THE VACANT LEADERSHIP IN THE LORDS.
SINCE Lord Derby's retirement, there has been a chronic weakness in the brain of the Conservative party,—not amounting to softening, but unquestionably to congestion of the corpus callosum (literally, callous or thick-skinned body), the uniting band which connects together the two hemi- spheres of that party organ,—the hemisphere of the Lower with that of the Upper House of Parliament. The late Lord Derby was an admirable " callous body " for the purpose. He was entirely callous to the finer scruples of his party, and yet he was not, like Mr. Disraeli, a mere strategist, for he was identified with his party by rank, by property, by feeling, by prejudice. To a great peer thus absolutely identified with his party much concession on the part of the party was natural. And Lord Derby was not averse to ask for much concession where the chance of " dish- ing the Whigs" seemed to him strong. He, and he alone, could prevail on the Conservative Peers to follow implicitly the lead of their great strategist in the Lower House. But now, as we have said, there are signs of chronic congestion in that band between the two hemispheres of the party-brain. Mr. Disraeli did not in all probability find Lord Malmesbury quite up to his work, and though Lord Malmesbury has told the world, in his letter to the Daily Telegraph, that he was acting upon " a fixed intention long held " when he gave up his lieutenant-leadership on Lord Derby's final resignation, yet it is at least certain that he did not retire with Lord Derby, but assumed the leadership of the House of Lords under Mr. Disraeli from February to August, 1868. Nor can we easily doubt that Lord Malmsbury's " fixed intention long held," would have been pliant to any earnest pressure from Mr. Disraeli to retain the lead of the Conservative Peers, had such pressure been applied. If it was not applied, as we may assume per- haps without any great risk of error, it was probably because the indications of weakness of which we have already spoken were beginning to manifest themselves under Lord Malmesbury's .somewhat nail' and slouching guidance. The Conservative party in the Peers will always differ in this from the Con- servative party in the Commons,—that it cares for prejudices and traditions more, and for mere victory and success less. The Peers are apt to be both wealthy and indolent. They don't much care for office, which very few of them can enjoy, and very few can even profit by. They are apt to despise strategy, and to love consistency. Only a great peer, one of the most eminent of their own order, and identified by every tie with its interests and wishes, could persuade them to sacrifice very much in this way when occasion arises. Lord Malmesbury did not stand high enough for this in any way. In the first place, he himself rather shared the torpid disposition of the Peers. He had not Lord Derby's combative party-instinct. Then, again, he is hardly a great nobleman at all. His style, too, is too bizarre to be exactly persuasive and influential. He tells the world (of course, in the clumsiest words) that he is an admirer, and a very disinterested admirer, of the Telegraph, in spite of that journal's unkind contempt for him ; and we can hardly wonder at his simple admiration for a fluency so foreign to his own nature, especially when expressing, as it so often does, that jaunty-sublime' mood of mind which doubtless goes near to satisfy Lord Malmesbury's individual form of the universal yearning for the Infinite. With so few of the gifts either of a party-leader or an orator, it was not likely that Lord Malmesbury should have succeeded in giving Mr. Disraeli the sort of co-operation he needed. It was necessary to try a change, and accordingly Lord Cairns was tried last session, and, so far as Mr. Disraeli's policy was concerned, the last act of the session, the compromise on the Irish Church, was eminently successful. Still, Lord Cairns was not, on the whole, a success. He did not lead, but only held a brief for the party. He could not imbue himself with the feeling, he .could not take up the attitude, of a leader. Even his very cough was deprecatory, instead of self-confident and proud. The timidity of the Peers and the gravity of the situation conquered for him in the end, but the session was a thoroughly humiliating one for the Conservatives in the Lords. Their leader had no hauteur, no mettle, no aristocratic strength!
