' RAWLINSON'S ORIENTAL ESSAYS.*
SIR HENRY RAWLINSON, whose competence as a witness on the subject none will dispute, has acted with judgment in republishing certain essays on Central Asia, adding thereto original papers which round off the theme, and styling the collection England and Russia in the East. Three dissertations which have been printed heretofore and three which are fresh make up a volume abounding in really useful political instruction, upon points of great present and in all probability still greater future interest. The style in which they are written is always clear, bright, and frequently vigorous, while boldness of idea and moderation of statement are so blended as to suggest the diplomatist not less than the soldier- political. Evidently, however, some apprehension that his writings would be regarded as having an official stamp has weighed a little with Sir Henry, and on one or two points has possibly restrained his pen. We find him out- spoken, indeed, but, considering how much knowledge and experience he possesses, it is allowable to infer that he might have said a great deal more had he not felt some embarrassment inseparable from his relations to the governing world. And
• England and Russia in the East : a Seriesof Papers on Me Political mid Geographical
Condition of Central Asia. By Major-Cenral Sir Henry Rawlinson, Ac. With Map. John Murray. although he has shown a discreet reticence, and speaks only after' weighing and measuring his language, the ordinary reader will probably find that he has been sufficiently daring in suggesting a line of policy towards Russia likely to shock the sentimentalistst•
who, in Imperial politics, lack the grit which characterised their forefathers. Be that as it may, the pages under notice contain vast stores of information, lighted up by real thought, which, if they are read and digested, will help to give a firm and defined shape to a public opinion at present little more than the exponent of a fiery instinct, easily excited when, at any point, the integrity
of the Empire is threatened. So far as the secular rivalry of RUBSill, in the Orient is concerned, England needs only some such
steadying ballast as Sir Henry supplies to give its boundless and spontaneous energy a right direction. What is Russia doing east of the Black Sea and south of the old Siberian lines?
is not the only question to be answered. We want to know the motive and object which have induced the heirs of Peter to threaten every Asiatic power from the Levant to the Pacific Ocean, but most of all to challenge English rule and influence. Sir Henry Rawlinson's essays will furnish more information on these points than any other- work with which we are acquainted, and should be read by all who desire to form sound opinions on a subject certain to be politically all-absorbing to the present or the next generation. In all respects save one the volume fulfils th?
purpose of the author, who "intended " it to be " a sort of manual
for students of the Eastern question." One more essay, indeed; is needed to complete the survey,—a careful estimate showing the probable and possible effects of Russian conquests in Central Asia
upon the future of Turkey in Europe and the fate of Constan- tinople. Is not the absorption of the Khanates, to be followed of course by the seizure of Khorassan, designed as a gigantic diver- sion, the aim of which is, by menacing India and the Persian Gulf, to attract British power eastward, and consequently weaken the force available for offensive operations in the Black Sea, and on the shores of the Bosphorus ? In brief, is not the aggres- sive policy of Russia in Central Asia intended to support a two- fold objective,—facilitate the partition of Turkey, and strike at English communications with India and the further East? It is a question of political and military dynamics ; and whatever line he might have taken, the views of Sir Henry Rawlinson thereupon would have been most welcome.
Apart from the omission which we have pointed out, the volume gives effect to its author's intention, and may be fairly regarded as a Manual for students on the Eastern question. The field covered is extensive and well cultivated. Sir Henry opens with an essay first published in the Calcutta Review so long ago as 1849; descriptive of our political relations with Persia, characterised, indeed, in the preface as " the only corrected summary that has ever been drawn up " on that subject ; and it is supplemented by a second essay composed expressly as a continuation, bringing the series of events down to the present time. These are valuable contri- butions to somewhat obscure passages in recent and contemporary history, some interest in which, perhaps, may havebeen awakened by the visit of the Shah. It is only the general reader who needs to be reminded that Persia, " placed geographically midway between Europe and India, can hardly fail to play an important part in the future history of the East." If we remember that a compara- tively narrow strip of territory separates the Caspian from the Persian Gulf, we shall see one strong reason why Persia should attract attention disproportioned to the space she occupies on the map and her place in the scale of nations. Sir Henry is of opinion that Russia could not conquer Persia, which may be true ; but master of the Caspian provinces and of Khorassan, she would exert an influence which would reach the Gulf on one side and the Indus on the other, and the stress of her presence would soon be felt in Scinde and the Euphrates valley. Unless Russia aims at establishing a powerful position south of the Gurgen and the Caspian, her exertions on the Jaxartes and Oxus must be held to represent merely an objectless thirst for territorial expansion. Credulity or good-nature may accept that explanation, but it does not accord with the proved astuteness and tenacity which have governed Russian policy for more than a century. Assuming, as we have a right to do, that the Court, or rather Cabinet, of St.
