Horus in the evening
Desmond Stewart
Cairo No nation on the planet can boast a more majestic symbol than Egypt's Sphinx. The `Horus in the evening' of the Pharaohs, mistranslated by the Arabs Abul Hol, Father of Terror, is benign, unlike the breasted creature whom Oedipus worsted. He approaches his five-thousandth birthday, due in some centuries, remarkably intact: he still has his wig, his tail and much of his ruddy complexion. He has however had his crises. The tablet between his paws records how an eighteenth dynasty prince, taking a siesta afrer hunting, dreamt that the nearby Sphinx implored him to clear the sand which, as in Napoleon's day, encumbered his body. The prince obeyed and later became Pharaoh.
Guardian of the Necropoles sacred to Osiris, the Sphinx guards his own atmosphere, dwarfing the son et lumiere cables in front and the huddle of temporary structures run up for dubious pleasures on the ridge behind. When I visited him last Sunday night his enigmatic smile seemed appropriate. The Egyptian government had that day announced the cancellation of a proposal which threatened to use him and the Pyramids as a backdrop to a suburb for the very rich built round an ankh-shaped golfcourse. The professor, Mr. Peter Munk, had meant 'to take a little water and a little shit and make an oasis of green where there's only been sand for five thousand years, to create a golf course where every plane from Europe to the Middle East or Africa has to pass over and look down ... ' To match this assault on the numinous one might just as well propose a cruciform night-club to stand in the shadow of Calvary.
1974 was a well chosen year in which to request the Pyramids Oasis. concession. Many Egyptians then believed that their army's performance in crossing the Canal would induce the Americans to impose a just peace on the harassed region. There was a mood of try-anything-Western, from importing a replica of Disneyland to allowing an American-trained kangaroo to dance on a trampoline atop the Great Pyramid. Euphoria as well as the pressure of work could explain President Sadat's signature to Republican decrees overhauling conservationist laws. And the optimism which was to reach its climax with Sadat's journey to Jerusalem postponed any public scrutiny of his decision.
But after the failure of the Christmas peace meeting, and the continued inability of the 'open door' policy to solve the economic problems of ordinary Egyptians, the Pyramids Oasis Scheme became a natural focus for attack. The campaign against the scheme was led by a woman academic, Neamat Ahmed Fuad, who published a book at her own expense and called public meetings. Her allies came from every political direction. It was no surprise to find Dr Louis Awad, former literary editor of Al-Ahram and recent adherent of the new Wafd, opposing the project. He shared the Coptic reverence for the Pharaonic heritage and as that rare phenomenon, an Egyptian who chooses to live in the country, he passed the work in progress on his way to the Fayum. Some opponents feared that the lake which was part of the project might cause pyramidal subsidence or that bulldozers might obliterate undiscovered tombs. A stronger criticism was social. That in a city of the nine millions, where the
young cannot afford to marry for lack of apartments, it was dangerously provocative to encourage film stars and Saudi princes to live in a Caribbean juxtaposition of luxury and slum. The Kolwezi episode, where the presence of foreigners justified outside
intervention, reinforced the argument that the settlement west of the Nile was as
dangerous as the existence of Israel's set tlements in Sinai. Those ignorant of Egypt's nineteenth century might find this para noiac, but Khedive Ismail's gloomy prediction that the Canal would end up owning Egypt had proved largely correct.
Sadat, while attacking critics of the scheme, had nevertheless referred the matter earlier this month to his prime minister, who appointed a Committee of experts. Sadat's acceptance of their negative con; elusion showed his awareness that public opinion 4'as virtually unanimous in its opposition to the scheme. Yet his critics could argue that it also showed the unwisdom of his announced decision to establish an inquisition into those journalists and politicians whose criticisms had irked him. Yet it is not every politician who prefers to be right late rather than to persist in error and Sadat deserves credit for his decision. In its desperate last public relations counter-attack the company behind the scheme quoted a BBC correspondent as saying that 'if the Egyptian Government gave way to opposition demands, it would have serious implications for them in their attempts to attract Western investment.' This argument is unconvincing. The kind of investment which this scheme represented is of dubious benefit to the Egyptian economy. The sums invested were tiny compared to the intended profit, which largely depended on the Egyptian gift of ten thousand acres. Nor would it have cemented friendly relations. The expatriates playing golf on the western fringe of Cairo have fretted at inadequate public services, while their use of these would have inspired resentment among Egyptians, even if a few work as caddies or nannies.
The abrupt termination of a contract of four years' standing — with the bill for compensation likely to be large —floodlights two problems facing Sadat's regime. At a time when critics are being muzzled, the episode shows the need for more criticism rather than less, so thal mistakes are rectified sooner not later. It also illuminates the failure so far of the new economic policy.
Nasser's much attacked relationship with the USSR did at least result in the acquls"
ititin of a large number of productive enter prises which, even if they operated inefficiently, employed many workers and
acted as an industrial university. The major problem which Egypt now faces is how to secure this productive form of investment from its new friends. Or perhaps it should
be put the other way round: this is the prOlY lem which the West and the rich Arabs must
solve if they do not want to see the Arab world's most influential nation collapse into chaos.
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