The Trouble in Egypt
A LTHOUGH the Declaration of 1922 nominally gave
A
Egypt her independence it gave it on strict conditions. These conditions should always be remem- bered when mischief brews in Egypt, for while from their nature they account for frequent outbursts they keep the danger within measure. Egypt, indeed, has so much to lose and so little to gain. by forcibly challenging British control that the present uneasiness will probably be added to the long list of crises which have passed without conflict or paralysis.
Friends of Egypt here are sometimes apt to argue as though the overruling conditions mentioned above did not exist. They say, " As we have given Egypt her freedom, and there is now an overwhelming Nationalist majority, that majority ought surely to have the right of decision. If the Egyptians wish Great Britain to leave the country it is 'not for us to say no. Otherwise independence really means nothing." What is forgotten by persons who argue thus is that the Declaration of 1922 was an extraordinarily balanced and delicate instrument. It did not grant independence free of all restrictions, for the simple reason that it was ImpoSsible for us to do so. When with general consent we became solely responsible for Egyptian welfare we had entrusted to us the responsibility of protecting all the foreign residents—Frenchmen, Italians, Germans, Greeks, Armenians, Slays, Levantines, and Jews—who live under the Capitulations. We mention that point first because Great. Britain cannot disembarrass herself of such obligations. But there were, of course, other points more intimately concerning Great Britain herself.
It is a thousand pities that the reservations which Great Britain felt compelled to make in 1922 were not embodied there and then in a Treaty. They would then have been beyond the possibility of dispute so long as faith was kept. As it was, when we declared the British Protectorate in Egypt to be abolished we men- tioned four special matters as being " absolutely reserved to the discretion -of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto." The Egyptian Nationalists not unnaturally feel that as the relations of Great Britain and Egypt are not finally settled it is worth while to strengthen their position and weaken ours in preparation for the final settlement. The four special matters reserved were : (1) The British duty' of protecting Egypt against outside aggression. (2) The safeguarding of Imperial communications. (8) The pro- tection of the foreign communities. (4) The retention of the Sudan as a purely British area of administration. These reservations created a sort of overhead Constitution in Egypt which can be modified by " free discussion and friendly accommodation," but certainly not by force or wile.
Ever since Zaghlul obtained his sweeping majority, but refrained from taking office himself, his followers have made life a burden to the able Liberal statesmen who have held the post of Prime. Minister. These Prime Ministers have taken up the task, not because they represented the opinions of the Wafd (Nationalist Party), but because they alone had enough experience. As the Cairo correspondent of the Times points out, the Wafd' campaign (invariably anti-British, of course) has been marked so far by foilr distinct phases. First there was the movement; which Was completely suCcessfUl quantitatively though it failed qualitatively, to obtain control of the Chamber. ' Next there was the capture of the fellahin. The fellahin used to be the stoutest supporters of the British Occupation, for they knew that under British rule they could obtain justice against rapacious Egyptian officials and could obtain it in no other way. Few things pleased Lord Cromer more in his various experiences in Egypt than the saying of a peasant woman who bravely defied an official. " There is a man called Crahmer," she said, " and he will help me." The Wafd obtained the adherence of the fellahin by collaring the village mayors and using them as party agents. Then the Wafd forced into its orbit the religious establishments. The fourth move—which is the cause of the present trouble—was the attempt to control the Army.
A Parliamentary Committee has recommended that the grant for the Sirdar should be withheld by the Chamber. It is not that the Nationalists desire in a pacific temper to reduce the cost and size of the Army, for they actually want to strengthen it. They think, however, that by abolishing the Sirdarship they will end British military control and make the Army available for Egyptian uses. For a long time they have tried, not without some success, to turn the Army into a political machine. It is quite clear that this inter- ference with the Army strikes at the very heart of the reservations which Great Britain made in 1922. If the Army refused to obey its few British officers, or if, even though it gave obedience, it had been debased into a state of inefficiency, Great Britain could not guarantee the safety of the foreign communities or protect Egypt or secure the Canal.
The ingenious Nationalists argue that the Egyptian Army was not even mentioned in the British Declaration of 1922. " How can any Egyptian Government be really responsible," they ask, " if the Army is not at its disposal ? " Although the Army was not discussed in the negotiations which ended in the Declaration of 1922, the maintenance of its status was very plainly implied. The Army was then, of course, under British control and obviously Great Britain could not have accepted so many responsibilities if she had sanctioned any possibility of the Egyptian Army being turned into a hostile or even an obstructive body.
Of course, there is no question whatever of going back 'upon the grant of independence to Egypt. The degree of independence must ultimately be increased, not lessened. But the future is with the Egyptians themselves, not with us. The sooner they make it possible for us to modify the extent of our interference the better we shall be pleased. If they choose the way of violence they will deflect sympathyto Great Britain, who is the champion of the foreigner. The British nation as a whole is still of the opinion which Palmerston expressed to Napoleon III ; we want friendly relations with Egypt, but as little responsibility as can be. The extremists ought to help us on our way to that end instead of delaying us. It is difficult to understand what they think they would gain if they could make it impossible for Great Britain to stay in Egypt. If Great Britain went, somebody else would step in. Would the Nationalists prefer. Signor Mussolini ? Cyrenaica would be a good jumping Off place for the next candidate for our responsibilities. And Signor Mussolini would certainly have a Very short and sharp way with the Wafd.
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