SPECTATOR'S LIBRARY.

MILITARY STATISTICS,

A Narrative of the March and Operations of the Army of the Indus, in the Expedi• tiou to Afghanistan in the Years 1838-1839. Illustrated by a map, &c. and vari- ous tables. Gan prising also the History of the Dooranee Empire, from its founda- tion to the present time. By Major W. Hough, Author of " Practice of Courts- Martial," &c. &c. Allen and CO

TRAVELS,

Memoranda on France. Italy. and Germany ; with Remarks on Climates. Medical Practice. Mineral Waters, &c• To which is added, an Appendix on some of the predisposing causes of Disease, and on the advantage of Travel and a Residence Abroad. By Edwin Lee, Esq., M.R.C.S., &c. Author of "a Treatise on some Nervous Disorders," &c. Saunders and Otley.

GOSSIP AND CRITICISM,

Music and Manners in France and Germany : a Series of Travelling Sketches of Art and Society. By Henry F. Chorley, Author of "Conti," &c. &c. In three

volumes Longman and Co. Premien, The Fawn of Spring Vale, the Clarionet, and other Tales. By William Carleton, Author of •• Fardorougha the Miser," &c. In three volumes.

Longman and Co.; Curry and Co. Dublias

The Lover and the Husband; The Woman of a Certain Age, Re. Edited by Mrs.

Gore. In three volumes Bentley.

MAJOR SLOUGH'S MARCH AND OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE INDUS.

Tins work would be called by the Duke of WELLINGTON a true book : part of it could be proved true by a reference to records such as muster-rolls and military documents ; other parts of it are extracted from reports of engineers or surveying-officers, or consist of quotations from general orders issued to the army, &c.; and where Major IlouGu speaks from his own observations, his manner is characteristic of the accuracy of the military Major and Judge-Advocate combined. Little is advanced that the gallant author is not in a condition to prove ; and where his statements must rest upon opinion, as in the few descriptions of scenery, es- timates of character, or accounts of the country, we have no doubt that every thing is strictly accurate according to his own percep- tions—he is ready to depose to the best of his belief.

After this, it is superfluous to say that the volume is one chiefly designed for military men, or for such persons as may wish to gain a full idea of the country in order to study its geographical statistics or its means of defence.

But it will not be without use to the military or medical statist, who would see from monthly returns (to such detail does the volume go down) the number of diseases, deaths, and cures that took place during the campaign. And although it cannot be recom- mended to the general reader, the results which it contains are of general interest : for its ample selection of orders and other military documents gives an insipt into the economy of an army on service ; the facts and descriptions, dry as they are, almost de- monstrate the nature of the country, the difficulty of penetrating it, and the all but certainty that any army, no matter what its magni- tude—for the more the men the greater the difficulties—must utterly perish in the mountain-land beyond the Indus' if opposed by a small body of resolute and disciplined troops. The volume also impresses the truth of the general rule which the Duke of WELLINGTON, at an early period of his service in India, deduced from the disastrous retreat of MoNsoN—the first thing we should consider in a military operation is, whether we can feed the army. Of course, some of these points have reference to an overland invasion of India ; and a few facts will illustrate the difficulty of getting an army to India that could stand the remotest chance of protecting itself there, much less of conquering the country. From Sukkur on the Indus to Cabool, was a march of about 700 miles ; and the country for the most part arid and barren, and when cultivated rarely productive enough to supply the wants of an army. Our disposable force was 28,350; of whom about 19,000 actually marched through the celebrated Bolan Pass into Afghanistan—or, in other words, two-thirds only of the army were actively employed when less than 200 miles had been passed over. During the campaign, no fewer than 33,000 animals died ; so that for every two soldiers three animals had to be replaced, independent of those which struggled through the hardships and hunger of the march. From Cabool to Peshawer, (after Shah SHOOJAH was restored,) the army lost 1,300 camels out of 3,100 in a distance of only 193 miles' besides the cattle of officers and others. In one place where a detachment was stationed, the loss of the troops in fifty-seven days, by disease, was 257 men, or nearly one-tenth of the whole division. At Candahar, the cavalry had become useless from the loss among the horses and the weakness of those which survived : had the army been attacked, it must have fought with infantry and artillery only. Every reader of the Duke of WELLINGTON'S account of the failure of the siege of Burgos will remember the importance which he says a "few mules and a few bundles of straw to feed them" may have upon an opera- tion. This was illustrated in a larger way at Candahar. Had Herat been likely to fall to the Persians, the instructions permitted the detachment of troops to its aid, supposing they could be spared. It was practicable to have sent about 4,500 men, but it would have been impossible to have furnished them with means of transporting their baggage-ammunition and food. All this, be it remembered, took place without an enemy that ever ventured to take up a position ; and with the communications in our rear perfectly free except from marauders. The difficulties at Candahar occurred only 400 miles from the Indus, where large magazines were provided ; and with an army under 20,000 men. How, then, could 60,000 men (which is the lowest number calculated to be necessary for an invasion of India) ever hope to reach the centre of Beeloochistan or Afghli.; nistan. It is probably true that the Russian soldiers can habitually shift more than the British or Indo-British; but, whatever be their means of endurance in this way, we may be sure that it is more than counterbalanced by the inferiority in the Commissariat and Paymaster's departments. Our money even served us when pro- visions ran low. At Myhesur, only 150 miles from the Indus, non-combatants were put upon half-rations and half-money. "There being a difficulty in bringing on supplies from the rear, the Comsat Dept. for the present, to issue half-rations to men of the mustered establish- ments; paying compensation in money in lieu of the other half: this order not to affect the troops." A useless sort of thing where there was nothing to buy, but more gratifying to the mind than the "empty purse" with the other concomitant of the song in 1Ifidas. The non-combatants were not, however, long alone on short commons-

