Wen correspondence at the beginning of a campaign is never
very illuminating, and the three books which form the first- fruits of Russo-Japanese war literature are no exception to the rule. Until the strategy of a geners.1 is understood it is difficult to give an iif.1ligible account of events, and the general's plan is not usually communicated to the corre- spondent. He must perforce snap at impressions and bolt his news undigested, these being the conditions of his trade. In this case he is bound to be specially uninforming, for he has been shepherded unmercifully by both sides, kept at the base, misled as to movements, left without facilities for transport, until the marvel is that he can give a coherent account of anything. Of the three, Mr. Cowen is the best, mainly because he does not profess to be an eyewitness, but writes as an historian, familiar with the theatre and the personnel of the war, and able to acquire and arrange good second-hand information. He does not appear to have seen any actual fighting, but he is the only one of the three who writes with any perspective. Mr. Palmer is the thorough war corre- spondent—spirited, confident, occasionally dithyrambic— better, perhaps, to read in a daily paper than in a book, of which the author has probably been unable to correct the proof-sheets. There is a little too much of the "penman's latest piece of graphic," the strained prose in which heaven and earth and the waters under the earth are ransacked for metaphors. Not that the author is to blame, for the best of us, if he were penned somewhere in the rear of an army and received information in minute doles, would develop a wonder- ful faculty for elaborate prose. And Mr. Palmer has many merits : a gift of really vivid description, and shrewd and sensible comment, and sometimes a faculty of making one of those rare generalisations which are genuinely enlightening. He writes with humour and good humour, and is always interesting. Mr. Story is in the same class, with a difference. He moralises more than the other writer, and the flowers of sentiment adorn his pages. Also, he has practically nothing to say about the fighting, having spent most of his time well in the rear of Kuropatkin, since the Russians and the Japanese are at one in their views about war correspondence. There are not twenty pages in his book of real strategical or tactical information. His work is readable enough, but his generalisa- tions are wilder and his comments less convincing than Mr. Palmer's. But we should be sorry to have to construct from the episodes and impressions of either a coherent account of the campaign. For that we must look to Mr. Cowen, who, so far as he goes, gives us a lucid and orderly narrative.
In tracing the genesis of the war all three writers show fairness and understanding. The antagonism between the two Powers has been a slow growth, and Japan has long proclaimed, in the language of Army and Navy Estimates and educational schemes, her resolve to go to war some day. Mr. Cowen states impartially the cases of each, showing that in this war we have that rare phenomenon, a genuine antagonism
(1) The Russo-Japanese War from the Outbreak of Hostilities to the Battle of Liao.yang. By Thomas Cowen. London Edward Arnold. [15s. net.]- 2) With .Kuroki in Manchuria. By Frederick Palmer. London : Methuen and Co. [7s. 6d. net.]—(3) The Campaign with Kuropatkin. By Douglas Story. London T. Werner Laurie. [105. 6d. net.]
side. Mr. Palmer, like all good correspondents, takes the colour of the nation he campaigned with, and gives us the Japanese view ; while Mr. Story, with some temper, espouses the Russian cause. The delays in Tokio were too much for him, and he went over to the other side, so it is with a tone of almost personal grievance that he declares that "Japan acclaims to the world her civilisation and her progress : they are but the lacquer on her barbarism." It is well, nevertheless, to have the Russian cause defended, however hotly, in an English book, for the other side has had too exclusive atten- tion in this country. Of the sea battles Mr. Cowen gives a clear account, including a very graphic, if somewhat inaccurate, picture of the fight of the Varyag ' at Chemulpo. He writes, indeed, with so much vivid detail that if he was not present himself, which we do not suppose possible, be must have had access to the reports of eyewitnesses. He is right, we think, in emphasising the preliminary and auxiliary nature of the naval warfare. Sea battles have contributed largely towards great issues, but have rarely achieved them alone, and in the circum- stances of Japan and Russia the contests between the fleets could not produce any final decision. He thinks the Yalu the most significant of the land fights, and at this point the reader passes under the conduct of Mr. Palmer. The Japanese seemed to him to move with the precision of a field-day, when troops have been taken over the ground the day before and every detail rehearsed. There was a good deal of sledge- hammer tactics on both sides, but the victory naturally lay with the men who had accuracy as well as force in their aim. Mr. Palmer seems to us at his best in his description of the two attacks on the Motien Pass, for the fighting there was more confused and protracted than in the set battles, and gives a better field for a writer who is compelled to be episodic. Mr. Story, who was at the other end of the battle- field, puts his finger on what was probably the secret of Russian failure in that mountain warfare. They trusted too much to their cavalry, and there was no room for cavalry to fight; while they neglected the artillery work which the Japanese excelled in. Mr. Cowen fills up the gap in the narrative by describing the fighting at the neck of the Port Arthur isthmus, before Oku went north to the great encircling movement. Of Liao-yang none of the accounts are very clear, and certainly none give the complete picture of the Times correspondent, who published his version a few days after the battle. Kuropatkin's plan was to let Kuroki isolate himself, and then destroy him in detail while he held in check the attacking forces from the south. But he was badly served by his intelligence, and only learned of the gap in the Japanese cordon at a time when he was too hard pressed to spare men to seize the opportunity. The Japanese had correctly weighed their opponents, and gambled on the accuracy of their diagnosis. Liao-yang was not a decisive battle, but it was a very great one ; and in the long struggle of nine days both sides showed remarkable qualities, for if the Japanese were brilliant in attack, it would be difficult to overpraise the management of the Russian retreat in the face of every difficulty. Mr. Story attributes part of the Russian failure to the fact that they had arranged their entrenchments before the millet grew up, and were not prepared for the cover it afforded to the enemy. This shows an intelligence system of amazing poverty, but may very likely be true. Strategically Kuropatkin's scheme was ruined when Orloff broke before Kuroki, and in the cir- cumstances we must give him credit for admirable resource in a hopeless situation.