Petersburg is not beating the air for sport, nor the victim, as we are sometimes told, of that military ambition supposed to inflame all Governors of Turkestan, the systematic campaigns which suc- ceed each other have their origin in a purpose, settled as to its outlines, but depending upon opportunity for filling-up. That purpose is plainly the complete mastery of the Steppe as far as the Afghan frontier, preparatory to a sudden occupation of Khorassan or a dash on Herat, priority being decided by circumstances ; in other words, by the exigencies of Russian policy in Western Europe, and the embarrassments which may befall England in the East. We cannot imagine that British statesmen, either at home or in India, are blind to the obvious scope of Russian designs, since they are plainly written on the map, and illustrated by an eloquent commentary, so abundantly supplied in the shape of con- secutive military actions which falsify, at every step, the diplo- matic utterances issued from the Foreign Office on the Neva. It must be an accepted axiom in Downing Street, that the high-moral talk about promoting commerce and extending civilisation belongs to the strategics of statesmanship, and is merely used, very often with success, to cover the gradual acquisition of physical advantages which would place Russia in a position whence she could inflict the greatest and suffer the least damage in a war with England. International good manners, we suppose, require a continuance of relations which consist mainly in an exchange of hollow professions, varied by glaring breaches of faith, against polite and timid protests ; but the country should understand that beneath the shining veneer of a high-flying morality, inlaid with affectations of friendship, Russia has, ever since the Crimean war, engaged in a series of costly enterprises with the direct purpose of injuring British Imperial interests. We did not plant our garrisons beyond the Indus in order to take up a strategical position against the Russian Empire, but Russia went out of her way to occupy the Oxus and the Attrek expressly to conquer a strategical position against India. She had a full right, of course, to enter on a policy of hostility ; we also have a right to call the policy by its exact name, and as in duty bound, to oppose action, at once aggressive and offensive, by every available means in our power.
Four chapters in Sir Henry Rawlinson's volume are occupied in narrating the history of recent years, so far as Russian progress, Afghan revolutions, and Indian policy are concerned, and in suggesting counter-measures. Two of them, one entirely geogra- phical, were published in the Quarterly Review, and attracted deserved attention when they originally appeared. They are en- riched by valuable notes, bringing the facts up to date, and correcting erroneous judgments. The other two consist, one of the amplified drafts of a speech, which we regret that Sir Henry did not deliver in Parliament in 1868; and the other, of a disser- tation on "the later phases of the Central-Asian question," dating from the time of Lord Mayo's famous interview with Shere All at Umballa in 1869, and following the swiftly-developing drama to the present hour, when it is quite obvious that Russia is pre- paring her eagles for a flight as far as Merv. Sir Henry Rawlin- son's remedy is the oft-suggested occupation of Western Afghani- stan, not "as proprietors," to use the famous phrase of the Emperor Nicolas, but as tenants "Taking it for granted," he writes, that we shall never wait to be attack-ed, in which case the troubles in our rear would probably be more serious than those in front, the next point to consider is how and where we are to meet the enemy. At what point are we prepared to say to Russia, ' Thus far shalt thou go. and no farther 1' Along the northern limits of India and its dependencies Russia has herself drawn a line—the line of the Oxus—which she is bound not to transgress; but this limitation hardly meets the general question, since the road into India from Russia's European base is not from the northward across the Hindii-kesh to Cabul, but from the north-westward by Merv, Herat, and Candahar, and upon this line there has been hitherto no understanding as to a finality of advance ; nor, perhaps, is it advisable that there should be an understanding which would hamper England, but leave Russia free. Without, therefore, making any offensive notification to Russia about the limitation of her advance, and reserving to ourselves the right, in the in- terests of the Afghans, to impede her occupation of Merv, if it seem ad- visable, I submit that we should at any rate make up our own minds that she shall not follow up the Murghab valley from Mery into the Afghtin territory unopposed. In fact the facility of taking Herat by a coup-de-main from Mery is so patent, while the consequences of that movement to British India might be so fatal, that it seems a fair matter for considera- tion whether the Russian occupation of the one city should not be immediately followed by the British occupation of the other."
Should the Ameer acquiesce, of course all difficulties would vanish; if he were hostile, there must be a demonstration against the Khyber. But in either case, 10,000 men would suffice, Sir Henry thinks, for the Herat expedition ; 5,000 at Herat, 3,000 at Candahar, 1,000 at Quetta and Pisheen, while 1,000 were distri- :buted between Ghirishk and Furrah, to connect Candahar and Herat. This is at least a bold measure, and no doubt perfectly practicable, providing the command were not jobbed away, but entrusted to the ablest soldier and statesman available. But it is difficult to see how it could result in other than two things,—the assumption of the virtual suzerainty of Afghanistan and war with Russia. In the game which Russia has initiated, and which she -plays with such striking patience, great stakes must be risked on .botk sides,.and. England is not yet pusillanimous enough or suffi-
ciently corrupted by wealth to recoil from the encounter, cost what it may. The moment of collision may appear to be remote, but it is visible above the political horizon, and hence the impera- tive necessity for cool preparation. Sir Henry Rawlinson's volume and map will help to stiffen as well as educate public opinion, and in publishing it he has done a marked service to his country.
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