" The people of the" Mustered Establishments" had been on half-rations !since the 8th March last, or for the preceding forty-eight days. The Cavy. and H. A. horses had been put on half-rations since the 24th March; so that they had been on reduced rations with scanty forage for thirty-two days. The troops and camp-followers had been on half-rations since the 29th March, and had now been twenty-eight days on these rations, without having much oppor- tunity to purchase grain or obtain any vegetables as a substitute.

• "The Cavy. and H. A. horses had no grain since the 30th March ; so that for the last twenty-six days they were subsisted on such green forage as might he procurable, and often on very bad grass."

The attention shown to what may be called the feelings of people, was not, however, confined to our own troops, but extended to the enemy, and not merely in matters of interest, but of prejudice. Here is an extract from a general order- " Requiring the troops and followers to be careful not to interfere with or insult the prejudices of the people of the country through which the army is about to advance.

"The mosques not to be entered by any one not of the faith of those by whom they have been erected. "The poles and flags by the way-sides are considered sacred by the people, being emblematical of the grave of a ; these are on no account to be removed.

" The surwans and others are to be directed to abstain from cutting fruit- trees for forage for their cattle, or for other purposes; and signal example will be made on the spot of any one who may be detected in the act of committing this offence.

"Caution to European and Native soldiers from interfering, when in the bazaars or villages, with the women of the country; quarrels and loss of life will attend a disregard of this warning. "The substance of the above order to be particularly explained to the troops, and proclaimed by tom-tom throughout the different bazaars and lines of the camp." Equally stringent are the orders when passing through the terri- tory of an ally on the army's return- " While passing through the Punjab and protected Sikh States, all are required to abstain from killing pea-fowl, the neelgby, or the domestic pigeons, or from offending in any way the prejudices of the Sikhs ; and the D. C. G. will prohibit, in the strictest manner, the slaughtering of cattle.".

"Major-General Thackwell and Brigadier Persse will use every means in their power in restraining camp-followers from injuring or trespassing on the cultivation ; and parties under the Provost-Marshal and his assistants must be early on the new ground daily, to place safeguards in the villages and over the corn-fields.

"The Provosts are enjoined to deal strictly with those they may find tres- passing, or committing any act of oppression. "Officers commanding must remind their men that the army is passing through the territory of an ally ; and that as the soldiers of that prince, from not possessing the same degree of discipline of which the British army can boast, may be more ready to enter into quarrels, and to make use of offensive expressions, it will be the duty of all to keep a guard on their temper, and to be careful not to allow themselves to be forced into collision with those whom the Government requires that they shall look upon as friends."

AU this is, no doubt, proper ; and to this strict attention to pe- cuniary obligations, and to the protection of the property and feelings of the invaded people, much of the success of the British army is to be attributed, however unpopular this strictness may be with the army itself. One cannot, however, help inquiring, if such scrupulous care is taken by the Commander-in-chief on service to protect an enemy, why some little protection is not extended by the Commander-in-chief at home to citizens who maintain this army. It is easy enough to see that had the Canterbury or Wind- sor rioters thought fit to play their pranks in Afghanistan, their conduct would not have been passed over so coolly and of-course- like as has been done by the Horse Guards. The character of the celebrated Bolan Pass we described in reviewing Major ODTRAM'S publication ; but this, though the longest, is not the worst mountain-pass; and the country through- out offers positions which, if occupied by ever so small a disci- plined force, could check and in places destroy an invading army by thirst, water being sometimes scarce and frequently bad. In reading the daily narrative of the army's marches, the reader con- tinually wonders how a man of DOST MOHAMED'S ability and acti- vity was so supine as not to beset his enemies in the early part of their career,—attacking their van, harrassing their flanks, and threatening their rear, besides making a stand in the numerous places where numbers would be of no avail ; for though his troops could not perhaps have permanently held any position against the British army, that army must have been con- quered by hunger, or what is still more terrible, by thirst. The true secret of MOHAMED'S neglect, however, is intelligible : like many other monarchs and states, that chieftain seems to have been "hard up." His system somewhat resembled NAPOLEON'S: he was driven to impose heavy taxes in order to maintain his position, which drained the country, excited dissatisfaction, and left him at last without "sinews" to wage war against the British, and with many persons disaffected or tired of his rule.