And now the leadership is again vacant, and not improbably M Mr. Disraeli's own instance ; for he must have perceived the weakness of Lord Cairns, and the advantage which he himself would derive from having such a man as the present
Lord Derby for his lieutenant in the House of Lords,—a man never willing to resist any permanent and well-marked ten- dency of public opinion, a man thoroughly cold to Tory and Liberal enthusiasms alike, and yet one whose vast posses- sions and eminent rank, no less than his solid abilities, will command universal respect among the Peers. That Lord Derby is Mr. Disraeli's choice for leader of the Con- servatives in the Upper House, we feel very little doubt, though, of course, we pretend to no information on the subject. In fact, the alternatives mooted are scarcely alternatives, unless Mr. Disraeli himself were to abdicate his position, which it would require, we imagine, an enormous political pressure, a huge battering-ram of Conservatism, to compel Mr. Disraeli to do. But it is one thing what Mr. Disraeli wishes, and may very likely succeed in bringing about, and quite another what would be the solution really best for the interests of the party itself, and, therefore, we imagine, for the nation at large,—for in the long run it can never be a good thing for Liberals that the opinions of their opponents are inadequately rendered and smothered in the very bud. Nor will Lord Derby, we imagine, himself much enjoy the position for which he is probably designated. He is, as we pointed out some weeks ago, not a party man at all. He has not the art of encouraging his party. He has a very happy art of discouraging it. He will be a sort of political damper on the Conservatism of the House of Lords, and that is hardly a pleasant, though it may be a useful office. Then he cannot endure the necessity of considering superficially a great number of subjects, instead of mastering one or two. He has not the readiness or alertness of mind for a vigilant party leader, and it will always be a weariness to him to have not only to listen to, but to utter so much talk on matters he only half understands. He is Con- servative more because his mind is apt to depreciate the import- ance of the reforms urged by Liberals, than because he cares for the past or clings to the present. His chief Conservative formula is, " Beware of quacks." He agrees with the Preacher, " That which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that which is not, cannot be numbered." Lord Derby is a political economist to the backbone, and laissez-faire is his principle wherever he can apply it at all. All these tendencies must make him very anxious to be independent, to stand alone, to mediate now and then, but not to lead. He has little of his father's love of strife. His political sense, though very strong and lucid, is not aggressive. If he leads, he is perfectly aware that he will not be a popular, though he may be a respected, leader ; and, as leader, he will certainly not be able to be absolutely himself. Still, all these are considerations rather personal to Lord Derby than concerning the Conservative party. If it were possible to find a better leader for that party, Lord Derby would probably heartily rejoice. But what other alternatives are there, while Mr. Disraeli continues to lead the Conservatives in the Commons ? Only the Duke of Richmond, and the Duke of Richmond is never mentioned in this connection except ten- tatively and speculatively, and with an obvious feeling that his name is only put forward to be withdrawn.
A really better organization of the Conservative party by far would be attained if Lord Salisbury or Lord Carnarvon could take the lead of the party in the Lords, and Mr. Gathorne Hardy, for want of an abler leader of the same type of mind, could lead it in the Commons. For years the Con- servative policy of England has been living a sort of ascetic and mortified life under Mr. Disraeli's rule, and there is really almost danger in having it so imperfectly expressed, nay, so absolutely distorted, as it now is by the leader whose voice it obeys. The steady, moderate Conservatism of England has scarcely found a fitting utterance since the death of Sir Robert Peel. On Church questions, for instance, on which it has always felt keenly, it has been steadily deserted by Mr. Disraeli, and it will continue to be deserted by Mr. Disraeli acting in concert with Lord Derby. Perhaps nearly the best thing to be said for this latter arrangement is, that it would give us far the best chance we shall have of passing the final repeal of the University tests in the coming session. But it is not only on Church questions that Lord Derby will wring the heart of the Conservative Peers. On all questions where common-sense and tradition are at variance, it will be the same. The Married Women's Property Bill would meet no opposition from him. On primary education he would be sure to snub the Duke of Marlborough's clerical conservatism. And in Colonial affairs he would be but too likely to smile approbation on the anti-imperial and disintegrating policy of Lord Granville. In a word, Lord Derby will not on any
questions, except, probably, that of landed tenures, express adequately, as Lord Salisbury or even Lord Carnarvon would do, the true feeling and wish of the Conservative party. If, then, it be desirable, as we cannot but believe that it is, that the Con- servatives of this country should be as fully and as characteristic- ally represented in Parliament as the Liberals, it must be a mis- fortune, even for the country at large, that their leader in the House of Commons should be what we may call a strategical Con- servative, that is, one always willing to modify the party creed for the sake of a victorious coalition with opponents,—and their leader in the House of Lords one who is only Conservative at all because he has slender belief in the power of legislation to do good. We confess that we should be glad to see the Conservatives better, that is, more typically, led. In the House of Lords their most potent leader would probably be Lord Salisbury, who, with high Conservative principle, com- bines an aggressive force of mind almost more conspicuous than that of the late Lord Derby. His defect is a certain impulsiveness, an occasional bitterness of tongue that is not prudent, and therefore not truly Conservative, for of true Conservatism prudence is almost the very essence. Lord Carnarvon is wiser and more prudent, in fact more of a statesman, but his style of speaking is not so inspiriting as Lord Salisbury's, and his voice is itself so weak that he would in that respect hardly have any advantage over the present Lord Derby. Moreover, he has lost popularity somewhat of late with the party to which he belongs,—being too independent and in some respects too broad for them. And, indeed, for either Lord Salisbury or Lord Carnarvon to act with Mr. Disraeli is, we imagine, a political impossibility,—hardly even a contingency to be speculated upon. The Conservatives, if they wish ever to be led again as Sir Robert Peel led them between 1832-1841, must rid themselves of their adroit and brilliant chief in the Lower House. Till then he will not only lead, but rule. His is not a mind to endure a second place in the counsels of his party, and not a calibre of intellect which will find much difficulty in keeping the first place. We never attributed great credit to Mr. Disraeli for his easy ascendancy over the mind of the late Lord Derby, for that brilliant orator was never a statesman, never more than a dashing politician. But he is to be credited with great insight for maintaining, as he has so long done, his ascendancy over the mind of the present Lord Derby, who can hardly have relished the very awkward position in which from time to time he has been placed by the reckless strategy of his chief, and yet, though, no doubt, greatly against the grain, has always succumbed to the genius of the great Caucasian.
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