MR. BRODRICK'S ARMY SCHEME.
WE cannot sympathise with the attacks which are being made in so many quarters just now in re- gard to Mr. Brodrick's Army scheme. We are quite willing to admit that the scheme is capable of amendment in certain respects, but there never has been, and we may feel certain the. there never will be, a scheme of which that cannot be said. But Mr. Brodrick's scheme is attacked on much wider grounds. One would imagine from much that is written and spoken about it that he had proposed a dangerous and doubtful revolution in our whole military system, and that it was necessary to oppose it in order to save the nation from some fatal step. In our view, this is a most exaggerated way of looking at the matter. The great advantage of Mr. Brodrick's plan is that it is essentially practical and, in the best sense, conservative. Introduced at a time of crisis and upheaval in our military system, it does not attempt any very momentous or original changes, but attempts instead to remedy patent defects on the one hand, and on the other to develop parts of the existing organisation which have been proved to be useful and valuable. Mr. Brodrick was in the position of an architect called in to advise how to deal with a standing building which obviously required a great deal of attention. He might, of course, have said that the only way would be to pull down and rebuild from the foundation. Instead he advised, as we think very wisely, that as the building must remain in use, the best plan was not to rebuild altogether, but to strengthen certain parts and make certain additions,—i.e., to preserve the main fabric in an improved condition rather than first to destroy and then remake. Let us consider for a moment what the essentials of Mr. Brodrick's scheme are, and then ask our readers whether at the present juncture it would have been reasonable to attempt anything more than has been proposed.
A great deal has been said in condemnation of Mr. Brodrick's proposal for an organisation of six army corps at home, and certain critics have talked as if the proposal were a terrible blot on his scheme because the army corps system is alleged to be utterly unsuited to our needs. Personally, we do not attach any very special significance to the army corps organisation, and are quite prepared to believe that a system of divisions would be as good. But in truth the matter is of minor importance. The great thing is to get the men, to get the proper proportions of artillery and mounted men, and then to get them organised for training under capable general officers with efficient staffs. This can certainly be done under an army corps system—though no doubt it could be done under a divisional system —and therefore if the Comman,er - in -Chief and the Headquarters Staff prefer to think in and organise by means of army corps, there is not the slightest objection to the plan. To talk as if the army corps organisation would imperil, or even absolutely prevent, true military reform is childish. If our leading soldiers prefer that grouping, and like to think out all the necessaries for an Army in terms of that grouping, by all means let them do so. We beg our readers, then, when they consider Mr. Brodrick's scheme, not to be alarmed by any terrible things they may hear said about army corps and their complete uselessness to the British Empire. They must not, of course, on the other hand, swallow the scheme merely because it contains those "blessed words," and imagine that if they have so many army corps all will be well. They must just leave the army corps proposal on one side as from their point of view of secondary importance. If they get a good scheme on other lines, the army corps organisation will certainly not ruin it. When we come to the essentials of Mr. Brodrick's scheme—i.e., to the flesh and blood and iron out of which all armies, whether called army corps, or divisions, or com- mandos, are formed—we find that Mr. Brodrick has applied himself with great practical sense to the task of providing men and material for the military needs of the nation. Our Army consists of three elements,—the Regulars, the Militia. and Yeomanly, and the Volunteers. All these require strengthening and improvement in various ways, and in our belief Mr. Brodrick has in all three instances applied, we will not say the best possible remedy, but what is in most cases the best remedy possible in the circum- stances. The way in which the Reserves answered the call showed the value of our short-service system taken as a whole. But that system can only give its fullest and best results if the plan of a battalion abroad and a battalion at home is maintained The number of troops required at present to police the Empire has made it necessary, how- ever, in a large number of cases to keep both battalions abroad. To remedy this Mr. Brodrick proposes to raise a certain number of special garrison battalions out of old soldiers, and to let these battalions take the place of bat- talions now abroad. The result will be to strengthen the Regular Army without increasing the number of recruits required in each year,—the explanation being, of course, that in the case of the soldiers who join the new garrison regiments their period of service is prolonged. In this way the Regular Army, without either increasing the demand foi recruits or going back to a long-service system, is placed on a surer footing. In addition, Mr. Brodrick proposes very greatly to increase the Regular Artillery. All this is sound and good, but