THE PAYMENT OF CABINET MINISTERS.
" T"question of Cabinet Ministers' salaries is one which I think ought to be dealt with compre- hensively as a whole." This was the answer given by the Primo Minister to a question put to him on the 18th of last month, and that be should have spoken in this way at a time when the Government have so much and such anxious work on their hands is quite reason enough for again drawing attention to the subject. It falls into two distinct parts, one referring to a Minister's time when in office, the other to his time when he is in retirement. As regards the first of these periods, the most striking fact is the great and, on any rational principle, unintelligible differences in the salaries attached to different offices. The popular idea of the Cabinet is that it is a Committee of men to whom the conduct of the policy and business of the Empire has been committed by the Sovereign, and for once the popular idea is the right one. The work that has to be done is distributed among the members—the idea of a "Minister without portfolio" has never gained much recognition in England—but, with the exception of the Prime Minister, they have equal voting powers in Cabinet deliberations, and equal opportunities of influencing the result of those deliberations to the best of their ability. When a Ministry is formed each man is given the charge of a separate Department, and is specially responsible for the work done by it. But in the business of general Policy and the direction of national affairs—necessarily the most important part of a Minister's functions—all act together, and are invested with equal responsibility. It seems only reasonable that men who do the same kind of work, and have an equal voice in every decision arrived at, should receive the same pay, but as a matter of fact this principle is wholly disregarded. The First Lord of the Treasury, the five Secretaries of State, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Presidents of the Board of Trade and the Local Government Board receive £5,000 a year each. The Lord President of the Council, the Secretary for Scotland, the Presidents of the Board of Agri- culture and the Board of Education, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and the First Commissioner of Works receive £2,000 a year each. The First Lord of the Admiralty gets £500 less than the Secretary of State for War, the Chief Secretary for Ireland—who often has the most onerous post in the Cabinet—gets £4,425, and the Post- Master-General gets £2,500. This is a singular series of variations, especially when it is borne in mind that there is no corresponding inequality in the work done in return. Why, when the Ministers concerned with trade and local govern- ment receive, as they now do, £5,000 a year, those who have to do with agriculture and education should receive con- siderably less than half that sum ; why the Lord President of the Council—the most dignified of all Cabinet posts— should be left poor in comparison with the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant—a post which not verylong since was often held by a Member not in the Cabinet—would be in- soluble problems if we did not know that these inequalities are in most cases a matter partly of history and partly of accident. Agriculture is now a subject of the first import- ance. Education, again, is yearly costing the country more, and new problems are constantly presenting themselves which are difficult enough to tax the brain of the ablest Minister. Yet, while the magnitude of these subjects is being proclaimed on every platform, we contentedly mani- fest the amount of importance we really attach to them by giving their representatives the worst-paid places in the Cabinet. To what purpose is it that we go on describing the ,wonderful future that lies before the land and education, and the legislative genius that is needed to shape that future aright, so long as we consider that genius amply paid by £2,000 a year, though those who preside over trade and local government are each worth £5,000? In the days when the Government was largely the preserve of great families these differences mattered far less than they do now. To-day capacity is increasingly measured by the 'cash return it brings to its possessor, and if Cabinet rank is still to connote Cabinet qualifications there should be no inequality in Cabinet salaries. Circumstances will create differences enough between the members ; there is no need to extend them to the region of official income.
