Political Realism ?
IN polities as in literature, genuine realism is a difficult achievement. To commit indiscretions which shock Mrs. Grundy, to emphasize disagreeable realities which senti- mental idealists ignore—such types of sincerity are easy enough.. But to face all the relevant facts and to see them in their true proportions, that is desperately hard.. Few realists establish their right to the title they claim.
. In Moral Man and Immoral Society*, Professor Reinhold Niebuhr offers us a study in political realism. The founda- tion of such realism is the recognition of the necessity and inevitability of social struggle. Groups, classes, nations cannot be expected to act on the same moral level as indi- viduals, since inertia, selfishness, egotism cannot be eradicated from collective units of humanity. Privilege is never surrendered, except to pressure. Power in a privileged group must always be met and matched by the power of an opposing group. The social revolutions demanded by justice can never be secured except by some form of coercion. To shut one's eyes to this necessity of conflict is to live in a fool's paradise. The influences of morality, whether rational or religious, are not to be denied. In individuals, ignorance can be enlightened by education, selfish inertia may be diminished by religious enthusiasm. But when we turn to inter-group relations, we are faced with situations in which force of some kind or other is the only remedy.
The social ideal which Dr. Niebuhr embraces is the equalitarian ideal of the disinherited workers. To realize social and economic equality, it is necessary to destroy "the kind of power which cannot be made socially responsible— the power which resides in economic ownership for instance." It is sheer folly to suppose that the groups who at present poSsess economic power—bankers and financiers, business magnates and investors—will surrender it or share it without a struggle'.
At the same time, Dr. Niebuhr is far from being a believer in blind force. Once granted that sonic form of coercion is necessary, those methods of coercion arc to be preferred " which do justice to the moral resources and poSSibilities in human nature and provide for the exploitation of every latent moral capacity in man." So Gandhi is to be preferred to Lenin. Dr. Niebuhr says, quite justly, that Gandhi's method is a method of coercion. It is net non-resistance but non-violent resistance, and the two should not be con- fused. But non-violent methods possess a higher moral quality than methods of violence, and do less injury to the moral fibre of society. If then redress for wrongs can be 'scented' in this way, violent revolutions are mistaken and wrong. Dr. Niebuhr commends Gandhi's example to the negroes in the United States. , He does not apparently regard either Gandhi or Lenin as the true model for Labour, whether in America or In Western Europe. He advises Labour to work 'as far as possible through democratic forms, always remembering that the intransigence of the privileged may compel resort to the exercise of more drastic powers. But his wain insistence is on the dangers of middle-class sentimentalism. Because the bourgeois is comparatively comfortable, he declines to face the necessity of a surgical operation. Sociologists and religious leaders alike put their 'faith in a sweet reasonableness, which is too slow to effect radical change. The incurable romanticism, shallow optimism and hypocritical evasions of middle-class political philosophies are Dr. Niebuhr's especial bugbears.
His hard-hitting exposure of the weaknesses of middle-class political opinion is timely and should be widely read. The
• Moral Man and Immoral Society. By Reinhold Niebuhr. (Scribners. 10s. 6d.) romantic optimism, so severely handled, may be more prevalent in America than in England, but the limitations challenged by this book are characteristic of the bourgeois mentality in every land. Yet a bourgeois reviewer, while accepting Dr. Niebuhr's chastisement as an excellent oil, may question whether the author's realism is realistic enough. The book is marked, for example, by a steady disparagement of the influence of the appeal to reason and moral principle in the conduct of nations, which is not true to history. Thus, he assures us that idealists in the past have not been strong enough to affect the actions of nations and have had to be content with disassociating themselves from their nations in times of crisis. This is not the whole truth. John Bright, for example, could not prevent the Crimean War, but his courageous stand did much to prick the bubble of Palmerston's blustering foreign policy, and helped to keep England out of continental wars for thirty years. " The British Liberals could not prevent the Boer War." True, but they could and did, under Campbell-Bannerman, make a more generous settlement at its close, and Dr. Niebuhr does not mention this. Contemporary events are notoriously difficult to estimate, but Dr. Niebuhr's judgements do not always inspire confidence. He sees in the election of 1901 proof that " the middle-class will inevitably turn against socialism in a crisis when national patriotism is arrayed against the policy of the working-class." But in 1981, Labour had no policy, and middle-class sympathizers turned from Labour because through inexperience the party was useless at a crisis. The antagonism to socialism, at least, in England, is not as deep as Dr. Niebuhr supposes.
, Dr. Niebuhr's belief in the inevitability of social struggle is in part determined by his adoption of equalitarian per- spectives. He nowhere argues the case for the communist ideal : he assumes it. To establish the validity of the equalitarian ideal, it is not enough to demonstrate the inde- fensible character of existing inequalities. Dr. Niebuhr admits that there are elements of exaggeration and illusion in Mandan equalitarianism, but he thinks these elements are necessary to inspire the right revolutionary fervour. Revolutionary fervour involves illusion. But - he fails to note that once we are conscious of the element of illusion, we cannot respond to it ourselves, and to foster a vital lie in others is to be guilty of intellectual dishonesty.
Another serious doubt arises when one, observes that the necessity for coercion once granted, the choice of methods of coercion is a question of expediency. Mr. W. B. Yeats records a fine saying of an Irish patriot, " There are things a man may not do for his country." Some forms of coercion are definitely wrong in all circumstances, torture for example, and political assassination. Dr. Niebuhr does not appear to recognize any such absolute moral limitations to coercion, But the fact that international morality is on a lower level than individual morality and perhaps must always be so, is no reason for denying either the existence of international morality or the necessity and possibility of steadily raising the international moral code.
In the end, Dr. Niebuhr leaves us perplexed and unguided. If we grant that moral and rational forces arc at present as ineffectual as he supposes, what ought we to do about it ? Are we to take existing limitations as final ? Is that a genuine realism, or merely a mood of disillusion as the author himself seems to admit in his preface ? A thorough- going realist...would class religious and moral factors among the imponderables. The fact of social struggle means that men of good will must redouble their efforts, not lose faith
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