Security in Moscow
The Foot in the Door
By J. V. DAVIDSON-HOUSTON*
A WESTERN embassy behind the Iron Curtain is an island of freedom in a sea of suspicion. Despite all that is said about the comparative 'liberality' of the Khrushchev regime, and the denunciation of Stalin's methods in other coun- tries of the Soviet bloc, unrestricted intercourse between foreigners and natives is still impossible, and social contacts never develop without official sanction on the Communist side. Moreover, Communist States are pyramids of privilege, and diplomatic missions are able to maintain a reasonable standard of living only by virtue of special treatment by the authorities. In the Soviet Union, for example, the Bureau for Servicing Foreigners (Burobin for short) is the sole means by .which servants, accommodation, petrol, theatre tickets and palatable food can be ob- tained: such things are reserved for foreigners and for the higher grades of the hierarchy. It thus came about that the British Embassy In Moscow, where I served as Military Attaché during the development of the Vassall plot, em- ployed a Soviet citizen in its Administrative Office as an indispensable link with Burobin and other Russian authorities. This man, like all other native employees, such as chauffeurs, tele- phonists, cooks, maids and porters, was supplied bY•the State as the sole purveyor of labour. It was generally recognised throughout the Diplo- matic Corps that all these people were under the direct control of their government and were bound to report to the proper quarter anything which might be of intelligence value. The calibre of these potential spies of course varied enor- mously, from the housemaid 'straight off the trees' to the chauffeur, who was probably a major in the KGB, but the principle stood.
Thus the danger had been realised for some time, and consideration had also been given to replacing Russian staff by British. This was found to be impracticable, not only on account of the enormous expense which would have been involved, but because it would be impossible to find weekly-paid British workers who could acquire a fluent knowledge of Russian (and the Russian way of doing things) in the normal two- or three-year tour. Instead, warnings were issued from time to time that members of the Embassy staff must report approaches made to them by any Soviet citizen, whether employed by the Embassy or not.
While I was in Moscow we began to appre- ciate that the greatest risk was not eavesdropping, but blackmail. In this respect the main targets of Soviet Intelligence were the junior staff. Lack- ing the longer experience and training of the More senior members, and without the full pro- grammes of official entertaining and travelling which kept the latter out of mischief, their in- dividual morale was a matter of concern. They Were housed in somewhat dreary 'Diplomatic blocks' allotted by the Riissians, and although there was a British and an American club which *Brigadier Davidson-Houston was Military Attache in Moscow during Vassall's service there. made the most of the limited facilities available, there were few of the outside amenities to which they were accustomed at home. Dances and `socials' were organised, there was an Embassy tennis-court, and I used to run Scottish dancing classes whose membership was by no means confined to Caledonians; but all this depended on personal effort, and it was not easy to fill everyone's leisure hours profitably and pleasantly. Nor were all the staff fully protected by diplo- matic immunity.
It was the duty of the Soviet Secret Service to watch these people, discover particular weak- nesses in an individual's character, and seek op- portunities to exploit them. A typical case was that of a young married couple who found that they could sell British-made clothes and other commodities to Russians at several times the cost price, and a ready agent offered himself in the person of the engaging and obliging Mik- hailsky, the Soviet citizen employed in the Embassy's Administrative Office. Such transac- tions, which had been effected for many years to the mutual satisfaction of foreign sojourners and the ill-clad native population, had recently been declared illegal by the Soviet Government; and when the couple had become well involved Mikhailsky began to turn the screw. Fortunately, they judged it beSt to make a full confession to the Ambassador, and were sent home before any further harm could be done. Here lies the difference between their case and that of Vassall.
As the Radcliffe Tribunal has revealed, the Russian Secret Service soon discovered an ex- ploitable weakness in Vassall, whereas in the British Embassy it remained a matter of specu- lation. Perhaps 'trial and error' is the only course which appeals to the empirical British mind in such cases, but the Russians clearly appreciated the importance of their discovery and approached it on systematic lines. From the British side, however, the main question is why Mikhailsky's cultivation of Vassall and several other members of the Embassy, which was duly reported to the acting Head of Chancery, was not properly followed up.
While there can be no excuse, there are several explanations. Vassall's own superior, the Naval Attaché, was absent on duty at the time, and when he returned I was on tour. The Head of Chancery was on leave, and his deputy did not see fit to act on his own responsibility. I once more warned my own staff of the risks attach- ing to social contacts with Soviet citizens, and particularly with Mikhailsky, but for the reasons given similar action was not taken in the case of the other known 'targets.' In other words, the co-ordinating machinery, which had been set up for just such an eventuality as this, failed to work. The failure to get rid of Mikhailsky im- mediately, though regrettable, was of less im- portance, since his successor could have been equally dangerotis; moreover, the long (and probably contrived) delays which occur when a replacement is suddenly demanded from Burobin would have added to the administrative-incon- veniences which beset Moscow embassies even under the most favourable conditions.
Having received an expensive lesson from 'the dirty nurse, Experience,' what steps can we take to guard against further Vassall cases?
In the present state of the world it is no good looking for 'normalisation' of conditions; we are already living in conditions normal to our age. So long as Communist dictatorships remain in power the Cold War will continue, and the attempted penetration of foreign diplomatic and other missions will go on, though the technique may vary from time to time. We cannot take a leaf out of the Communist book by forbidding our unfortunate fellow-countrymen from putting their noses outside the Embassy, or by insisting that they shall never go out unless suitably ac- companied. Life behind the Iron Curtain is scarcely tolerable for many of them as it is. I am convinced, however, that if the existing security instructions are properly understood and carried out by all concerned there should be no danger. The faults revealed by the Vassall case are personal ones,. and can only be remedied by individuals or, if necessary, by action against individuals. Irresponsibility is one of the weak- nesses of modern democracy. Do the qualities of manliness, loyalty and honesty occupy the place they should in the selection of public ser- vants? Are we taking steps to ensure that we get good men, or only clever ones?
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