Communication
What France is Saying
[To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR.] SIR,---As I tried to indicate in my letters from Geneva, I was always a little uneasy about the attitude of France if, and when, it became a question of the resolute operation of sanctions against Italy. M. Laval had stated definitely his support of the Covenant, but he had expressed it in a negative form. In spite of constant reassurances that in the last resort France would not fail in the fulfilment of her obligations, my doubts still lingered, and I decided therefore to break a journey to England and see for myself in Paris what was the position of French opinion. What I have gathered in conversation with politicians and journalists so far from removing my doubts, has increased them.
Right. Wing French politicians are in the highest degree reluctant to face a breach with Italy. Their main contention is that economic sanctions are bound to lead to military sanctions, and that once they are in operation, it will be impossible to limit the extent of the conflagration. They do riot doubt that the British and French fleets in combination could render Mussolini powerless if he remained in isolation, but they argue that he cannot conceivably allow himself to remain. in isolation. Driven to desperation he will turn to Hitler for aid. A big price will be demanded of him. It Might include a free hand in Austria and the extension of the German frontier to the line of the Brenner. Mussolini will, in their judgement, have no other coarse but to pay it. For the only alternative will be his own destruction and that of the Fascist 'regime.
Even if Hitler refuses his assistance to Italy, he will demand, they argue, from France and Great Britain a • price for his neutrality: This might involve the surrender of Memel, or expansion at the expense of Czechoslovakia. In a word, to their affrighted gaze resistance to Italy might mean capitula- tion to Germany. This fear is really fantastic, for it pre- supposes in the face of all the known facts that Hitler is prepared; at this moment when his preparations are still in their infancy, to risk a war of revenge in defiance of the• opinion of his General Staff. But the fear exists and it colours the whole outlook of the Right Wing parties. They dread, too, the effect of a breach with Italy on the disposition of the French forces. It must be remembered that for France there is only really one frontier, and that is the Rhine. It was with a profound sense of relief that following on the Franco-Italian understanding last January they were able to denude the Italian frontier of troops and concentrate their forces against the German menace. They dislike intensely the thought that they would have to be divided once again. In this they are backed up by' the French General Staff, who contend further that the French army will only march in defence of French soil. " The Frenchman," they say, " will not put on his uniform again except to resist actual invasion." Little faith is put in the solidarity of the Left in favour of sanctions. The propertied classes, fearful of the future, insist, with very little evidence that I could discover to back it up, that the Communists are only supporting sanctions in the, hope and belief that in the upheaval that will fellow they will have at last a chance of establishing the Communist State on the ruins of capitalist civilisation. They are convinced that Faigland is still fundamentally pacifist, and they have no con- fidence in the efliCiency of our military and naval forces. They still refuse to take into serious account the change in the attitude of the British people on the armaments issue or the growing . strength of the public opinion in England ern favour of resolute action against the aggression of Mussolini. " Are your people," I was asked, " really prepared to face the recruitment of another Kitchener's army ? " " Do they not really see the situation, as, at worst, a major demon- stration of the British fleet ?" It was clear that they thought that the British people were prepared to damn the conse- quences of sanctions against Italy only because they did_ not realise what the consequences might entail. They were openly contemptuous of any expression of opinion by the man in the street. " What does it matter what lie says ?" they sneered. " He will say one thing today and exactly the opposite next week."
I was impressed by the growth of Fascist thought among Frenchmen. Probably it is confined to Paris, but it is powerful and it has a grip on the French Press. The expression of pro-Italian feeling in the Paris newspapers is not by any means entirely due, as has been alleged, to Italian subsidies. The money of the French Fascists has played an important part. It was significant too that the hoardings were placarded with posters protesting against the policy of sanctions, and that they were sponsored by Fascist Organisations. Little weight is given in this quarter to any suggestion that if France fails us now, we might fail them in an emergency. was at pains to insist that public opinion in Great Britain was concerned primarily with the maintenance of international law, and that our obligations under Locarno were only con- eeived within the framework of Geneva, " You will have to stand by us," was the answer. • " You are as much menaced by Germany as we are. Our two countries are the one bulwark of European civilisation against Nazi barbarism."
This was coupled with a renewal of the demand that the pre-War conversations between the French and British General Staffs should be resumed. I replied that they were living in a wholly unreal world if they imagined that British opinion would ever consent to that in the present uncertain attitude of France to her 'League obligations. Their proposal for the solution of the Italo-Abyssinian problem has at any rate the virtue of simplicity. Mussolini should be given a bloodless victory. He should be allowed to march to Adowa and thereby wipe out the humiliating memories of the Italian defeat there in 1896. Italy would then go en fete for a great victory, the cities would be flood-lit and Mussolini could stage a triumphal procession through Rome. Then, once he had been given this opportunity to vindicate himself and his army in the eyes of his people he would be perfectly prepared to consent to a reasonable settlement wider the Aegis of the League Council.
Admittedly these opinions came from only one section of French political thought and that probably not the largest. section. The hostility of the agricultural districts to the economic policy of the Government is growing in intensity. Even Right-wing men were ready to admit that Herriot Might well carry with him a majority of the nation.
But the General Election is still a year ahead. M. Laval will have to deal with the Chamber of Deputies as it exists today. He is a man of the Right, and I can well understand, now that I have visited Paris, his timidities and his hesitations. The men upon whom lie relies for power would like to scuttle out of all their responsibilities for action against Italy under the League Covenant. They will probably be persuaded. in the last resort to Consent to economic sanctions, but the very idea of military sanctions fills them with horror and alarm. The present temper of Right-wing opinion in France is .a serious complication to British policy in relation to the Italian situa- tion, but it is one that in my judgement must be faced and
understood by the British Government and am,
Previous page
