TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE ARMISTICE.
THE Government of the National Defence were, we think, on the whole and with some reserves, in the right in accepting the terms of armistice offered by the Ger- mans. As regards Paris, of course, their position was in- disputable. They had been re-elected during the siege by a formal plebiscite, were obeyed by a heavy majority of the people, and were fully entitled to decide when in their judg- ment the resistance of Paris had become hopeless. It seems clear that they did not decide on surrender until the supply of food had been reduced to the lowest point, and until there was imminent risk that the non-combatant population, for which they were directly responsible, might perish uselessly of hunger. They had not ten days' flour left for the civil popu- lation. Why the Generals declined to make one more effort, whether they thought it useless, or were distrustful of their soldiers, or were alarmed at any delay, even of hours, is a point for future explanation ; but clearly the moral right to decide rested with the Government, and they exercised it. Nor were the terms, as far as regards Paris, harsher than might have been expected. The Germans could not be expected to fore- go possession of the forts, the permission for the prisoners to remain on the spot was in some sort a concession, and the ransom for the city, which, as a huge fortress, was liable to sack and storm, was, though heavy to cruelty, still within its means. It was better to pay it, if all hope was gone, than to see Paris occupied, with the enormous risks of massacre occupation would have involved. Then as to the armistice,—that also was within the range of the Government's authority. The governing body was created to guide a war, and an armistice is one of the incidents of war as much as the raising of an army. Had time not been so pressing, its members ought to have communicated first with M. Gambetta ; but time was pressing, the Governing Committee had repeatedly voted by majorities, as, for example, when Trochu was removed by a majority of only one, and it might reflect that in the existing state of affairs a truce of three weeks could do little harm. The necessity for a lull had arisen, apart from negotiations. New armies could not be levied, much less equipped, in three weeks, and the only fault in this matter appears to have been the exception of the Eastern districts, a blunder for which a severe account will one day have to be rendered. As regards the promise to sum- mon a National Assembly, there is more room for doubt ; but, on the whole, the action of the Government in this matter was also justified by the facts. After the fall of Paris, their own surrender, and the dis- appearance of their armies, it was clear that fresh moral power must be sought somewhere, and it could be sought only in an appeal to the body of the people through an Assembly held in some free city, before which the Government, M. Gam- betta included, could explain its policy, which could replace the leaders paralyzed by imprisonment, and might authoritatively declare the ultimate resolution of France. For the Minister at War to resist such an appeal, when made by his colleagues, would have been to assume avowedly the position of an insurgent leader ; and this, though, as we maintain, a conceivably justifiable position, would not have been the one most beneficial to France, which requires before all things unity and decision of leadership. Gambetta the insurgent would have been weaker than Gambetta the Dictator, and his weak- ness would have been also the weakness of his country. He chose therefore a wiser course, announced that his policy was still war ; but ordered the Generals to respect the armistice, and told the Prefects that France now required an Assembly devoted to the war. He has not refused to appeal to the people, but has advised them upon the course he desires them to pursue. There is little doubt therefore that the elections will be held, more especially as the surrender of another army almost breaks the sword in Gambetta's hands ; or that supreme power will instantly accrete to it ; or that, elected, as it must be, by a kind of acclaim, its resolutions will be clear, strong, and executive. Masses of human beings rushing together to decide a question huge enough to stir their very souls, always give out their resolution by a kind of shout, and the tone and meaning of that shout can never be mistaken.
Which of the two words, Peace or War, will be shouted we cannot, in the face of such complicated facts, even attempt to decide. Primd facie, the appearances are in favour of a con tinuance of the war. In the first place, war was the instinc- tive cry of the townspeople, of Bordeaux, Lyons, Marseilles, all those huge centres of industry in which opinion is so deeply modified by emotion, and so little by external facts, and in war time it is emotion, rather than reason, which directs. the popular course. Moreover, this emotion will be immen- sely deepened by ablunder of the German chiefs, who have circu- lated over Europe a programme of the terms of peace which reads as if it were designed to drive all Frenchmen to desperation! Theterms flashed from Berlin to the Times have struck all. Europe with dismay, and will strike all Frenchmen with des- pair. Nothing in the least like them has ever been heard or in modern Europe. Not only is France to cede two grand provinces, including districts as purely French as Paris, not only is she to give up the one colony in which she has a. certain historical pride, not only is she to surrender all hen first-olass vessels ; but she is, after all her miseries, to accept. a National Debt as heavy as our own, to pay for ever thirty millions a year to her antagonist. We do not in the least, believe that these terms are Count Bismarck's ; but French- men may, and if they do, the very people supposed to be in favour of peace, the peasantry, will see clearly that war, how- ever protracted, could not ruin them more completely than a treaty which imposes on them for ever the annual tribute of near half the existing taxes. Then, as we have before observed, the members elected, being all more or less prominent men,. are sure to be all more or less sensitive to national considera- tions, while they will all be more or less under the influence of the Minister at War, the greatest orator possibly whom. France has ever produced. We have heard Frenchmen doom. Gambetta to death, but it was always as the representative• man of France. On the other hand, it is quite possible that despair has entered into the souls of a majority of electors ; that unbroken defeat for six months, the collapse of army after- army, the refusal of entire divisions to obey orders, the steady- advance of the German hosts, the apparent irresistibility of events, have broken the heart of France ; that the people in their despair will sacrifice anything for the sake of immediate. relief from the overpowering tension. The rapidity with which the Assembly must act—a rapidity scarcely admitting of debate—the necessity for reconstructing the Government, the pressure of the coming spring, when crops must be sown or France starve, fear for Paris left in the hands of the invader, all these circumstances may predispose the masses of the people towards peace, or rather towards submission_ This is the view taken by the Germans, by many Frenchmen,. and by the majority of English travellers, and it may prove. correct. If it does, France will remain unheard of in Europe until she has passed through some gradual but tremendous change,—will be an extinct power at least for a generation.
We have declined in this speculation to consider the effect of the political feeling of the various parties, because we do• not believe that in so supreme a crisis such feeling will have any effect at all. There will be no time for parties. As far as we understand arrangements sedulously concealed,. M. Jules Favre will apply to the Assembly for the tempo- rary ratification of his power as Foreign Secretary, and will then lay before it Count Bismarck's ultimatum, which must then be voted, after a comparatively short debate, by roll-call, Yes or No, and that vote will be given irrespective of politics. If it is No, the proudest Legitimist in the House will be the first to vote for Gambetta's dictatorship ; if it is Yes, some temporary arrangement must be made for a Govern- ment ad hoc, competent to sign agreements and issue victual- ling orders. But the actual vote of the Assembly on peace or war will be guided by no arriere pensle as to forms of government, but will express, so far as any such vote can express, the mass of latent feeling at the heart of the French people,—that afflatus which descends sometimes on enormous multitudes when gathered together for the performance of some supreme act.
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