The second part of the question is in some ways even more pressing. As things stand, probably every Cabinet is likely to contain men who must look forward to the resigna- tion of office with genuine alarm. They have given up professional work, say, at the Bar or in journalism, and the prospect of being able to return to it is exceedingly uncertain. The positions they once held have been taken by others, and the work they have been doing while in office has not made it easier for them to find fresh work of the old kind. This is the penalty which we inflict on men whose only offence has been readiness to sacrifice an assured income and good prospects in the careers they have chosen in order to serve the State. Nor is it only they who suffer by this state of things. The members of each Cabinet usually furnish a considerable part of the material of which future Cabinets will be com- posed. It is not well that a man should fall out of his political environment the moment he is no longer a 'Minister. The supply of political ability and experience
• to the Opposition Front Bench is no less important than the maintenance of the same qualities on the Ministerial Front Bench. Each is the actual critic and the destined 'successor of the other, and if at each change of Ministry
some of the ablest members are forced by their financial necessities to retire from the field, there will be a constant impoverishment of a kind of material most necessary to the welfare of the nation. Politics are not a subject to be taken up, dropped, and then taken up again in the cheerful expectation that disuse will not have affected the capacity of the worker. If the country is to get the best a man has to give, he must feel that he is equally serving it whethei he is in office or in opposition. If he is to do this with any degree of certainty, he must go on reading the same kind of books—chiefly those "Blue Books" which are the least inviting of all forms of literature. He must live a large part of his time in London, and mix with the best elements of the society in which he moved while in office. He must remain intimate with the men who were yesterday his colleagues, and who are looking forward to having him as their colleague once more. It is quite impossible that all this should be done without an assured income, and the command of time and energy which an assured income carries with it, and it is equally impossible for him to command these advantages if he has to spend all his time and energy in picking up the fragments of the professional prospects he gave up when he entered the Cabinet. Nor is this all the mischief that the present system causes. The men we are describing are under two very severe temptations. One is to use their official knowledge as a means of gaining the capital which may make continuance in political life possible. And if this is resisted, there is the temptation to speculate for themselves, not relying on any information denied to other men, but merely trusting to their Own ability or good fortune. Each of these ways may prove a road to ruin, though the latter has the advantage that, while it may be seriously damaging to the purse, it does not necessarily injure character in the same degree. But there is no real difficulty in guarding against both dangers by removing the inducement to risk either of them.
We have suggested a rearrangement of Ministerial salaries before now, but when the Prime Minister speaks of the subject as one that ought to be dealt with comprehen- sively, we need offer no apology for returning to it. We would have the salary of every member of the Cabinet, with the exception of the Lord Chancellor, whose position is ex- ceptional—the Attorney-General should never be included in a Cabinet—fixed at £4,500 a year, the difference between this and the £5,000 which is now the highest sum going automatically to found a pension fund. In addition to this income we would, if possible, give each Minister an official house furnished, warmed, and lighted at the cost of the State. The Prime Minister, the Foreign, Indian, and Colonial Secretaries, and the heads of the Army and Navy should each have an additional £1,000 a year to defray the expenses incidental to the entertaining which is a necessity for the Ministers holding these six posts. A pension of £2,000 a year should. go automatically and as a matter of right, not favour, to each Cabinet Minister, rich or poor, on his leaving office, provided that he has held Cabinet rank for four years in all. This would do away with the declaration of insufficient private means which is at present imposed on applicants for Cabinet pensions, and would give the pension the character which properly belongs to it—that of a deferred payment for past good service. No doubt this proposal is capable of many improvements, and to make it as perfect as possible we further suggest the consideration of the whole subject being referred to a small Committee. If such a Committee included the Speakers of both Houses, the chiefs of two Cabinets, past and present, one belonging to each of the two great parties, it might be expected to bring to the inquiry all the special knowledge required. But, in whatever way the question is handled, we share Mr. Asquith's conviction that it is not one that should any longer go unconsidered. No doubt under our scheme there would be a certain increase in the total amount of Ministerial salaries and pensions, but that would be amply made up by the justice done to individuals and by the certainty of better service to the State. Ministers underpaid when in office, and when in opposition not secured from penury if they resolve to avoid money- making of the kind which will either lower their personal dignity or else prevent them studying public questions, are a positive danger to the nation. To act as we are
acting now is to risk bad service where good service is absolutely essential to the public welfare.
We have one more word to add. If the thing is to be done, it must be done quickly, and before the present Cabinet go out of office. New Ministers cannot begin by raising their own salaries. That privilege is reserved for Members of new Parliaments. But Mr. Asquith, acting on the recommendations of an impartial Committee, might very properly pass an Act, to come into operation, say, within one year, establishing the system we propose. To do so might seem irksome, but unquestionably it would be a notable public service.
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