THE UNITY OF FRANCE
By PIERRE MAILLAUD T N the eyes of the world the Epic of Toulon seems to have I eclipsed a very important document which reveals as much of the French frame of mind as this tale of " self-immolation." I refer to Hitler's letter to Marshal Petain, several passages of which deserve more attention than has been devoted to them. " The landing of American and British troops in French North-West and North Africa," Hitler wrote, " undertaken with the aid of innumerable criminal generals and officers, has since ruined all the armistice conventions." Such a statement might merely amount to one of those well-known arguments to which Hitler's hypocrisy periodically resorts in order to vindicate a posteriori every new act of perjury, were it not for the fact that it was immediately fol- lowed by the demobilisation of the French regular forces. Whilst Hitler informed Marshal Petain that he " had given the order to demobilise those units of the French armed forces which, contrary to the orders of their own government, were being instigated to resist Germany actively," the demobilisation was not confined to a number of units, but soon became general and sweeping. In other words, there was not a single unit of the regular French army which Hitler could trust " not to resist Germany actively."
At what precise juncture such a resistance would have taken place in any organised way must remain a matter for speculation. Suffice it to put on record Hitler's acknowledgment of the existence of a potential Allied bridgehead on French soil. Indeed, the re- peated offers made to General Giraud by Abetz and German officers of the Reichswehr after the General's escape from Koenigstein sup- plied sufficient evidence that, in German eyes, this potential bridge- head existed, and that the forces of " active resistance " in un- occupied France might have become a thorn in Germany's flank if only they had been marshalled by a true leader instead of being. left to themselves or subjected to the effects of two years of weak leadership and demoralising propaganda. Today, General Giraud is in Africa. Men like General Delatre de Tassigny and many others who thought of resuming the struggle are either in jail or power- less. Hitler has demobilised what was left of the French army, and organised military resistance on French soil must be out of the question. It has, so to speak, been merged into the wider problem of French popular resistance.
In this last respect, other passages of Hitler's letter deserve attention. By a paradox which is only apparent Hitler dwells at length and in bitter terms on the anti-German attitude of "French generals and officers " (of which the public knew little, although informed Frenchmen abroad were aware of it), whilst he speaks with feigned sympathy of the " millions of workers, peasants and working middle-class " who are " foreign to these machinations and only ask for peace." It can hardly be a coincidence that Hitler should describe as " peaceful," and single out as such, those very sections of the French community which ever since July, 194o, have supplied his most uncompromising and relentless enemies. For resistance was born amongst those " millions of workers, peasants and working middle-class people." Not only, indeed, was resistance born amongst them, but it was in their case unconditional, by which I mean that it remained to a large extent independent of the varying fortune of war.
It is undoubtedly permissible for military leaders in an occupied or semi-occupied country " to bide their time." The distinction between " attentism " which consists of waiting for an opportunity to resume a struggle which one has never given up, and " attentism " which merely waits in order to pick out a certain winner and follow in his train, is a very difficult one indeed. I still believe that the majority of French officers belonged to the first category.
But from Hitler's point of view, the distinction had ceased to matter in November, 1942, as the prospects of an Allied victory were such as to convince most of the sceptics. Hence his decision to order a complete demobilisation of the French armed forces. In the case of the French people, workers, peasants, middle-class working-men, no such distinction need ever have been made. There was no " attentism " in the occupied zone of France. The only distinction was between a handful of collaborators and thirty million irreconcilable enemies of Germany. Hitler's motives in referring to the French masses as " peacefully-minded people," can only be ascribed to fear—the fear of a surge of popular feeling which he cannot prevent when the time comes, but which he attempts at least to postpone at a moment when so many strategic problems assail him.
Toulon has shown that even among this section of the French nation, where the Allied cause was viewed with mixed feelings, the hatred of Germany still overrules every other consideration. That, apart from this common denominator, there should have been a fairly wide range of conceptions and methods of action in what we call (for want of a better word) the leading classes is an undis- putable fact. Toulon has shown to a doubting world the strength of this common denominator. Now the whole of France is occupied.
To that extent the problem of French resistance has been simplified, or, if one may use this expression, standardised. Metropolitan France becomes identified with popular resistance to Germany and her puppets. Between the two forces no " buffer State " is left.
On French soil, French unity will be completed. But France is militarily powerless. Her resistance to Germany in every way, and by every available means, has already proved a valuable asset to the Allies, but her full participation in the struggle must wait upon an Allied intervention on the European Continent.
Meanwhile French participation in the conflict can and must increase. Fighting France has ensured it for the last two years, and its tangible deeds have been both an inspiration and a stimulus to active resistance at home, with which its action has been co- ordinated. Now further and wider opportunities are offered for a concerted action by the rallying of the whole African Empire to the Allied cause. A considerable army can be raised, and the weight of France can count far more heavily than it has for over two years in the scales. All Frenchmen are agreed on one point: that unity must be achieved between those of them who are in a position to carry on the struggle, and that it must be achieved not only for the sake of a far greater contribution to a common victory, but also for the sake of the people of France, whose resolute determination is that all the available forces of France should be marshalled against the enemy.
Such a demand comes from a people who themselves had never compromised, and who for two years have resisted both the enemy and those men who tried to impose upon them a regime which had nothing to do with France's traditions. The unity which is demanded must be able to lead from strength, and not from weakness. It must be a unity which, outside France, must truly represent French resistance inside the country. It must be achieved as between men who, with varied means of action, have followed the same course, and thought in the same terms. In their line of action, the Fighting French have undoubtedly represented in action the will of the French people. This is true equally of men who, like General Giraud, have been no less determined, although physically incapable, to resume the struggle. It is certainly true of a numb-= of French officers. It is between all these men that a fighting unity an and must primarily be achieved. This presupposes immediate contacts between the Fighting French and the " permanent " elements who in North Africa show, and have shown, a genuine willingness to fight. In this respect it is regrettable that the Fighting French have not been given, hitherto, the means of making those contacts with North Africa. A policy which would increase the difficulties of such a reunion would provoke a dangerous cleavage and possibly lead to a semi-neutralisation of North Africa, which is neither a consummation to be desired from an Allied point of view, nor a true representation of the determination of the French people. The problem is bound to be a delicate one in any case. Yet it is perfectly capable of solution. The building of a French army must be the first aim. An agreement on this capital point would be a considerable step forward. Should, on the contrary, divided counsels and different conceptions among the Allies delay the necessary contacts between London and North Africa, unity might be impaired or delayed outside France when it has been cemented on the French soil by common trials and by a common Ideal.
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