The League of Nations

Small States and the League

[d. William Martin, the political editor of the Journal de Genite, which is read all over the world for its accounts of the work of the League of Nations, is one of the most distinguished of Swiss journalists. The views he expresses in this frank article will interest our readers.—En. Spectator.] IT is sometimes said that the League of Nations belongs

exclusively to the Great Powers. In France there are to be found many people who foster the delusion that the League is a British institution ; in Great Britain the idea prevails that it is in the hands of the enemies of your country and directly threatens the unity of your Empire. Such opinions are, of course, fantastic exaggerations : the truth

is that, however real and legitimate is the influence of the Great Powers in the League, the predominant characteristic of that body is not the power that it gives to great nations,

but the fact that it has considerably increased the inter- national importance of small States.

The reason for this added prestige is twofold : the publicity given to League deliberations and the opportunities which its Councils and Assemblies afford for the development of

distinguished personalities.

Instead of comparing the position of small and great nations in the League, it would be more useful—and more instructive—to compare the position of small nations before and after the League came into being. For centuries they have played no international role. More often than not they have been the reflection or the political playthings of great States, and they have only been able to ensure their inde- pendence where this has coincided with the interests of Powers desirous of maintaining the equilibrium in Europe.

At the Vienna Congress everything was done by the " Big Five " of that time : England, Austria, France, Germany, and Russia ; and the delegates of the smaller States could only make themselves heard in the ante-chambers of Ministers or in the course of private conversation. Even the Paris Conference, with its autocratic organization, largely con- cerned itself with the requirements of all the participants in the War. During the nineteenth century politics were made between people who did not know one another, and in the privacy of Ministerial offices. It is not so much the principle of equality between the countries which has changed that—for it existed already in International Law—but the principle of publicity which has established itself in the communications between Governments. There are things which can only be done in secret. There are pressures to which a small State must submit, when exercised in diplo- matic secrecy, to which such a small nation would never be subjected before a gallery of journalists and a world- public. The great States themselves would not make certain demands in public which would seem to them quite natural in private. The principle of publicity has introduced into Government relations (and into the proceedings of the League of Nations) a new kind of procedure. A diplomat repre- senting a great country, who saw one day the Assembly of the League hanging breathlessly on the words of a delegate lzona Haiti, made this remark : Dans une grande capitale, on ne lui retournerait inane pas sa carte."

Again, small countries attain an exceptional position in the League by the strength of the personalities which represent them. The international situation is here regulated by elements which would never have been able to manifest themselves in the course of diplomatic relations : talent, intelligence, and eloquence. If one conjures up the names of M. Benes, M. Politis, M. Branting, M. Hymans, and many others, one must recognize that these men bring a powerful support to bear on the influence of their country.

The authority of the small States, which is considerable, would be still more real if it were better applied. The strength possessed by a small State was demonstrated when Count Apponyi publicly braved the anger of Sir Austen Chamberlain.

In the privacy of an office, Count Apponyi would have had to submit and the Hungarians would have been silenced. That they were not, is due to the fact that the Hungarian representative knew how to cope with Great Britain. But there are small countries which- have not yet understood the strength derived from this new international mechanism, and which still prefer the old diplomatic methods to the new methods of publicity. There are those who encourage the great countries at the Assembly to play a directing part, and Sir Austen Chamberlain was not entirely wrong when he said one day, when someone reproached him with being too much taken up with the opinions of his French and German colleagues and not enough with those of other members of the Assembly : How can I deal with opinions if they are not expressed ? "

The weakness of the small States springs first from the

fact that they do not dare to resist the great ones, and secondly that on many points their interests are not mutual. But at the Assembly, it may be confidently asserted that in all eases where representatives of small States show a sentiment of solidarity, they manage to achieve their object. The most characteristic example of this is that presented by the recent discussion on Security. There is no ground' upon which the interests of the great Powers and those of the small are so divergent. The great Powers are able to defen4 themselves, and at the same time to attack. An international guarantee might mean an extension of their security, but would be more largely still a responsibility weighing heavily upon them. It is quite clear that if sanctions arc ever to be applied, the Armies and Fleets of the great Powers will be the first to apply them. The small States, on the other hand, by their very constitution, cannot think of attacking great countries, nor can they in case of attack defend them- selves entirely alone. Their security therefore depends upon the help which they may expect. That is why, to-dayi the majority of them have embraced the policy of alliances. For such a policy the Covenant would substitute " engage- ments generaux " and mutual guarantees. The small nations, in short, measure the utility of the League by the degree of security that it can procure for them, in comparison with that which they possessed hitherto. I think it desirable to say quite plainly that amongst these countries there are many who do not believe in the superiority of the new' guarantee.

The scepticism of the smaller nations is based essentially

upon two incidents : Corfu and the Geneva Protocol. As regards Corfu, here was a small country attacked in the plainest way by a great one. If ever the principle of aggression, could have been demonstrated with precision, here was an example. Yet the League has only maintained peace by demanding from the attacked State a considerable ransom, Yet we may say that the League of Nations has done its duty4 Its aim is not to make justice reign in the world, but to promote peace. There it has succeeded, and the pronounced attach( upon it in this connexion are unjustified. Moreover, the attacks which were made on the League at the time werg concerned less with the organization as such, than with thq policy of the Council, which was then dominated by the great, States. Nevertheless, the fact remains that each small country imagines that, if it should in its turn become the victim of aggression, it must buy its liberation with gold, Rather than suffer such an indignity, many of them prefe4 good alliances, with the inevitable concomitant of a possible War.

In 1924 an attempt was made to amplify and define tb

guarantees of the Covenant, in order to enable the States members of the League to carry out a more rapid disarma-i meat. All the small States supported this move with enthusiasm. Great Britain wrecked the plan. It is not n question of analysing the reasons here—some were very, strong—but it must be said that, objectively, in rejecting the Geneva Protocol, Great Britain has struck at the interests, of all small States who put their faith in Article 16 of the Pact. For they ask themselves, how can this article be anything but a dead letter if it is not possible in advance to state precisely its scope and bearing ?

WhazAm MARTIN.