THE KAISER AND THE REICHSTAG.
TIIHE German Reichstag was opened on Tuesday by the Emperor, who, true to his instinct for making a sensation at all times and seasons, delivered himself of an impromptu oration after the conclusion of the formal speech from the throne. It is thought by the experts that this Session of the Reichstag will be brief, and that the early spring may find Germany involved in a General Election. This forecast appears to be made on the assumption that the principal item of the Kaiser's programme will not be acceptable to a majority of the present Chamber. That item is, of course, the naval programme. It will be remembered that the last naval programme submitted by the Government was received in a hostile spirit by the Committee of the Reichstag to which it was referred in the ordinary course, and it is assumed that a similar fate may be in store for the new proposals, which are of a vast and far-reaching character, involving the building of seventeen battleships, many cruisers and gunboats, the increase of the personnel of the Navy by 8,499 men, and various other items. The operations are to be carried over a period of seven years. It is at present quite uncertain what the Reichstag will do, though on a priori grounds we might, perhaps, anticipate a rejection of such sweeping proposals. The two sections of the Conservative party 'will warmly support the project, as will the National Liberals, and possibly the less advanced section of the now divided Freisinnige party. The Radicals, Socialists, and South German Democrats will as certainly oppose any forward naval policy. The ultimate decision will, omitting the small groups of Poles and Alsatians, rest with the great Centre or Catholic party which has maintained such vigorous discipline and unbroken front since the establishment of the Empire. It is -obvious, therefore, that the Emperor's policy will be to ." square " in some way the Centre party, and this, it is -freely asserted, is actually to be done. If the Centre Tarty can be attached to the Government for this specific purpose without losing its independence, while at the same time securing a solid advantage for German Catholicism, we may take it that the naval proposals, as a whole, will be accepted by the present Reichstag. For though the Social Democrats claim to represent now considerably more than two million voters, yet, owing to inequalities of representation, they number but forty-six Deputies in the Reichstag ; while the split in the Freisinnige party, growing out of an analogous con- troversy on the increase of the Army, has weakened Radical opposition. Everything, therefore, seems to depend on the Centre. If it goes against the Govern- ment, we may expect a dissolution of the Reichstag.
Two views may be taken of the projected increase of the German Navy and the making of Germany a great naval Power. It may be represented as a menace to some other country or countries, or it may be construed as a necessary insurance against the risks of expanding German commerce. From the latter point of view it is a business problem for • the German people to solve. Undoubtedly the volume of German trade on the oceans of the world is rapidly increasing. The great subsidised lines to New York, to Australasia, to East Africa, are to be increased by another to East Asia; • and it is significant that this project (which failed in the last Session) is put forward simultaneously with the occupation of Kiao-chow Bay. It is an admitted principle of modern State action that ocean trade calls for a naval insurance, for trade is the basis on which the modern State mainly reposes. German trade has gone up by leaps and bounds ; therefore, it may fairly be argued, a con- siderable German naval force, adequate to the new needs of the Empire, is as legitimate an object of national desire as a new water-supply is for a growing city. To such a proposition no exception can be taken, least of all by our- selves, for we have deliberately carried out a policy based on this assumption of the need of naval insurance. No external critic can, indeed, presume to say a word on the Imperial proposals from this point of view ; it is a question for Germany, and for Germany alone. We must assume, on this hypothesis, that the German Government has made up its mind that German world-commerce has not only come to stay, but that it will indefinitely expand, and that, consequently, insurance risks are also indefinitely increased. Well, that is a matter purely for the German people. They know the facts, and if they think the price proposed is not too high for the purchase, no outsider can have a word to say, though he may have his own opinions as to the possible straining-point to which the Kaiser is leading his people. The critic may think that, considering the enormous burden of the Army, the grave discontent alike in town and country, the known average income of the various classes of the German population, and the niggardly gifts of Nature to a considerable part of Germany, such a navy as the Kaiser proposes will strain the resources of the Empire to a point of danger ; but that is no affair of his, assuming that Germany is convinced that it is "good business."
