THE AMERICAN NOTE TO GERMANY.
pliESIDENT WILSON has reached the conviction that it is useless to argue with the German casuists. This conviction is written all over the face of his latest Note. We have not often seen trausparent scorn expressed in language so scrupulously civil. Mr. Wilson has had to make his choice between international law and submarines, and he has chosen international law, as we have often expressed our strong belief that lie would dos. When one comes to think of it, a predic- tion to this effect did not require great boldness. It was obvious that Mr. Wilson must declare for international law unless wo were to suppose that lie thought it worth while to look no further than the end of hiti nose and trust to a kind of hand-to-mouth policy merely because it yielded peace for the moment. To Mr. Bryan such a bat-eyed policy seemed good enough, but Mr. Wilson gave an open signal that ho was not of that opinion when ho parted company with Mr. Bryan. From that time it was plain what Mr. Wilson's line would be unless he suddenly abandoned reason in favour of unreason. We are sure that Mr. Wilson not only holds now, but intends to maintain, what may be called the position of a reasoning pacificist. Let us see what this moans. Mr. Wilson earnestly desires peace, and would stretch many points to save his country from war ; but he recognizes that after all international security depends upon the inviolability of the pledges which one nation makes to another. That is for him the whole foundation of peace among nations. A nation may be deterred, of course, from breaking the peace by fear of a stronger neighbour, but that is not a means of preserving peace with which Mr. Wilson has ever had any traffic. He holds by law, and law only. You make a promise to another nation, or it may be to all the other nations, that you will not do a particular thing, and at once, if the nations trust you, they are able to say to themselves : " We need no longer build ships and pile up munitions to guard against that particular danger, because it has been removed from the list of things that can happen." Inter- national peace has been reared for us all in this way on a foundation—incomplete, of course, but still a very real thing—of mutual trust. Destroy, or even adulterate, the quality of this trust and all sense of security goes with it. In the world of Mr. Wilson's visions the system of inter- national pledges would be continually extended until it became the foundation of a universal and unbreakable peace. We do not ourselves count upon such a happy possibility, but then we have had to reconcile ourselves to being regarded by many pacificists as wanton and blood- thirsty persons. It is evident, however, that to a man of Mr. Wilson's ideals and dreams the sense of security arising out of mutual trust is even more important than it is to us. It is very much to us ; it is everything to him. Without it the possibility of bringing the world to the condition of permanent peace which all sane people long for vanishes. It. is as though a delicately built ant- heap were crushed into a shapeless mass by a clumsy foot. The building has to begin all over again. From this point of view it is a matter of vital importance for Mr. Wilson to say to Germany in effect : " I cannot consent to your proposal that I should become an accomplice in the process of whittling down the meaning of international pledges. Everything in the world depends upon their being observed in the fullest sense of the spirit and the letter. On this ground I stand, and on no other. The world as I see it would become chaos if I agreed that the sense of security can be destroyed because it suits your purpose for the moment. Rather than see it destroyed I will fight to maintain it." No doubt it still seems paradoxical and perverse to Mr. Bryan and his friends that any pacificist should be found willing to talk of war in any circumstances whatever. But to a reasoning. pacificist it is no paradox at all. His need to be firm at whatevercost is greater than that of almost any other man.
Mr. Wilson, therefore, because he is a reasoning pacificist, has used in his fresh warning to Germany that grave phrase of diplomacy, "an unfriendly act," which has always been understood to mean that if the warning be disregarded relations will be broken off. At the time of the Fashoda incident, " unfriendly act " was the phrase which the British Government used in .prohibiting the further advance of Colonel Marchand. No one doubted that if the warning had not been acted upon war would have followed. Mr. Wilson says that the American Government has found the last Gorman Note " most unsatisfactory." Instead of meeting the real differences between the two Governments, and indicating some way in which the principles of humanity may be observed in submarine warfare, it "proposes, on the contrary, arrange- ments for the partial suspension of those principles." Mr. Wilson points out that whatever may be said about the blockade enforced by British ships is irrelevant to the discussion between Germany and the United States as to what the United States regards as " grave and unjustifiable violations " of the rights of her citizens. " if a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy with- out injuring the lives of neutrals as well as their property, humanity as well as justice and due regard for the dignity of neutral Powers should dictate that the practice be dis- continued. If persisted in it would in such circumstances constitute an unpardonable offence against the sovereignty of the neutral nation affected." Although the American Government is not unmindful of the necessarily changed aspects of naval warfare under the new conditions, " it cannot consent to abate any essential or fundamental rights of its people. . . The rights of neutrals in time of war are based on principles, not upon expediency, and principles are immutable."
