The President's Key
From DARSIE GILLIE
PARIS
IHIS has been Charles de Gaulle's peak year, in which he rose from a situation very near defeat to one very like triumph—in external as well as in internal affairs. So placed, a man of his resolution is almost bound to continue along the lines of thought so strikingly confirmed. A year ago his ability to make peace in Algeria and to master the steadily growing campaign of ter- rorism from the extreme Right were both open to question. Even when his emissaries had signed peace it was still doubtful whether the OAS ter- rorists would not succeed in sabotaging it. But their activity reachcd its climax in the attempt to murder the President near the end of August and then rapidly subsided. The wave of refugees from Algeria proved less dangerous than had been feared. The President's highly personal tac- tics in internal politics were immensely success- ful in the elections, startling the sceptical political experts. Externally he had enjoyed a popular triumph in Germany. confirming his policy of Franco-German. alliance. Britain's application for membership of the European Economic Community, an institution due to French initiative and in which France. played the biggest part. was in itself a further success, although the application was not altogether convenient. But it did strengthen France's hand within the Com- munity and 'threv, into relief her advantageous position. The Cuban crisis strengthened de Gaulle's position internally. France was less shaken by it than Britain. It seemed to confirm several of his main arguments: that the deterrent could work when a power possessing it was threatened in an essential interest that might well not work if the threat was only peripheral: that the NATO powers might be swept unconsulted into war; that the President's prickly policy of non-dependence was fruitful. France's prestige suffered less than that of Britain through not be- ing consulted. At Rambouillet it was clearly Britain. not France, that was asking to be helped —a most unusual situation.
Britain's 'special relationship with the United States seemed publicly abandoned by Washing- ton when Polaris was offered on the same terms to both Britain and France, but the long-resented inequality had disappeared, it seemed, through a levelling-down, not a levelling-up. This evidently was not de Gaulle's aim. That aim. it must be remembered, had been expounded in September, 1958. in the letter from General de Gaulle (then prime minister) to Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Mac- millan asking for a system of consultation with a view to the co-ordination of the three powers' policies the world over., Following on the Polaris offer came the Un'ted States attitude in the Congo, encouraging the United Nations action without any previous consultation will the three European allies most interested Here the very strong argument in favour of the United States going it alone as it did in the Cuban crisis did not exist.
The Polaris offer to France must be considered in two lights. First of all, is France interested in Polaris and secondly, what, other developments could the offer, even if rejected. bring about? President de Gaulle has no evident reason for abandoning his policy of non-dependence on the United States in nuclear armaments or anything Short of warheads. France's own nuclear de- velopment is now believed to be rapid and the advantages of non-dependence have been bought at a heavy price. She has no reason to turn her nuclear programme upside-down since, unlike Britain's, it has not been disturbed. It is also doubtful whether at present she could manufac- ture suitable warheads.
On the other hand, President de Gaulle's own method for establishing what he considers satis- factory relations with America has been 'ex- plained in his New Year greetings speech. The key for him is the consolidation of Western Europe so that as an organic unity it will balance the United States within NATO, thereby in his opinion strengthening NATO itself.
As an essential part of this policy the Presi- dent had already' spoken a fortnight ago in his message to parliament of the strengthening of Franco-German links as a primary aim. The premier in his turn had expressed regret in his speech to parliament that the negotiations with Britain were holding up those for a political framework to crown the economic one of the European Economic Community. In his New Year speech the President named two other further purposes for his policy of European uni- fication in addition to the main one of balancing America within thz Atlantic alliance. The first was that Western Europe should be able to re- ceive Britain once Britain had made up her mind to come in definitely and without reserve, and secondly that Western Europe should be able to negotiate a new peaceful relationship with Eastern Europe if the moment of relaxed tension should at last come.
From this it must be concluded that the Presi- dent looks to the increased weight of a united Europe as the cure for the chronic frictions be- tween the Atlantic allies and that Britain is only wanted in Western Europe if she enters it in order to add to that weight in Western Europe's deal- ings with the outer world rather than as a mediator. It would further seem that the Presi- dent considers the Franco-German link already sufficiently strong for the Western Europe which it reinforces to be able, even without Britain, to defend herself against the danger of a settle- ment between Washington and Moscow over the Western Europeans' heads. It may be that this way of thinking was the essential reason why the Rambouillet meeting was fruitless. If this cor- rectly interprets the President's way of thinking, then the Polaris offer itself is not likely to be accepted. but conversations may well arise out of the offer which would in themselves have some fruit. Above all, they would provide an occasion for President de Gaulle to explain that he is re- solved to defend Western Europe's claim to a de- termining voice in any East-West negotiations that would decide the future of Europe. He is de- termined to save Europe from a second Yalta even if Winston Churchill was unable to preserve her from the first.
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