But there is another hypothesis, impossible to ignore, from which the policy of the Government may be regarded, and there are words, both in the official speech and the Kaiser's unofficial oration, which seem to lend weight to this alternate hypothesis. "Germany," says the speech, "must be put in a position to maintain her prestige among the nations of the earth by her naval armament as well as otherwise." And the Emperor, having referred in his grandiloquent manner to the oath he took by "the glorious colours" of his First Regiment of Foot Guards to maintain the Empire founded by his grandfather, asked the Reichstag to support him "in powerfully upholding the honour of the Empire abroad." This does not read so much like the language of business and commerce, as the language of militant emotion and a foreign policy of immense energy. The national ideal which the Kaiser appears to entertain in his mind is that of a nation armed at all points, ready and eager to fly to action in a moment, and moving with the precision of a giant machine. We have passed from the business motive of insurance to the military motive of prestige ; and if the proposals are read in that light they wear a very different aspect. Already in the last Army Bill Germany has, as she thinks, made herself invulnerable against France ; but against whom is she to render her- self invulnerable at sea ? This is where the element of English suspicion will begin to play on the Imperial speech, especially if, by a process of exhaustion, the conclusion is reached that Great Britain is the Power with which, at some more or less distant date, the Kaiser dreams of matching his forces. It is true that he disclaims rivalry with naval Powers of the first rank,—i.e., with France and England ; but that was necessary for his purpose, which was to get the consent of the Reichs- tag to a not impossible, albeit extravagant, pro- gramme. It would not do to ask for the moon. Let it be remembered that the Kaiser, referring to his relations with foreign States, singled out his receptions at Peterhof and Budapest, thus indicating that there was to be no trouble with Russia and Austria. The peaceful termination of the Hayti incident and the assur- ances given to the United States do not indicate that the Kaiser intends to raise strife in America. Italy, perhaps, scarcely counts as a factor at present, while formally and on paper she is an ally of Germany. France and England are the only two Powers which thus seem to be affected, on the hypothesis we are now considering, by the Kaiser's naval programme. But as the Kaiser seems to be always actuated by a strong hostility to England, and by an apparent desire to build up amicable relations with France, as he tends always to reinforce the commercial rivalry between England and Germany by a political rivalry, it will be suspected here that this new German naval programme is aimed more directly at England than at any other Power. The reference to the possible blockade of German ports indicates something more than a policy of mercantile insurance ; and as during the Franco-German War the French Navy did practically nothing, it will be widely assumed here that England is the Power that may, in the Kaiser's judgment, engage in some future blockade of Hamburg and Bremen, of Stettin and Dantzig. That is how, rightly or wrongly, the speech and its proposals may be taken here by not a few intelligent persons.
Even from this point of view outsiders can say nothing, though they will naturally be on their guard. If the German dream of a mighty world-Power is really a widely held national ideal, and if the German people are prepared to make sacrifices for the attainment of such an ideal, which would be as heroic as they would be insane, they will support proposals even more far-reaching than these. But this dream cannot, of course, be realised without a tremendous collision with other Powers,—a, collision in which the German Empire would run the risk of being smashed and pulverised. For the essential point is that Germany cannot attain any such ideal without encroach- ment; the rest of the civilised world has been before her in appropriating unoccupied lands. Let the plain truth be clearly stated. Germany must be content with expan- sion through other territorial Powers, or she must, if possessed by this idea. of a world-Empire, run the risk of annihilation. For England the burden of expenditure is, of course, heavy, but it is light as compared with the burden which Germany will be called on to bear if the Emperor's programme is to be carried out. If there is to be a race of economic ruin, Germany will arrive at the goal long before we do, and on her head will be the main disaster. We write in the conditional mood, for it remains to be seen whether the Kaiser's megalomania is shared by a majority of the German people. There is much good sense and a vigorous logical judgment in Germany, to which one may confidently appeal. If, as we have said, the appeal is to be, in this case, on the grounds of mere insurance for German in- dustry, we do not doubt the calculations of the people will be made, as is usual with Germans, in a prudent and economic spirit ; and in any case criticism of such a verdict would be impertinent. But if, as the Kaiser's words and attitude seem to hint, a naval programme is to cover a policy of aggression, we do not doubt that it will be fought in Germany with the vigour and determination characteristic of the people, and in that case we can only wish success to the Opposition.
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