A curious passage follows, in which Mr. Wilson argues that it is not impossible, " as the events of the past two months have clearly indicated," to conduct German sub- marine activities "in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare." Those words have puzzled many English readers, who could not understand to what modifications in German methods they referred. It has since been explained that they referred to statements made in German wireless messages to the effect that neutral ships sunk by German submarines had been warned, and that the safety of the crews had been pro- vided for. Mr. Wilson next expresses his belief that the German Government will no longer refrain from " dis- avowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the Lusitania ' or offering reparation for the American lives lost." As for the German proposal that certain passenger vessels should, by arrangement between the two countries, be exempt from attack, Mr. Wilson—here speaks the true reasoning pacificist—points out that such an arrangement would by implication sanction illegal attacks on other vessels, and that it is therefore out of the question for the United States to consider it. Mr. Wilson passes on to turn the phrase "freedom of the seas," which is the fashionable cant with the German rulers, against the whole German theory of submarine warfare. Freedom of the seas—security of life for all non-combatants—is the very thing for which the United States Government contends. It " will continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter it is violated, without compromise and at any cost." Mr. Wilson ends with this solemn warning : " This is a critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it [the American Government] to say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States when they affect American citizens as deliberately unfriendly."
The first, and indeed the only, thing which needs to be said in indicating the bearing of this Note on the future of the war is that German submarine methods cannot possibly continue on their past lines without sooner or later sacri- ficing another American life. The German submarines could no doubt continue, on a small scale, to sink merchantmen bringing supplies to Britain if they made full inquiries as to the nationality of the crews, and pro- vided for their safety by towing them in their boats to somewhere near the land. Such precautions have been taken in two or three cases during the last few days. But they could not continue their warfare on anything but a small scale. The sacrifice of non-combatant lives is inherent iu the German plan as hitherto practised. If the Germans go on torpedoing and shelling merchantmen, they are certain to kill an American sailor before the year is out. Even if they give a crew time to take to their boats with provisions and water, one of those boats will be lost in heavy weather before being picked up or reaching the laud. A diabolical Method cannot go on without fatal results. The question, then, is whether the Germans will choose American friendship or a continuance of their submarine warfare. We have little doubt that they will choose the latter. If they do not; they will have to give up every shadow of hope of paralysing British trade. In the dispute between the German Foreign Office and Grand Admiral von Tirpitz the sailor seems to have won, at least to the extent of continuing to do what he pleases at sea. But if he is determined, so are the American people. They are heart and soul with their President. All the German intriguing is seen to have achieved no more than a few scratches on the surface. When there is a crisis to face oven the Americans of German origin are apt, wo suspect, to forget their hyphens. Most of them will be simply Americans. We do not by any means assume that the United States will be forced into war with Germany, but we are certain that if such a thing should, after all, happen, the talk of civil war in America would turn out to be moonshine. The moral help which the United States gives us now is difficult to appraise in exact terms, but we hold it to be of enormous value. And if the worst came to the worst, and Mr. Wilson could save the basis of peace only by fighting for it, the material value of American help would also be enormous. It is difficult to understand the point of view of those who say that the United States could do little against Germany. She could apply conunercial pressure at once. She could do it by simply breaking off relations. If she went further, of course she would want a considerable time to make ready, to improvise, or to create, but with her immense wealth and vast population she could ultimately put the possibility of a German victory—with all the evils for the world of free and civilized men that it entails—entirely out of the question.
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