Naval facts
Sir: I am afraid that the "alternative factual perspective" that Mary Kaldor puts forward in her review of Captain Moore's book The Soviet Navy Today is somewhat narrow. On the one hand she admits that "numbers and technical capabilities are not the most relevant criteria" by which to judge the significance of the Russian Navy and on the other hand she notes that "the Soviet Navy is smaller now than it was in 1958" without making it clear precisely what she is counting. Changes in the composition of the Soviet fleet and the rate of technological advance (with a concomitant increase in cost and capabilities per unit) render such statements of questionable value. These considerations are equally pertinent to her figures for manpower reductions in the Russian Navy. Indulging in the numbers game is a pretty futile exercise and in any case it can be played to show an increasing threat to Nato at sea, as the following extract from the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee's report demonstrates: "In 1969 we had a Navy of about 1,000 ships. Now we are down to under 500. During the period of this shrinkage, the Soviets passed the United States in the number of nuclear submarines (in 1971). They passed the United States in the number of surface combatants in 1973, having more major combatants alone than the United States had in its entire surface fleet of both major and minor combatants."
Some of the other points Mary Kaldor makes should similarly be dealt with caution. For example, she asserts that "only in submarines is the Soviet Union significantly ahead in numbers, but this is offset by the sevenfold American advantage in nuclear weapons aboard strategic submarines," yet The Military Balance 1975-1976 lists on pages 5 and 8 respectively that while the USN fields 656 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's) aboard 41 submarines, the Russians dispose of 784 SLBM's aboard 75 submarines. Comparison of the two nations capabilities in this area is complicated by: differences in the yield and range of the missiles involved, the deployment of both single and M1RV missiles (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles(s)), the Russian use of both conventional and nuclear boats and different missile launch modes. Consideration of any one of these factors in isolation is pointless. To find Mary Kaldor making sweeping generalizations about the balance of strategic weapons at sea is disarming since the problem of strategic comparison has presented one of the obstacles to the conclusion of a satisfactory SALT agreement.
On a more general level, one must question the premise which lies behind this observation: "It would be odd if naval strategy moved in the opposite direction from foreign policy, and if the Soviet Union built up an offensive capability at the very moment when peaceful coexistence and economic interchange were being touted." Is it not possible that Moscow regards peaceful coexistence/economic interchange with the West and increasing Soviet naval capabilities as complementary rather than mutually exclusive policies?
A...1. Spence School of Social Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich
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