Instances of the opportunities he lost through want of money, may be found in almost every page of the march ; but we will take an extreme one. THE PASSAGE OF THE 1/03IIIL PASS.

The Cavalry brigade and II. A. (horse artillery) were ordered to march today at one p.m. Thus there were two batteries, and six regiments with their baggage, to move through the Pass, and make a march of eleven miles included in one day's operation! The camel-battery was overtaken by camels and baggage. The Pass only admitted of one camel passing at a time. The ascent was so steep that some did not like to ride up ; nor, for the like reason, to ride down the descent, for this was more difficult still ; some camels fell, and stopped the rest behind. This state of things caused the march of the cavalry and H. A. to be countermanded ; but it was too late, their baggage was in the Pass; and it was clear, as it turned out, that it would take the whole day to cross and pass down the H. A. guns and troops already in the Pass; for each gun, each tumbril, waggon, &c. was to be separately handed down by manual labour. Orders were given to turn back the camels, and make them go by a different route— that by the left. This augmented the confusion ; and the whole became one accumulated mass of troops, guns, and baggage. The ammunition-waggons came into the camp. Troops were ordered back to protect the baggage for the night. The whole of the Commissariat stores were in the Pass.

Fancy troops in this state vigorously attacked by an enemy, or even delayed.

CROSSING BRIDGES OF BOATS, &C.

The great object in crossing a bridge, is to avoid crowding on it, so as to have the whole of the road-way covered at once. Infantry, if in a very close compact order, weigh more than the same space occupied by cavalry; as the spaces between the horses being greater than be- tween men, the weight of cavalry is proportionably less. It is even said that if a given extent of bridge be occupied by a gun, horses, &c., they bear with less weight on it than a close column of infantry. In many cases, cavalry dis- mount if the bridge has a weak road-way or the boats are not strong. Cavalry, therefore, should pass over by single files ; as, if the stream be strong and rushes with violence against the boats, the horses are apt to be frightened. Infantry should generally pass over by threes, or by small sections, with proper intervals between. Camels, &c. should pass over singly ; and if unsteady, their loads must be taken off. If horses are unsteady, and likely to fight by going two abreast, confusion will be created.

THE GOVERNOR AND GUNNER AT GI/BENTE.

Hyder Khan, the Governor, when he heard our first firing from the "fuse attack," went to that quarter; but when he learnt that the British troops were entering the fort, he galloped back to the gateway, where he met some of the Europeans. He had a bayonet run through his kummur-bund, (waist- band,) and one of his attendants had a shot through his turban. At this mo- ment his horse reared, and he was almost falling ; if he had, his life was gone. He recovered himself, and dashed away up to the citadel. He saw the place was lost ; and he resolved to give himself up to the first British officer he saw, fearing the men would kill him. Captains A. W. Taylor and G. A. Macgre- gor passing by, he sent to tell them that he was in the citadel, and ready to give himself up on his life being spared. nyder Khan, the Governor, who is only now about twenty-one years old, did not understand the probable effect which the explosion would produce : his chief gunner, a native of Hindostan, knew that there would be no use for his services any longer, and he escaped from the fort. He afterwards came in to us, and said, having served in forts attacked by the British in India, that "as soon as I heard the explosion, I knew the gate was blown open, and that you would storm the fort and take it without escalade ; and I thought it time to be off."

HOST MOHAMED AND HIS CHIEFS.

Dost Mohamed, it is reported, had assembled his chiefs, and had declared his conviction that Ghuznee had fallen through treachery. He then asked them as to their intentions, and begged those who did not intend to support him to withdraw at once. They all replied, that they were true to his cause, and would support him against the British ; but could not help suspecting an intention on his part to desert them. They said, "Let us ask you, if yea will stick by us ? "

WANT OF WATER.

When the Cavalry (Bengal) came up, not finding water immediately, the Brigadier asked for and obtained leave to go in advance to seek for some. We had marched twelve, and he marched ten miles further, before he found water at the Doree River, which lay to the left of our road. They procured plenty of water and forage, but not till both men and horses had suffered dread- fully; fifty or sixty horses fell down on the road and died. The Lancers were

obliged to dismount, and to goad on their horses with their lances. • • Those who were present describe the scene as most appalling. The moment the horses saw the water, they made a sudden rush into the river as if mad : both men and horses drank till they nearly burst themselves. Officers declare that their tongues cleaved to the roofs of their mouths : the water was very brackish, which induced them to drink the more. The river was three feet deep, and more in some places ; and was five or six miles off the proper road. Many dogs and other animals died. No officer present ever witnessed such a scene of distress.

Besides these points of a purely warlike kind, there are many others of a more general interest, though still bearing upon war. For example—