The Prime Minister and the League
R. BALDWIN more than any other public man has the power of expressing the better' moods of the nation. For thiS reason_ lie is a truly national representative. If we wanted to choose someone to gather up and epitomize current feeling and interpret it to other countries, we ShOuld chOOse' Mr Baldwin without hesitation. Nor deeS his talent stop at inter- pretation for export. Another, and perhaps the most important aspect of his gift, is that he interprets Englishinen to themselves.
If his method was Merely to accept what is current, he would not be distinguishable from the politician who keeps his ear to the ground ; birt Mr. Baldwin's supreme merit is that he can lead his followers on to better thoughts and loftier ideals even while they are 'telling thernselVes that he is"simply saying what they all feel: It 'IrOtild need Defoe's praiie of 'the' balanced mind and the middle way to do justice to the influence of one who can inspire enthusiasm without ever making a call upOn partisanship, and Still less upon fanaticism. Mr. Baldwin could lead his countrymen anyWhere; and all we' deSire is that he should appreciate his own power, for we knoW that he would use it rightly. All Mr. Baldwin's virtues were apparent in what he said about the League at the- Albeit Hall last week. It was a noble speech. If it doeS not dissipate many of the misunder- itandingS of British foreign policy in the list few weeks we shall have to ask' whether other nations 'are doing all that they. might to substitute for suspicion a readiness to help thii country in ensuring the peace that all Englishmen earnestly desire: The Prinie' Minister's` unqualified declaration that there had' been no -change' whatever in' the *foreign policy of the UoVerninent was thoSt OppOrtune. -AS' our readeri know, we never supposed for a moment that there was any substance in the hundreds of rumours about the " reorientation " of British policy, a " new entente " with France, a " pooling " of the British and French navies, a solidifying of the Anglo-French front against America and to some extent against Italy, and the formation of an exclusive cave within the four quarters of the League. It stood to reason that none of these things could be true, because one and all they would have meant an abandonment of the whole idea of the League and an abandonment of Locarno.
Sir Austen Chamberlain's title to fame is that he presided over and guided the Locarno negotiations. Those who believe that he was willing to tear up his title with his own hands would believe anything, and we cannot help suspecting that party feeling in this country explains much of the recklessness with which accusations have been made against the Government.
The intention of the conversations which produced the Anglo-French compromise was irreproachable. The conversations were designed simply to help the Pre- paratory Commission of the Disarmament Conference out of a hole. It was America who suggested that France and Great Britain should attempt to settle their differences privately, as they were the representatives of the most opposed schools of thought on the Com- mission. Americans who talk of private plots must have forgotten that. The scheme was that the formula reached in secluded conversations should then be brought before the Preparatory Commission as the basis of general agreement. So far, so good ; but clumsy handling and a quite unusual lack of imagination wrecked the scheme.
The partial disclosure of the nature of the compromise —a disclosure which suggested much more thin it explained—flushed rumours in all directions. But, in our opinion, the worst blunder was that the Government did not do anything to mitigate the shock that was certain to be felt by the American Government when they discovered that the British and French experts wanted to apply limitation only to the very ships and guns which the American Navy has for years stated to be most suitable to its needs.
As, however, the Anglo-French compromise is dead there is no necessity to say more about it. The task of to-day is to clear up the litter of misunderstanding which it caused, and it would have been impossible for anybody to apply the broom more honestly than Mr. Baldwin did in his great speech last week.
We mentioned above the excesses of party spirit in criticism of the Government's foreign policy. We desire to write a few words on this subject because it would be a catastrophe if our foreign policy after having had for many years a general unity of design were to become once more the sport of parties. The liberty of criticism within wide areas must be preserved, but when insinuations are broadcast to the world about the honesty of the Government's intentions, there is obviously a failure to make the policy of peace a policy of the nation. Perhaps the greatest service which Mr. Baldwin did last week was to demonstrate that the whole future of the Unionist Party is interlocked with the success of the League.
The Manchester Guardian is so honourable a paper that even those who disagree with its opinions do not dream of impugning its sincerity. The argument which it has been advancing during the past few days is cer- tainly not due to any irresponsibility or unfairness. The only explanation we can think of is that there has been a passing failure of humour. However that may be, the argument of the Manchester Guardian, which is read, as it deserves to be, all over the world, may do something to spoil the great effect which we hope Mr. Baldwin's speech will have. The Manchester Guardian says, in effect, that though Mr. Baldwin's speech was just what it should have been, it is impossible to reconcile it with the recent statement of Lord Cushendun, that no new entente with France is necessary as the old one is still in existence. The Manchester Guardian labours the point with solemnity and at considerable length. It demands a clearing up of the mystery.
Until we read these words we could not have supposed it possible that Lord Cushendun's little adventure in the art of complimentary exaggeration could have been so misjudged. When Lord Cushendun's remarks were reported it never occurred to us—and we are sure that nearly every other reader must have been in a like case— that he intended anything but the harmless equivalent of " People talk about France and Great Britain becoming friends again. Why should they ? They have never ceased to be friends." Does the Manchester Guardian really think so poorly of an ex-editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica and an ex-editor of The St. James's Gazette that it refuses him the little play of fancy which it would expect and appreciate in any other intelligent man ?
The Government will, indeed, make a hash of their policy if they are not friends with France. But they must not pursue friendship with anybody to the hurt of others. Mr. Baldwin's speech was shot through and through with an ample recognition of that principle.
Previous page
