TOPICS OF THE DAY.
A CLOSE TIME FOR SOUTH AFRICA.
AIR RHODES has triumphed. There is no use in pretending otherwise in face of the fact that the Government are not going to take any action on the Report of the Committee, that Mr. Chamberlain has given him a fresh certificate of character, that the Cape Premier warrants him to be considered "the necessary man" by all South Africa, and that the regular Opposition, speaking by its leaders, virtually endorses the action of the Govern- ment, and carefully abstains from making any serious attack upon Mr. Rhodes's actions or policy. Our readers will not need to be told that though we are obliged to admit the fact, we regard Mr. Rhodes's triumph with the utmost alarm and regret. We have no personal feeling against Mr. Rhodes, and we have not the slightest wish to suggest that because a man has once done ill he ought not to be forgiven, and forgiven fully, if there is a, reasonable chance of his amending his ways and doing good work in the future. Vindictiveness may be a crime in private morals. It is something worse in public affairs. Our regret, then, is not due to any desire to see the nation revenged upon Mr. Rhodes, but to our belief that the Government, backed up by the Opposition, are by their action doing a grave injury to the public service. In the first place, the Government have missed an opportunity for letting Englishmen all over the world know that they do not care to be served by methods such as Mr. Rhodes adopted, and that the Empire has no use for men, even when their ultimate aims are patriotic, who deceive their superiors ind their colleagues, and induce subordinate Imperial :Aficers to commit grave breaches of duty. Provinces procured by such means are not worth having. But Hr. Rhodes did not even procure us provinces by his breaches of duty. He may be more rightly said to have lost them. The Matabeleland revolt was the result of the Raid and of Mr. Rhodes's native policy, and Matabele- .and would almost certainly have been lost to the Empire had not an Imperial force been sent to reconquer the oatives. When want of success is added to deceit, and ruin to dereliction of duty, it is surely the business of Government not to pardon but to make an example. If Mr. Rhodes had not been so colossal a blunderer there would be something to be said for pardoning him, and for using his services in the future. When a really good tool drops in the mud, it is wise to pick it up, wipe it, and use it again. That is not so with a tool that has never proved satisfactory. Of course we shall be told that Mr. Rhodes is a good tool. Let us test the truth of this declaration. As we have several times stated before, there were three vital problems in South Africa,—three problems with which South African statesmen had to deal and to help on the solution. One was the problem of reconciling English and Dutch feeling. The next was the problem of ruling the natives firmly and justly, and preventing native risings. The third was the problem of preventing European interference in South African affairs. What is Mr. Rhodes's record in regard to these problems ? He blundered hopelessly in respect of all three problems, and has greatly impaired the chances of their solution. The race animosity is far worse now than when he entered political life. One must go back a whole generation to find a time when Dutch and English were so antagonistic to each other, and regarded each other with such suspicious feelings. As to the natives, South Africa has never in its history wit- nessed such hideous, such cruel blundering in the manage- ment of the natives as is to be seen in Rhodesia under the rule of the Company over which, till eighteen months ago, Mr. Rhodes was supreme. Lastly, Mr. Rhodes's policy has induced the Boers to lean on foreign help and to introduce foreign factors into South African politics in a way never dreamt of before. Before the Raid the Orange Free State was as friendly and as true to the greater Imperial interests as if it had acknowledged our suzerainty. Now it is hostile and suspicious. It is true, no doubt, that the firmness of Mr. Chamberlain has pre- vented any active dangers arising from the attempt of the Boers to call in European help, but this is no credit to Mr. Rhodes. The result of his policy was to make the Boers disloyal to the leading South African ideal,—the ideal of independence from foreign central. Mr Rhodesmust indeed, if judged by his acts and not by his professions, be pronounced to be a blunderer and a destroyer, rather than a builder, of Empire. For yet another reason we should have liked to see a mark put upon Mr. Rhodes's methods of political action,—to have had them ticketed as not wanted in the Empire. Mr. Rhodes, who professed to be an Imperialist, gave X10,000, to Mr. Parnell when Mr. Parnell was admittedly trying to make British government in Ireland impossible. Mr.. Rhodes, we believe, alleges that he made this gift in order to induce Mr. Parnell to accept the retention of the Irish Members at Westminster, and so leave a door open for Imperial Federation ; but it is unnecessary to go into. his reasons. We will leave the fact as it is, and merely point out the assistance which Mr. Rhodes thus gave to the Nationalists. Let us not forget, too, that at that moment Mr. Parnell was also receiving subscriptions from the American Irish, and that their aims were certainly not Imperial Federation. We will put, however, only the most favourable interpretation upon Mr. Rhodes's action. By a gift of £10,000 he induced Mr. Parnell and his party to adopt a certain course of action. That is,from what he con- sidered patriotic motives he bought a particular policy of which he approved. But in doing this he did something— nay, a great deal—to demoralise our public life. To teach political groups to adopt changes of policy for money down is about as demoralising an act as can be imagined. That Mr. Rhodes did not care to remember this, but paid his money and took his policy in exchange, was a sign of his attitude towards public affairs. This will, no doubt, be described as an old story. So it is, but it none the less it marks the political methods of the man. To say that Mr. Rhodes gained nothing personally by the- transaction with Mr. Parnell is beside the mark. We have never accused Mr. Rhodes of personal corruption,. and do not believe him guilty of it ; nor have we accused him of ignoble aims. What we do say is that his political methods throughout his career have been demoralising in a high degree, and that in addition he has proved himself a hopeless blunderer as a statesman. But when a man whose methods are bad, and who makes horrible fiascos, is fairly caught out, it seems to us that the wiser plan is to dispense with his services, not to start him afresh on his career of blundering and demoralisation, But though we hold that Mr. Rhodes ought to have been punished instead of being given a clean sheet and a fresh start, we are not so foolish as to think that we can now alter public opinion. The Government have decided on a certain line of policy in South Africa, and have accepted the heavy responsibility, as we think, of carrying it out. This being so, the only thing that patriotic Englishmen can do is to give their policy a fair trial. The two courses of acquitting Mr. Rhodes and punishing him cannot be run together. Those who have the power have decided that Mr. Rhodes must be given another chance, and in the interests of South Africa and of the Empire that chance he must now have,—provided, of course, that the people of South Africa do not say him nay. We plead, then, for a close time for South Africa. For eighteen months South Africa has been a welter of conflicting policies and fierce discontents. At last a decision has been come to, and an end, rightly or wrongly, put to the struggle. We do not like the decision, but we recognise how infinitely better it is than no decision at all. In public affairs almost any plan is better than no plan. Our hope, then, is that for the next few years there may be a real closure applied to South African affairs. The driver may have taken the wrong road, but at any rate he has taken it, and clutching at the reins and jogging his elbow is now worse than useless. It can do no good, and it may produce the ruin it is meant to avert. We must, of course, watch events in South Africa, and judge as best we can of the new problems that arise ; but it is clearly best now to say as little as possible about the old controversies. What is wanted is that we should begin as soon as possible to see things in their true pro- portions. Let us try to remember that after all South Africa is only a small portion of the Empire—a dominion far less important than Canada, or Australia, or India— and that its affairs, pending the development of the Government's policy, may very fairly be given a second place in our thoughts. A little less talking about South Africa and its past, present., and future will do nobody any harm.
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