An illusion shattered
Sam White
Paris This time Giscard came clean. In what was generally acknowledged to have been the most effective speech he has ever delivered since becoming President, he spelt out clearly what would be the consequences of a Left victory in the French general elections in five weeks' time. The speech, delivered last weekend in a Burgundy township, was much anticipated since he had promised to indicate to the French what their President thought would be 'the good choice' for the nation in the coming elections. Nobody doubted what the President would consider to be 'the good choice', everybody doubted, however, whether he would express it with sufficient clarity and force to rule out any possible collision between himself and a victorious Left next March. In the event, he told the French that, if they insisted on playing with fireworks, then they were not to count on him to play the role of some super-nanny running around administering first-aid and otherwise limiting the damage. He would be powerless, in other words, to prevent a victorious Left from implementing the full common programme to which the two major parties of the Left, the Socialists and the Communists, remained committed.
It was a much needed, even dangerously belated clarification. Until this speech was made, there had been a great deal of confusion over what would be the powers, even indeed the functions, of a President with four more years of his office still to run in the face of a freshly-elected hostile parliament. Giscard, by his repeated statements that he would stay no matter what the outcome of the elections, had merely added to the confusion. The main effect of these 'statements was to reassure the electorate that, with Giscard at the helm, it was safe to vote Left. The result would be a few spectacular social reforms stopping far short of the full programme of the Left, with Giscard holding the ultimate powers to block. It was an illusion which has played an important role in giving the Left such a spectacular lead over the existing majority in the public opinion polls. The question before last Friday's speech was whether Giscard would continue to maintain this illusion or break it.
He broke it with a bang. The real fact is that, despite all the nonsense talked about the Fifth Republic constitution creating a kind of presidential monarchy, ultimate power under it lies not with the president but with parliament. If parliament wills, the president must bend — or resign. If the Left wins, it will be able to enact every piece of legislation that it has promised to enact — and the president could not block it. The president however would still retain one important weapon — and only one — that of the right to dissolve parliament at a time and on an issue of his own choosing. It is an important asset but one not to be squandered lightly: having been used once it cannot be used for another year. But, as Raymond Aron points out, this is not as impressive a weapon as it sounds; with a triumphant Left baying for the president's resignation, an early dissolution could be positively welcome.
The most likely outcome of a victory of the Left, then, would be to reinforce the new majority, force Giscard's resignation and bring about early presidential elections. Certainly the Socialist leader, Francois Mitterrand, would attempt as soon as possible to use a parliamentary triumph as a springboard for a presidential one. In short, the idea that Giscard would be allowed to retreat quietly to the Elysee and bide his time there until the inevitable disaster ensued is an illusion — and it is an illusion which until recently he himself has been inclined to share. Certainly as far as Mitterrand is concerned, his strategy will be not to make things easy for Giscard but to oust and replace him with himself as quickly as possible. Thus Mitterrand, and not for the first time in his chequered career, has come full circle. From being the Fifth Republic's fiercest enemy, after having described its constitution as a recipe for dictatorship, he now not only covets its highest office but sees it as a vehicle for his own ambitions — and not just for those of de Gaulle, as he was fond of declaring in the past. The presidency, by giving him national stature, will give him the whiphand not only over the Communists but over his own left-wing supporters, but then Mitterand's whole career invites irony. A Socialist who shunned Socialism in his heady youth, he was, after all, busy being a minister in ten different postwar governments — he came to Socialism rather late in life. His public declarations are Marxist, his private ones disclaim fidelity to that doctrine. Abroad, among his fellow statesmen of the Socialist International, he boasts that his greatest achievement has been to cut the French Communists down to size while at home he was responsible, before the recent split, for handling some thirty major towns to the Communists in last year's municipal elections. Meanwhile, paradoxically, the split on the Left, far from weakening it, has actu. ally strengthened it. All its component parts — the Socialists, the Left Radicals and the Communists, are doing better divided than they ever did united.
This has led to yet another switch in Communist tactics: instead of scenting defeat for the Left, they now scent victory' As a result, they are demanding that Com* munists be represented in the anticipated Mitterrand government after the elections. Mitterrand is already committed to inviting them to join his government, but they are insisting that they will not join in any junior capacity but will demand some of the major posts. Their weapon in forcing Mitterrand's hand will be the agreement that will have to be reached immediately after the first round df voting as to who will stand down in favour of whom in the second and decisive round. So there goes another illusion shared bY almost everyone only a couple of weeks ago — that whatever else the split on the Left entailed, its major consequence would be the definite exclusion of Communists frorn the next French government. Mitterrand's offer to invite them to join a Socialist-led government despite the recent disagreements was not meant to be taken seri' ously. Unfortunately his bluff is being called on this point too.
As Raymond Aron points out: 'Cynically, Mitterrand is moving to the left just, because the Communists accuse him 0' moving to the right. He is now accepting certain measures which he rejected with indignation when the Communists first proposed them. If after the first round the Communists, as a price for standing down 10 some electorates in favour of the Socialists,
demand such and such ministries and such and such new nationalisations one wonders if Mitterrand, driven by an appetite Rif power and conscious of the fact that this is his last chance of achieving it, will still have the courage to resist. We shall see. Mean' while it is interesting to recall that when Mitterrand met President Carter recentlY he told him that if the Left won in March it would come to power in an atmosphere of crisis.' He can say that again.
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