The War Surveyed
RUSSIA'S ACHIEVEMENT
By STRATEGICUS
ALTHOUGH they are fighting with undiminished stubborn- ness, no one can fail to see how grave is the position of Russia's heroic armies. When this is thoroughly realised, it is possible to recognise something of the greatness of their achieve- ment. It is the nineteenth week of the campaign, and into it Hitler has thrown all his ruthless determination. He has shut his mind to the immensity of the casualties his army has suffered and the great exhaustion prevalent among them, and has per- suaded or compelled a group of other nations to shoulder a considerable part of the burden of the offensive. With such a spirit and such resources he has gone from one success to another. He has dealt the heaviest blows upon the Russian armies ; and from a surface point of view there may be some justification for his propagandists proclaiming that all is over.
But in our concentration upon the remarkable successes of the German army we tend to ignore the even more remarkable achievement of our ally. Clausewitz maintained that the defen- sive is the stronger form of war ; but the soundness of the thesis can hardly be sustained in an era which, to the general advantages of the possession of the strategic initiative, adds the ascendancy of the tactical offensive. It will be seen that Germany has secured all her successes by the offensive, that what Russia has lost she has lost by the strategic defensive. Indeed, if she had not infused into it a notable measure of energy as well as skill, she could hardly have retained the morale that has kept her armies in being. At the present moment, when the climax of the "gigantic" attack which began on October and is developing, when it is so easy to see the peril of her position, it is clear that Germany's further success may exact a damaging price. At Kalinin, the most northerly point of the immediate threat to Moscow, the Germans are still fighting where they were a fort- night ago. Even the two towns that lie nearest to Moscow have figured in the communiqués for the same period. The spearhead of the advance may be only forty miles from the capital ; but it was there a week ago, and spearheads may be broken off.
After nineteen weeks of fighting against the strongest army the world has ever seen, on a strategy that in the present circum- stances is the weaker, is it not a great achievement that such should be the condition of affairs before Moscow? It may be admitted that on this sector of the front there are many good defensive centres and strong defensive works ; but experience has shown us that the only men who benefit by defences are those who do not rely upon them. The position of Moscow has deteriorated; but what a time and price it has exacted.
It is in the south, however, that the position looks most critical. The Donetz basin is being overrun. There has been a penetration of the defences on the neck of land that joins the Crimea to the mainland. Kharkov has fallen, and the Germans are within ten miles of Rostov on the Don. The mere recital of these facts gives no clear impression of where the crisis lies. As soon as the enemy reached the neighbourhood of Kharkov its usefulness had passed. While the advance in the Donetz basin continues, its value has ceased to exist to all intents and purposes. It is not, in fact, the threat to this most important area that is now to be considered. The position has moved beyond such considerations. It is the question of the ability of the Russian armies to continue their fighting retreat that matters most ; and all that we can see is the same stubborn resistance, the same fierce counter-attacks and the same will to fight on. Marshal Timoshenko may have gone to the southern front in the nick of time to prevent another breakdown. But this front has seen several partial breakdowns and yet recovered.
The peril, as it concerns Russia and us, lies in the failure to halt the enemy advance. While it continues he has the choice of several directions in which he may exploit his present suc- cesses. He may strike towards the north, towards the rear of the central armies; or he may strike east or south. His imme- diate objective in any case is Rostov and the lower Don. To strike towards the north he would require a flank position; and the lower Don would supply it. At present he has not secured that position; but, if he should, he has the choice of the three directions in which to build upon his success; and all of them imply deadly threats to the Russian army. The first would aim at the disruption of the Moscow group of armies. The eastward and southward thrusts would threaten to cut the lines of corn-
munication between Russia and ourselves. Whether he struck towards the Caspian or towards the Caucasus, he would equally cut the Allied communications and stop, or gravely diminish, the supplies that must flow along them.
These alternatives have no doubt been considered. Russia might find a new line of resistance for the winter along the lower Don to the Don-Volga Canal and then along that river. She may *yet hold the Donetz and Moscow. If we speculate upon the more depressing possibilities it is because they lie in the foreground now, and whether they will take actual shape depends upon considerations that lie beyond our knowledge. Each of the alternatives involves sacrifices; but at all costs we may be sure Russia will resist the choice which Yugoslavia made of allowing herself to be cut off from her ally. If that fate should befall her in spite of her efforts, the Middle East campaign will at once take shape and we shall be involved in heavy fighting. But whether it should or should not develop earlier than we have been led to expect, it is better to judge the position according to reliable military standards. The position looks dark. Emotion is the worst of all counsellors. Truth and realism demand that we should judge the position with the same detachment with which a doctor approaches his case.
Clausewitz lays down the aims of an army as follows : (t) "To reduce the enemy's military power to such an extent that he is unable to prosecute the war "; and (2) " To conquer shis country so that a new military force may not be formed."
.(3) " But even if these two things be accomplished the war cannot be considered at an end until the will of the enemy be subdued."
If the war be judged by these criteria it can be seen that what has happened so far, grievous and distressing as it is, has only touched the fringe of the purposes which Hitler formed in launch- ing it. The Russian power of prosecuting the war is " reduced " indeed, but not in the sense that Clausewitz used the word. Voroshilov and Budenny are busy behind the front organising fresh armies; and the number of these is certainly as great as thosa which have already played their part in reducing the German army. It is limited only by the equipment that can be found for them; and this includes not only small arms, but tanks and aeroplanes, heavy and light artillery, and anti-aircraft guns. Germany is not herself supplying the war-material she needs; she is depending upon the nations she has temporarily enslaved to do that. Russia is not in worse plight in having to depend henceforth upon Britain and the United States. The one crucial difference between Germany and Russia in this respect is that the arteries along which the fresh supplies run are more secure on one side than on the other.
Is the second aim any nearer fulfilment? Germany has covered immense distances already, and her immediate objec- tives involve further marches. But the conquest of Russia, in the sense indicated, is beyond her power. Communications can be stretched; but even they have a coefficient of elasticity beyond which the breaking-strain is reached. Is the third point reached? Is the will of Russia broken? There is no sign of that at present. In spite, then, of Dietrich's claim that the deci- sion has been achieved, the end is still far off. By the tests of their own military teacher there is no sign of it yet; and surely it is a great achievement that Russia can say that, after so pro- longed and massive an offensive, which she has chosen to fight on a wasting strategy. She entered the war with an approxi- mately equal number of tanks and aeroplanes, but with immensely greater reserves. If she had used them to strike with all her force at the flanks she has been so frequently offered, it is in- credible she would be in her present position today. Even now apparently the Germans are moving Finns from the North and Rumanians from the south to strengthen the momentum of the attack upon Moscow. They must be giving opportunities for disturbing counter-attacks in many directions. It may be that the time has passed when they could safely be launched. Recognising the handicaps her strategy has laboured under, it is impossible to ignore the nature of her achievement generally; and it must always appear remarkable. Bearing this in mind, it seems difficult to place a limit to what she may yet achieve.
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