineers." Things have tended in this direction for long. Sir John Fisher has accelerated the pace. Sir John Fisher has been much blamed for conferring executive titles on the engineer officers of the day ; it was the one point in his reforms which gave your humble correspondent most serious pause, but I think I now see the joke, and am gradually coming to consider it quite a brilliant "double barrel." The amalgamation or co-ordina- tion of all the lower branches of the Service has been in process for many years, the "general service" man was being evolved, and with his appearance arises the necessity for the general service officer; hence the College at Osborne, and the common entry and upbringing of boys who later will be differentiated into the various classes of officer. Undoubtedly the step was a bold one; no one but a big man could have taken it. For its justification we must wait; of its ultimate success I have not a shadow of a doubt. So far as it has gone, those who have seen the system in operation speak of it with enthusiasm. Not only has a revolution been effected in the education of the coming officers of the Navy, but a start has been made which must affect the schools of the country, possibly of the world, for the introduction of mechanical details has had surprisingly satisfactory results. I have to thank you, Sir, for having allowed me to state my case, and I should be glad if my letters lead to a more generous consideration of what I hold to be the effort of a great man to improve the Service in which be has served so long and so faithfully. Not until the possibilities of finding his successor are discussed does Sir John Fisher appear in his proper perspective, for the Service know full well how impossible it would be to find in the present Flag-list any one worthy of his mantle.—I am, Sir, &c., Thom.
[We publish our correspondent's letter, as we are most anxious that we should not even seem to be prejudiced against Sir John Fisher. Not only have we made no personal attack on him, but have repeakedly acknowledged his great ability and the good work done by him in many particulars. If our correspondent bad honoured us with a somewhat more diligent study of our pages, he could hardly have failed to remember that we wrote sympathetically as to the changes in regard both to the Marines and engineers, and also supported the new scheme of training at Osborne, though several of our correspondents strongly attacked that scheme. But though we have admitted Sir John Fisher's good qualities, we have not considered that they place him above the reach of criticism, or make it a kind of high treason to suggest that all he does is not perfect. When we have thought him and his policy wrong, and his attitude of mind arbitrary and injudicious, we have not hesitated to say so. We think it has been ruinously wrong in the matter of (1) a "practically
ready" Fleet and nucleus crews for ships that ought to be at sea; (2) the diminution of the Channel Fleet, and the neglect of true strategic principles in the disposition of the fleets on which the safety of our home waters depends; (3) the fostering of the best spirit in the Navy; and (4) the relations of the Admiralty with the Press.—En. Spectator.]
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