WHY SHOULD FRANCE REVERT TO A MONARCHY /
IT is curious to observe what an amount of disgust, and even anger, seems to be inspired in decent English society by the bare suggestion that France should retain the form of a Republic. The Times writes of that possibility as if it meant nothing but political fever and ague, intermittent hot and cold fits, and endless unrest to all Europe. Now, we should very much like to make out what is at the root of this notion. We will admit that only a minority,—per- haps not even a considerable minority of the nation, is at 'heart Republican in principle,—that is, opposed to 'the principle of monarchy. But then it is quite as certain that what we must compare, is not the strength of, the anti-Republican party with that of the Republican,— for it is very certain that the various sections of the anti- Republicans will attack, and oppose, and weaken each other even more bitterly than they will attack, and oppose, and weaken the Republicans,—but the strength of each of the Throne-parties with that of the Republican party. The Or- leanists have ever been far more hostile to Napoleon and his dynasty, and the Imperialists have ever been far more hostile to the Orleanists, than either of these have been to the 'Republic. There is no use whatever in count- ing the various partizans of a throne together ; since for no practical purpose whatever could they co-operate. The peasants, who are said to be again calling out for 'Notre pauvre Empereur,' would not care a rush for the Comte de Paris, or do anything at all to prop up his throne even if it were raised. With them the name of Napoleon is still a familiar one, and in some sense dear ; they have a theory,— which is absurd, but just as good for its purpose as if it were true,—that their poor Emperor was " betrayed." They have never learnt to look with any but cold eyes on the Orleanists. The miseries which preceded the great Revolution and the fiery trials which followed it, really weeded out all their regard for the ancient dynasty if they ever had any, nor was there anything at all in the reigns of Louis XVIII., or Charles X., or Louis Philippe to restore their love for either branch of it. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie of Paris and certain districts of Britanny, where the Orleanists have always had a certain popularity, will assuredly not be disposed to give the slightest aid to the Imperialists, especially in the hour of their deep and well-merited disgrace. The strength of the Republi- can party must be compared, not with the strength of all the parties-which would prefer a monarchy if they could only agree upon a monarch, but with the full strength of the largest monarchical party that has a real solution of the problem ready ; and it must be remembered, moreover, that the Republic would be far more likely to receive a modified and provisional support from the various friends of a throne, than any section of them would receive from the other sections. So far, then, we see nothing at all to support the conven- tional English view that a Republic would be a very much less stable form of Government than any throne (except, perhaps, that of 'Leopold of Belgium, if he could bring Belgium with him as his dowry),—or at least any which has a practical chance and a real body of support in France. It is useless to say that France is not Republican at heart, if it be quite as true,—as we believe it is,—that she is not Legitimist at heart, and not Orleanist at heart, and not, now at least, Napoleonist at heart, and that the Republican minority is not smaller, if so small, and certainly not less vigorous, probably much more so, than any of -these parties taken alone, and much more likely to receive a sort of passive aid from them than any of them would receive from the other.
But is there not something in the mere constitution of a Monarchy which promises more stability to France than can be possible from a Republic ? We do not see how this is pos- sible apart from the question of the particular ruler on the throne. What has Greece gained by either Otho or George ? As far as we can see, not even a shadow of stability and immunity from political crisis. What is there to choose between the monarchy of Greece and the least credit- able of the South - American Republics ? We do not believe that King Otho and King George have been of the smallest use to Greece, or prevented a single evil which Greece would have had to endure had a republic been attempted. And Greece is almost the only true parallel for France,—not, of course, in political condition,—but in relation to the absence of any competitor for the throne to whom we could look to give personal aid, by individual force of character, to the Government. If Leopold of Belgium, indeed, were to take the throne, both by the magnificent dowry he would bring, and by his reputed personal moderation and astuteness, he might wield a beneficial influence. But what other candidate for the throne is there who would exercise a wise and sobering control over France ? The ex-Emperor ? If it were possible for the man who would unite so many fierce hatreds against him to resume the government, it is clear enough on his own confession that any restraining and superintending power which he may have had, had died out from him before he plunged into this war, and we can hardly suppose that the man who, before his calamity, was, as he himself maintains, a mere straw- dancing on the political waves, would in old age and growing weakness, be able to moderate the passions he has roused.. If the boy is to succeed, the question of Regent would be the supreme question, and then an even greater -difficulty would break out afresh. Would you take an Imperialist follower as Regent when you had rejected the Emperor ? Would the nation that could not tolerate Louis Napoleon, accept Bazaine ? Plainly, the passions which a restoration of the fallen and helpless exile would provoke would be nothing to such a pro- posal as that. Clearly, if you are to have a throne to temper and restrain the nation, it must be filled from some quarter which has not recently excited against it any furious political passions, and as far as we know, only the Comte de Chambord and Comte de Paris are likely to be suggested. But what is there in either of them to encourage the hope that they would even last as long as Louis XVIII. or Charles X. ? The Duo d'Aumale, indeed, has a reputation for ability, but by all accounts nothing would induce him to accept a throne to which he thinks his nephew has so much better a right ; and even if he did, his practical ability is quite untried ;. he is known only as a man of a certain amount of literary power. If a royal line had not a sort of magic in it for which you cannot artificially manufacture any substitute, Trochu himself would probably be a far better choice to act the part of a firm constitutional King, than any of the Orlean- ists ; and he has made greater sacrifices for France.
