BOOKS.

CREIGHTON'S "HISTORY OF THE PAPACY."

Tax period with which Mr. Creighton now deals is less attractive than that which occupied his first two volumes. They told of a time in which men had still enough religion to be keenly alive to abuses and to desire amendment. Not only heretics like- Wycliffe and Hass, but the whole body of decent Churchmen, wished for reform, and it was attempted in the Councils of Con- stance and Basil. With the failure of the Conciliar movement, the hope of a peaceful reformation in head and members died away, and it became evident that the Popes were no longer the- spiritual heads of Christendom. Their ecclesiastical position, remained, and was of the greatest importance to them, since it brought them into relation with all the Powers of Europe, and gave them the means of rendering services to those whose assist- ance they required. Their aims, however, were no longer catholic and cocumenical ; they did not seek to extend the authority of the Church, but to use its prestige for the advance- ment of their personal interests.

Mr. Creighton's sub-title, "The Italian Princes," suggests• the dominant purpose of the Popes of this period, which was to get within their grasp as much territory and as many cities as possible. The greater part of these two volumes is taken up. with telling us how the towns of the Romagna were taken and. retaken by force and fraud until they became a part of the Papal dominions. This scramble for territory affords in one way a poor material for history, since it is hard to be interested in mere battles of kites and crows. On the other hand, it affords- the narrator the advantage of a simple and continnons action. In dealing with the great days of the Papacy, the historian's view must range over all Europe, and he may find a difficulty in bringing its world-wide influences into the scope of a single narrative. Here we are distracted by no efforts on behalf of religion or morale, and can watch every move in the varying chances of the game until the stakes are landed, and the temporal power of the Popes established. Mr. Creighton tells us that the work was not in vain. No action of the Popes, he urges, could have prevented the Reformation, which was not due merely to an outraged sense of morals, but to deep and wide differences of thought :— "If this be so," he says, "the foundation of the States of the Church was by no means an unworthy or unnecessary work. If the crash bad come when the Papacy was politically insignificant, it might have been entirely swept away. As it was, the Papacy was preserved on political grounds till it bad time to put forth new strength and re-establish its hold on the ecclesiastical system. Had not the Papacy possessed a strong foothold in the States of the Church, it might, in the rapid movement of the Reformation, have been reduced to its primitive condition of an Italian bishopric. The story of the founding of the States of the Church may be regarded as an episode, an ignoble episode, in the history of the Papacy, bat it is none the lees an integral part of its development."

There may be readers who would "crane" at the assumption that the maintenance of the Papacy was a necessary work, but

• A Hiatory of the Papacy during th. Period of eh. Rejtmeation. By M. Creighton, M.A. Volo.III, and IV.—" TheItalian Princes," 14644518. London: Longman and Co. 1887.

wa do not think it needs justification. The historian's business is not to speculate on what might have been, but to show the causes of what exists ; but he must be on his guard against attributing to the actors too much foresight as to the result of their work. Mr. Creighton is not exempt from this failing, and it is an instance of it that he finds a settled and reasonable policy in the nepotism of Sixtus IV. and Alexander VI. To maintain the temporal possessions of the Popes, he tells us,—

" Sixtus IV. combined natural affection with statecraft, and elevated nepotism into a political principle. If the Pope were to act decisively, he must have lieutenants whom he could entirely trust, whose interests were bound up with his, and who could use for the furtherance of the Papal rule the resources which the Pope could supply Sixtus IV. disregarded all considerations of de- corum ; he took his nephews, men of no position and little capacity, and placed at their disposal all the resources of the Roman See. They were to be magnificent puppets on the stage of Italian politics, moved by the Pope's hand, executing the Pope's schemes, and bringing back their spoils to the Pope's feet."

As a matter of fact, these puppets were very much alive, and little inclined to postpone their own aggrandisement to any public aims of the Pope, nor can we see that Sixtus had any purpose beyond that of pushing his family. If he had had such a purpose, he would not have been willing to forego Papal claims and remit tribute in order to secure an advantageous marriage for his nephew. As with Sixtus IV., so with Alexander VI., the first object was the advancement of his family; and had his plane been fully successful, Caner Borgia would have been the real ruler of the Roman States, and the next Pope his instrument. The result showed that the power of the Papacy could not thus be transferred, and Riario and Borgia alike fell as soon as a change of Popes withdrew the support to which they owed their posi- tion. Meanwhile, in trying to secure a principality for them- selves, they had prevented other Italian Powers from obtaining possession of the territory which was soon to belong definitely to the States of the Church ; but the service thus rendered to the Papacy was unintentional.