we wish that Mr. Brodrick had done one more thing to the Regular Army. Except during war, the Guards are now to remain at home. We wish Mr. Brodrick while accepting this had added to the Guards a Welsh Guard regiment of three battalions, and made the Irish Guards three battalions also. He would then have had at home always at full strength fifteen battalions of Guards—i.e., fifteen thousand men with the colours—and as the Guards have a really short service he would have had also a very large Guards Reserve. With- out, that is, adopting the impracticable plan of a great home army, he would have got a good many of its advantages. However, we get something very like that as it is, and we shall not quarrel with Mr. Brodrick over our Welsh regiment of Guards. As regards the Militia, Mr. Brodrick does, we believe, the wise thing. He proposes to increase and improve the Militia, and also to make a real Militia Reserve. His Yeomanry proposals are both bold and sound. The Yeomanry have proved of great value, and he is going to develop them from a useful survival into a most important part of our forces. They are to give us in the future a mounted force of some thirty-five thousand men. When we come to the Volunteers, we also find Mr. Brodrick's proposals sound, except in one particular. He is quite right to give the Volunteer Artillery better guns, to help them in the matter of transport, and to try to improve the Volunteer officer. Our only objection to his scheme is that he seeks to put too great a strain upon the Volunteers in the way of camp exercise. It seems to us that it is essential never to forget that the Volunteer is not, as a rule, his own master, and that, therefore, if too great demands are made on his time, he will be unable to remain a Volunteer. The official answer is, of course, If the Volunteer cannot give up enough time to get properly trained, he had better abandon Volunteering.' To this we demur altogether. The great use of the Volunteer Force is to provide a large number of men who have the elements of military training, and who in a great national emergency could be converted in a month or so into fully trained men. That is, we would rather have three hundred thousand men of the present Volunteer type than thirty thousand men who were as well drilled as if they were Militia We want to see the Volun- teers encouraged in every possible way by the issue of good weapons and the supply of other equipment, but we would not make the strain on the Volunteer any heavier than it is at present. All that we would exact ruthlessly from the Volunteer would be good shooting. We would infinitely rather have a high average of shooting in a Volunteer regi- ment than a high average of attendances in camp. Doubtless. however, Mr. Brodrick's scheme can and will be modified in this particular should it have the effect of stopping Volun- teering, as we fear it may have. Taken generally, then, we hold that Mr. Brodrick's scheme is, as we have said, sound and practical,—does not attempt too much, and yet does what it was wise, nay, necessary, to do.
There remains to be considered the objection that Mr. Brodrick will not get the men for his scheme because he failed to propose any addition to the pay of the Regulars. Some of his critics profess to think that his whole proposal must fall to the ground on this score. Such a form of criticism appears to us to be particularly unreason- able. We are ourselves on the side of higher pay, but we cannot blame Mr. Brodrick for determining to try first whether the old pay and certain ameliorations in the soldier's lot will not get him the numbers he requires. If they do, he will have shown his wisdom in waiting. If not, then he must increase the pay to whatever point is neces- sary. It is clearly not part of Mr. Brodrick's plan never to. increase the soldier's pay. Instead, it is evidently assumed in his plan that sufficient pay must be granted to raise the numbers he asks for. In our opinion, it is probable that the pay will have to be considerably raised, but we should like first to see the effects of a clear adver- tisement of the fact that in the future the soldier will not be subjected to stoppages, and that as long as he is not in trouble with his superiors he will be " all found and well found," and have a shilling a day to spend as pocket-money. If that does not draw recruits, we must go to Captain Lee's ls. 9d. a day. If we do, we shall, of course, get a superior type of man, and one who will be of much better physique, and so far less costly in the matter of hospitals. It seems to us, then, that the resolutions passed by the Service Members, which in effect say that Mr. Brodrick must offer more pay and better conditions, do not in the least destroy or cut at the heart of the scheme.
Let us hope, then, that when Mr. Brodrick's scheme is discussed it will be discussed on its real merits, and that criticism will not be confined to matters which can be so easily set right if they are wrong as the corps d'armee organisation and the rate of pay. We do not, of course, say that these matters, especially the latter, are not ex- tremely important, but we do say that Mr. Brodrick's scheme does not stand or fall by them. If the present pay had to be raised by 9d. a day, except as regards the cost, not a single item in the scheme would require modifica- tion. Again, even if those agitating words " army corps " were got rid of, all the essentials of the scheme would still remain intact.
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