In the absence, then, of any feasible candidate for the throne who might fairly be expected to bring to the councils of France a materially sobering and restraining power, what 'la- the ground of the superstition which argues for a throne qua' throne, and without relation to the person who occupies it ? It will be said perhaps that it at least limits the ambition of the leading statesmen, who can, at best, only hope to guide, and not ostensibly to role. But is that a consideration on the right side, the side of temperance ? Is not the undivided responsibility of the actual ruler for the time being a far more sobering influence than the divided responsibility of a mere counselleri Would either Louis Napoleon or Emile 011ivier have decided on war, if either of them had been solely responsible, instead of dividing it with the other,—the. Emperor with his parliamentary Prime Minister, the Minister with the responsible ' head of the State? Is not the undi- vided responsibility of our Cabinet far more sobering ?—and re- member that this could only be attained in France by the Ministry of a Republic, for a dynasty holding so little direct control as our own over public affairs can only be an element of stability where it has for generations secured the affections of the people,—a condition of things which is wholly in- applicable to the setting up of a bran-new dynasty. It would be simply absurd to start a new monarchy in France that should be politically a cypher, and at the same time, —which ours is very far from being,—socially a cypher too. We suspect that one of the great reasons of the- extreme restlesssness of France during the last half-- century, has been the recurrent irritation of the jealousy between the throne and the administration,—neither the throne nor the administrations having really succeeded in. gaining the popular confidence, or, if they had, in persuading themselves that they had gained, and act- ing as if they possessed, it. The Government of France has been a series of hesitating experiments on the favour of the people ever since the fall of the first Emperor. What remedy for this is, on the whole,—we will not say so hopeful, for we do not know what is hopeful there,—but so, clearly not certain to fail,—as a real republic,—a republican• assembly not nominated by the great cities, but by Prancer— which should keep the whole power in its own hands, be able- to change the actual administration at a moment's notice if it, pleased, and so be compelled to assume the undivided re- sponsibility of governing France, returning for new sanction to the people every four or five years? This is a form of republic which has never been -tried, and which is, we- think, at least likely to prove a much more sober form than the ordinary one, and much more suited to the special genius of France. The notion that Presidents chosen for- a fixed period of time are guarantees against popular caprice is, we are well convinced, a political superstition. This plan all but ensures a considerable jealousy between the President and his parliament,—greatly hampers the machinery of government even among a solid and stable people like the- Americans,—and in the case of a mercurial people like the French, puts direct temptations of the strongest kind in the way of the President to get rid of his parliament as best he can. Let a minister feel that his tenure of office is conferred and absolutely limited by the pleasure of the popular Assembly by which he was chosen, and his first object is, and must be, to avert jealousies between the two, to study its genius and temper, and to retain its confidence by winning its respect. That is practically our plan, and though we have the no doubt considerable advantage of a throne which is at present respected and popular, to form at least a strong centre of the political and social fabric, the Queen is no more a President than she is her own Prime Minister ; and if she were, there would be endless squabbles between her and Parliament every session, which would no doubt end, as they ended with the Stuarts, in a direct conflict.
What seems, to us at all events, absolutely clear is, that in the case of a restless nation, an artificially-manufactured centre of political life is a positive mischief, a certain cause of struggle. An absolute assembly and the minister it chose might do Nany foolish things, but we exceedingly doubt if they would be half so liable to try dangerous experiments as Emperors, Kings, or Presidents. The Crimean war was undoubtedly the Emperor's policy. The Italian war was undoubtedly the Emperor's policy. This last war would never have been undertaken if the Corps Legislatif,—bad as that was,—had had to take the full responsibility of it. The invasion of Rome in 1849 was jointly the Republic's and the President's doing, and it was a very bad measure ; but it was at least thought safe, and not a hazardous experiment made for the sake of glory. Popular parliaments, and ministers who are the appointees of popular parliaments, are now almost always and even morbidly cautious. England will not venture any- thing for her old ally. Italy will not venture anything for her political saviour. The Prussian Parliament would never have made war on Austria, though Bismarck and the King did so. Whatever may be said,—and we admit a great deal could be said,—for a wise and cautious King for France, such as the late King of Belgium, a wise king who should be in some sense his own first minister, we sincerely doubt if any solution of the difficulties before the nation be so bad as the solution of a figure-head-king accepted from mere superstitious fear of the bogy of Republicanism.
Previous page