Both the war correspondents give us much interesting detail about the incidents of the march and the character of the armies. After the Yalu a Russian Captain was buried with full military honours, a Buddhist priest and a Danish missionary taking turns to conduct the service at the grave. Nothing could illustrate more curiously the attitude of Japan to the ceremonial side of life. Mr. Palmer has a very striking description of a funeral service for the dead conducted by a Shinto priest who served with Kuroki's Second Division, one of the rare rites of an unritualistic race. He insists upon the remarkable level of Japanese capacity. "A commander may choose the unit at hand as a mechanic takes down any one of a number of equally tempered tools from a rack. If you want a Horatius at the Bridge, take the nearest sergeant." The
Russian army had heroes, like Keller; but Japan has no heroes, for they are all the same. This characteristic of the race should make them the finest privates in the world ; but there is also the risk that the great leader may be uncommon, and the most perfect level of competence is the better for the inspiration of genius. Much nonsense has been talked about Japanese fatalism, which might lead in the case of a reverse to wholesale self-destruction. But, as Mr. Palmer points out, the Japanese soldier does not seek death in battle like an Eastern fanatic; he seeks to kill his enemy, and he tries to achieve this end without any needless bravado. He will serve his Emperor with his death if necessary, but he would much prefer to serve him with his life. It is too commonly assumed, also, that Japanese soldiers, while magnificent in attack, are in- capable because of their very virtues of the kind of retreat which plays so large a part in war. It is forgotten that at Liao-yang Kuroki fell back in perfect order when the chances of successful attack were gone. At the same time, Japan's special and peculiar merit is her instinct for the offensive. "The Japanese," in Mr. Palmer's words, "never wait on the enemy, but go to him—which is the first instinct with a martial race." Whether or not this instinct can be success- fully restrained on all occasions in the interests of good strategy has so far not been proved in the campaign. Mr. Story gives us some valuable sketches from the other side, and though there is too much of" the cross of St. George on a pure white tunic" style of writing, his pictures are graphic and convincing. We regret that we cannot share his enthu- siasm for Admiral Alexeieff. He may "represent not only a settled policy but a natural law " ; but he is a very inadequate representative of political wisdom. Though Mr. Palmer reports instances of Russian mutilation of the dead, and Mr. Story of the same thing on the part of the Japanese, the fighting men in both armies stand out in their pages in a pleasant light. Mr. Story's portrait of Kuropatkin is his most successful effort, and he records two sayings which are worthy of all attention. "At the end of the first month men will call me inactive, at the end of the second month they will call me incapable, at the end of the third month they will call me a traitor, at the end of six months—nous verrans." And again : " Ce n'est pas le moment d'acheter des maisons h Liao Yang, h Mukden non plus, a, Harbin—oui !" He, at any rate, is a man with a policy, a policy suited to the genius of his countrymen, and its value is still in issue. So far there is no guidance to be had from the campaign as to which side will win the ultimate victory ; but many valuable lessons appear in the general principles of war. Not the least important is that, in spite of M. Bloch, scientific inventions will never eliminate the need for courage and suffering. Indeed, they set a higher premium upon both. "In this age of high organisation," says Mr. Palmer, "some officers who sit in routine facing rows of pigeon-holes will tell you that war is entirely made with brains nowadays. All such should have seen Hayentai. There they would have learned that the taking of critical points, which are essential to academic plans, still depends upon brute butchery or brute courage."
THE HISTORY OF THE MOON.*
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