KINGLAKE'S THEOREM.
. Kinglake takes a scientific interest in international politics, and has established a "theorem" of his own, at least to his own satisfaction ; not, indeed, a rigidly uni- versal theorem, but one which' holds good, he' tells us, for all ordinary eases, for all except what the mathematicians call " singular values" of the variable elements. We need not enlarge on the blessings of any new theorem on such a sub- ject, if it can only get itself established. They are patent to all eyes. We will come at once to the important theorem which Mr. Kinglake has discovered. In his own words it is as follows : "In the policy of States a sentiment can never govern. The rela- tions between various States will always, or almost always, be go- verned by their great interests."
If this be true, it is no doubt a principle of vast import- ance, and should continue to be known by Mr. Kinglake's name. But unfortunately we are supplied with no demon- stration, only with one of the instances in whichthe truth is exemplified. It appears to have been inductively reached by abstraction, not a priori. Mr. Kinglake sees its in- fluence in the recent policy of England on the American question, but does not, of course, build so broad a truth on BO narrow a foundation. He says :
"The, people of the 'North had perhaps some sort of ground for supposing that the strong feeling which this country entertained on the subject of slavery might affect the course which we should take when the Southern States became separated from the North. They seemed to think that on that ground we should at once have de- clared for them in order to abolish the evil which we had always de- nounced. We did nothing of the sort ; and from what has happened I draw a lesson in support of a principle which I have always en- forced—that in the policy of States a sentiment can never govern."
This leaves us rather in the dark as to the avenue of proof by which Mr. Kinglake has approached this great and abstract principle. And it is not very easy to supply from the resources of our own minds the path of induction by which he has been led to it. We are baffled at once by the vagueness of the terms and the greatness of the inference. Is it a principle for all-time, or only of the modern world and the present century ? Does "sentiment" include " pas- sion," or only the national "tastes" ? Both these questions are essential to our understanding the gist of the theorem itself. Mr. Kinglake should have prefixed a few metaphy- sical definitions to his political Elements. As it is, we can only approach it by such light as we have. Tried by ordinary instances, and taking " sentiment" and "interest" in their ordinary sense, it does not strike us as a very happy generalization of historical fact. Would it offer a solution of the combinations among the petty Greek States in the Peloponnesian war, for example ? Had political sen- timent nothing to do with the sides assumed in that war ? Were the " comprehensive interests" of the minor States the principal moving force in ranging the partisans of Sparta and of Athens ? 'Were the Crusades the fruit of comprehen- sive interests? Was the English invasion of France under the Plantagenets due to the pressure of great interests ? Had sentiment and passion nothing to do with the wars of the Roses ? Are we to exclude sentiment from all influence over the Huguenot and Puritan struggles,—and from the conflict between Spain and England in the days of the Armada ? Are the great European wars of the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, the wars of Louis XIV. with England and the Low Countries, the War of the Succession in Spain, and the bias of the various parties to those great struggles, to be interpreted without any consideration of political sym- pathies, taste, or feelineb ? Even if Mr. Kinglake meant only to limit his principle to our own enlightened age, we have no less difficulty in tracing the course of his thought. If direct national interests were the primary stimulus to the great war with revolutionary France, and if political passions, sentiments, and predilec- tions, had nothing to do with the formation of the Holy Alliance and its policy, the history of that,period must much need rewriting. Again, it is surely a hard saying to ascribe our policy with regard to the Greek revolution to a cold and comprehensive view of English interests ? And certainly the Crimean war, though we do not dispute the advantage in the highest sense which Europe reaped from it, seems ti have had an origin by no means explicable by the theory enlightened self-interest. As far as we are able to form an judgment at all, the policy pursued in all great internation struggles is determined primarily by the passion and sen ment of peoples or their rulers, and secondarily only, and a very much smaller degree, by an enlightened self-interes We should be disposed to degrade Mr. Kinglake's in " law" to the position of a modifying disturbing influence in fact, to read " sentiment" or " passion" for " interest,' and " interest" for " sentiment."
Perhaps Mr. Kinglake would have been a little leas wide the truth if had laid down his principle only with regard t the secondary parties to a great struggle, and admitted to th full the overpowering effect of passion and sentinm. 4n. th original combatants. No doubt the scale into which natio throw their influence, when they are not engaged as p cipals, is much oftener determined by a calm view of cons quences than is the course taken by the original parties to r national conflict. If the national temper be not warmly excited, milder considerations have room to operate, and in- terest will be fully weighed. But even then. a sentiment which does.not amount to a passion will generally outweigh a selfish interest. We were not directly concerned either with the Greek, or the Italian, or the Hungarian revolution. In the strict sense of the term, the interest of England was rather opposed to all these movements as embarrassing to commerce, and was strongly opposed to the extension of French influence in Italy. Yet, in all these cases, the sen- timent of sympathy so far triumphed over our interest in peace, that our influence, so far as it was exerted at all, was exerted strongly on the revolutionary side. And no doubt exactly the same inference may be drawn from the attitude of England towards the Northern and Southern States of America. It is not true that our interests have overruled our sympathies, though it is unfortunately true that our irritation at Northern boastfulness and insolence—which we suppose is at least as much of a national " sentiment" as our detestation of slavery—has overruled, in great ,measure, our deep-rooted aversion to the fundamental institution of the South.
On the whole, then, and speaking with due reserve of the possible effect which Mr. Kinglake's withheld demonstra- tion might take upon our reason, we are strongly disposed to regard this great theorem of his as very nearly the con- verse of the truth. " Kinglake's theorem" strikes us as a pure illusion.
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