The attribution of a public and politic aim to these selfish rulers is but one example of Mr. Creighton's general tendency to make the best of the Popes. This is manifest specially, and we think mischievously, in his treatment of Alexander VI. Any one who derived his impression of this Pope only from the book before us, would think him a man no worse than his contem- poraries, who had got a bad reputation because he had more energy and ability than his rivals. This excessive lenity is not due to any readiness to condone crime in consideration of strength and capacity. It comes rather of an over-scrupulous desire not to be unfair to one whose character has been too much blackened. We are told in the preface ;—

" I have tried to deal fairly with the moral delinquencies of the Popes, without, I trust, running the risk of lowering the standard of moral judgment. Bat it seems to me neither necessary to moralise at every turn in historical writing, nor becoming to adopt an attitude of lofty superiority over any one who ever played a prominent part in European affairs, nor charitable to lavish undiscriminating censure on any man. All I can claim is that I have not allowed my judgment to be warped by a desire to be picturesque or telling."

Against this we have not a word to say, and we do not com- plain of a want of censure, bat of an excess of apology. We are too often reminded that the current morality was low, and that Alexander only acted like his contemporaries. In a sense this is true. There is probably no crime or vice of his that could not be matched among the condottieri and political intriguers of Italy. But justice does not bind us to try a Pope by the very lowest standard of his time, and even so Alexander VI. would have a bad pre-eminence. Others were notable for lust, cruelty, or treachery, but Alexander for all. When we are told that "Alexander frankly accepted the principles of the game, but broke through its flimsy conventions," it appears to us to mean that whereas his rivals were hampered by some little grain of conscience, he alone was utterly unfettered. Perhaps the most curious thing is the way in which Mr. Creighton treats charges of assassination or poisoning. When, as of course often happens, they are unproved, he dismisses them as slanders. Yet when he comes to sum up the matter, he says:—"It is not improbable that Alexander VI. used poison in the same way as his con- temporaries, but I do not think that many of their attempts succeeded." In support of his opinion, he adds the quaint argument that "even Cardinals must die, and the number who died in Alexander's pontificate was not beyond the average," and a table of deaths under four Popes is subjoined. We suppose Mr. Creighton is indulging in a rather grim joke. His tables show a rate of deaths under Alexander of 2.45 as compared with 1'8

under other Popes, and would make him responsible for about seven deaths, if it were not that such averages are utterly valueless.

We have insisted on this point of Borgia's character because it exemplifies the danger, often not recognised, of being over- reasonable. It is well for the historian to remember that he is dealing with men like himself, and to imagine what motives might have urged him to act as they did ; but he must also let his imagination play freely on points of difference, and not fear to represent things as they were, even though to us they seem monstrous. He will be excused for becoming more picturesque and telling, if he is also more true.

The apologetic method works better with Julius II., although even here Mr. Creighton passes somewhat too lightly over the vices that stained the Pope's character. Julius at least did not sacrifice the State to his family. He often blundered, and he lacked entirely that knowledge of men which is a ruler's chief gift, since it enables him to choose fit instruments. Yet his energy and audacity gave him some touch of greatness, and he did occasionally show political capacity, as in his treatment of the Schismatic Council. If he had contented himself with asserting his supremacy, and ordering the Council to dissolve, it might have become an organ for the widespread discontent of Europe. By the counter-move of summoning a Council to the Lateran, he converted a dangerous attack into a source of wealth and credit. Yet, when all has been said on their behalf, it must be admitted that both he and his successor were altogether unfit for their position as spiritual heads of Christendom. And even allowing that the Reformation was not simply a moral revolt, it is none the less true that many of the evils that accompanied it sprang from the debasement of the central government of the Church. It is a defect in Mr. Creighton's work that he brings ns to the very verge of the Reformation without any hint of the storm that was gathering beyond the Alps. It seems as if his attention was so concentrated on Italy that be had no eyes for the rest of the Christian world ; yet a history of the Papacy should surely deal with its relations to all its subject populations. We do not mean that Mr. Creighton was bound to write a history of religious development in Europe, but we should expect him to note signs of prevalent feeling, whether of growing disaffection or content. Moreover, there is one very practical point on which information would be valuable,—the Papal finance. What was the Pope drawing from Europe in the fifteenth century P Here is a question which affects his relations with the whole Church, as well as his princely power in Italy ; yet, so far as we know, Mr.

Creighton does not touch upon it. We read of special occasions when the Pope got money by the sale of offices, by the appoint- ment or the death of Cardinals, but we have no attempt at estimating the tribute that he received from Europe. We are aware that it is easier to ask such questions than to answer them ; yet the most imperfect estimate would do something to make the Pope's power and influence more intelligible.

When all deductions have been made, the book remains a valuable addition to our historical literature. Mr. Creighton shows the same thoroughness of study as in his previous volumes, while his mastery over his materials is even more noticeable than before. He has the rare gift of knowing what to leave unsaid. Too many historians cannot bear to waste any knowledge they have acquired, and overwhelm their readers with details which distract attention from the main narrative. Here even the notes are made strictly subordinate to the general effect. This may seem to some a small matter, but it will not be judged such by any one who knows how much of capacity and self-restraint it implies.