GORBACHEV'S GAMBLE
Bohdan Nahaylo suggests why
Mr Gorbachev was driven to release Dr Sakharov
WHAT is happening in the Soviet Union? Less than a month ago, when the promin- ent dissident Anatoly Marchenko died in prison, Soviet spokesmen were callous and unforthcoming. On 10 December, the Soviet authorities again prevented dissen- ters from holding their traditional vigil in Pushkin Square to observe International Human Rights Day. On the same day, at a rare press conference in Moscow on human rights, a panel of high-ranking officials gave glib, evasive answers to questions from foreign journalists. And yet, in the same month, the USSR formally proposed holding an international conference on humanitarian issues in Moscow, allowed the dissident poet Irina Ratushinskaya to travel to Britain, and then, to top it all, not only freed the most famous dissident of them all, Dr Andrei Sakharov, from inter- nal exile in Gorki, but also allowed him unrestricted access to the Western media.
Is the return of Dr Sakharov to Moscow a tactical withdrawal on Gorbachev's part or an orderly retreat? Does it signify a genuine change in the Kremlin's human rights policy, a nod in the direction of real liberalisation, or is it just another ploy to refurbish the Soviet Union's tarnished image in the world?
Certainly there are good grounds for scepticism. It was, after all, a deputy foreign minister who announced the news of Sakharov's release to Western journal- ists. The very manner in which, after years of isolation, a telephone was installed in the Sakharovs' apartment and Mr Gor- bachev himself called the couple to tell them that they were free to return to the Soviet capital, suggests a carefully calcu- lated public-relations manoeuvre. Mr Gor- bachev's policy of seeking to defuse the human rights issue in the eyes of the world by disposing of high-profile dissidents such as Anatoly Shcharansky, Yuri Orlov and Irina Ratushinskaya, is one thing, but, as Dr Sakharov has lost no time in pointing out, it is what is still happening to the thousands of anonymous or less well- known Soviet prisoners of conscience that counts.
Up to now, Mr Gorbachev has come over as a stern disciplinarian who is, however, prepared to show greater tolera- tion in some areas if it suits his purpose of modernising the Soviet system. Some idea of his general attitude can be gleaned from an interview which he gave to L'Humanite in February 1986. Echoing Khrushchev's mendacious claim of 30 years ago, Gor- bachev categorically denied that there are any political prisoners in the USSR. 'They do not exist in our country,' he retorted, `just as persecution of citizens for their belief does not exist.' As for the Kremlin's policy towards Soviet Jews, he insisted that `this issue has become part of a frenzied `There'll be big businessmen with vast sums of money making a nightmare of the white cliffs of Dover . . . Anti-Soviet campaign, a veritable psycho- logical war against the USSR.' And Sakharov? Well, he had broken the law, and although he was being punished, the Soviet state was treating him exceedingly leniently.
Despite this seemingly uncompromising political outlook, Mr Gorbachev has nevertheless permitted a freer climate to develop. His emphasis on glasnost or open- ness as a means of exposing corruption, inefficiency and excessive bureaucracy, however limited, has resulted in a reduc- tion of censorship, and has encouraged people to speak out. In particular, Mr Gorbachev has wooed the creative intel- ligentsia, making no secret of the fact that he needs their support for his efforts to `Restructure' Soviet society in the face of opposition from conservative forces. The concessions given to the intellectuals have led to a cultural thaw and have raised expectations.
There have also been signs of ameliora- tion in other spheres. Much has been written in the Soviet press recently about the defects of the legal system and the need to ensure the protection of citizens' rights. In October the Politburo called for a reorganisation of legal bodies and, signifi- cantly, underlined 'the inadmissibility of any attempts by whatever party to interfere in the investigation and trial of specific cases'. There have been indications, too, that the Kremlin wants to improve its handling of some 'humanitarian' questions, as well as a tantalising hint that it may ease restrictions on religious life.
So far, the purpose of these changes has been mitigation, rather than liberalisation. The freeing of Dr Sakharov, though, has given a new twist to this process. After all, Mr Gorbachev may not actually have gone to Canossa, but the symbolism involved in his telephoning Dr Sakharov, and per- mitting the latter to return to Moscow as a hero, almost amounts to the same thing. Even if, as the dissident Russian historian Roy Medvedev suggests, Mr Gorbachev feared that Dr Sakharov might start another hunger strike which could have killed him, surely there were other ways in which the Nobel Peace Prizewinner could have been returned to Moscow. What then has made a Soviet leader, and a singularly forceful one at that, make such an unpre- cedented concession?
The answer may lie in the increasingly difficult situation in which Mr Gorbachev finds himself. Not only has he painted himself into a corner with the 'integral', all- or-nothing arms control package he pre- sented at the Reykjavik summit, and failed to sway Washington with his unliateral moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons, but also, and probably more importantly, at home his efforts to jolt Soviet society out of its long stagnation are meeting with more resistance than he bargained for. Yet, having committed him- self to a 'new course', there is no going back for him. If he lets up now, he becomes a spent and expendable force. The Soviet leader's predicament was candidly described in an interview given on 9 December to the Italian Communist Party daily L'Unita by Yeogor Yakovlev, the editor of Moscow News. Asked about the extent of the resistance to Gorbachev, Yakovlev admitted: `It is difficult to iden- tify a precise social group that derives nothing but benefits from the "restructur- ing".' The worker, he explained, is being told that 'he must work harder and better'. Party and state employees are afraid of losing their 'comfortable jobs' and the `security and stability that they enjoyed before'. Similarly, for the intelligentsia, there is also 'an element of risk and . . . some loss of privileges'. When the inter- viewer asked whether this means that Gorbachev's "New Revolution" is actual- ly supported only by a minority, however active, determined and aware', Yakovlev agreed indirectly by venturing that Gor- vachev's task is made all the more difficult because 'there are many people who do not believe in anything — neither slogans nor appeals. They are tired.' Viewed against this background, the freeing of Dr Sakharov seems more like a calculated risk, if not actually an act of desperation. Blocked at home by strong entrenched forces which probably have their champions even at the highest levels, and his ambitious 'peace initiatives' consi- dered unacceptable by Washington and its West European allies, Mr Gorbachev appears to have embarked on that extra mile to win the trust and backing of the West and of discontented or sceptical elements at home. As Aleksei Glukhov, a diplomat at the Soviet embassy in Paris, told Radio Paris, the Kremlin has released the Sakharovs because it is interested in `appeasing certain elements in our country and therefore in having social justice'. If this is in fact the case, then Mr Gorbachev is playing a dangerous game. His opponents have been given all the more reason to think that he is going too far and should be stopped. By pinning his colours to the mast of reform and mea- sured liberalisation, the Soviet leader is opening Pandora's box even wider. He needs the backing of the country's intellec- tuals and opinion makers to get things moving, yet, as Yakovlev confirmed in his interview, already 'much of what is hap- Pening is the result of a spontaneous action, a reawakening of the intelligentsia made possible by the new conditions'. Whatever the case, there is no doubt that Mr Gorbachev has skilfully usurped the slogans of the Soviet human rights movement when it was at its height with Dr Sakharov at its head: 'openness', 'demo- cratisation' and 'moral revolution'. This in itself makes the present period the most exciting one in Soviet history since Khrush- chev inauguarated the process of de- Stalinisation in the mid-1950s.
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