MARGINAL COMMENT
By HAROLD NICOLSON HE many political and economic difficulties which now beset the British Commonwealth and Empire Commonwealth and Empire would, even in the days of our maximum power, have demanded the greatest national unity and the utmost governmental discretion. In dealing with these problems our fathers would have taken it for granted that in defending British rights and interests they were adopting a policy which would commend itself to the vast majority of their fellow-countrymen. Yet today, although it is abuhdantly deat to what extent British rights and interests are in- volved, there are many sincere and even admirable people who imagine that to defend British interests is in some manner reactionary, ' whereas to further Russian interests is progressive and good. The Russians themselves are deterred by no such inhibitions ; in every quarter of the globe they are persistently advancing their own interests, often in complete disregard of the engagements into which they have themselves entered as of the wishes of the populations con- cerned. Thus whereas the Soviet Government and their associates pursue a policy which is constant, co-ordinated and relentless, we give to the world an impression of uncertainty of purpose, hesitancy in action and division in counsel. To a large extent this is quite inevitable, since it will be many years before we have struck the new balance between our essential requirements and our capacity to safe- guard those requirements. For the moment our actions are bound to be empirical, and it is for this reason that our principles should be overt and constant. Few things would be more dangerous than for us at this stage, which is assuredly a stage of transition, to formulate a rigid policy or to occupy any positions which are not absolutely essential to hold. We are thus fortunate in having as our Foreign Secretary a man who combines soundness of principle with imperturbability of conduct and with that greatest of all diplomatic assets, the gift of patience. Under his pilotage we may well traverse this stormy stretch of sea and be able to refit eventually in calmer waters.
It is to be regretted, therefore, that among Mr. Bevin's political supporters there should be some who contend that he is pursuing a "right-wing policy." He.is, in fact, seeking, in the face of formidable difficulties, to construct a policy which is neither of the right nor of the left, but which aims at achieving stability through material im- provement. Few British Foreign Secretaries have been as aware as he is of what might be called the sedative influence of an enhanced standard of living. To him those strategic, and even political, con- siderations which loomed so largely in British foreign policy in the past are of less urgency, and of less ultimate importance, than the creation of conditions which will enable the more restless areas of Europe to achieve a higher degree of economic welfare. His long- term policy is thus original and creative rather than traditional ; it is not fair to judge him only by immediate actions in situations which he has inherited from the past and in many of which, owing to no fault of his own, he is placed in a false position. I should say that of the seven or eight Foreign Secretaries whom I have known, and with some of whom I have been in dose association, Mr. Bevin is the one who looks furthest ahead. It may well be that, in our =- predictable era, his long-term policy, being shrouded in the mists of the future, may seem somewhat nebulous ; it may well be that it is one which it is difficult at this stage to define in any but implicit terms ; but it is a long-term policy none the less, and as 'such it should be furthered by all men of good will. And meanwhile we should accord him our confidence, our sympathy and, above all, our patience in the truly horrible perplexities which he has now to face.
* * *
Of all these perplexities, perhaps the most distressing is that which has now arisen in Greece. Few people who know anything about it would deny that we had no alternative but to intervene
forcibly at the time of the E.L.A.S. putsch. Few people could deny that our attempts thereafter to establish a Government of the left- centre in Greece were disinterested attempts. Few people could deny that, having once accepted the principle of a plebiscite on the Monarchy, we were obliged to abide by the result. Yet the fact that we were unable at any given moment to break the unhappy chain of circumstance has now placed us in a situation which ionot only false but highly invidious. We are being edged into a position in which it will appear to all the world that British forces art being maintained in Greece not for the purpose of preventing massacres, but for the purpose of preventing the Slav bloc from reaching Salonika. And it would be ingenuous, and quite useless, to pretend that the Aegean has not become an area of grave strategic competition between the West and the East. The Russians will accuse us, of course, of supporting a Monarchist-Fascist system for purely im- perialistic ends. There are many, even of our friends, who will credit that assertion. And whereas, along the whole northern frontier Of Greece, the Yugoslays, the Albanians and the Bulgars can foment serious disturbances, without any independent investigation of their complicity being permitted, the slightest counter-action on our part will be. patent to the whole world.
We must expect that before long the Yugoslays, the Bulgarians and even the Albanians will unite into a Federation extending from the Adriatic to the Black Sea and affiliated, in spirit if not in the letter, to the Soviet Union. We must remember that the distance which separates Salonika from the Yugoslav frontier is not more than fifty miles. The war of nerves which the Slays have been able to direct against Greece and Turkey is therefore based on formidable realities. If we are to steer through these reefs without damage, we must accord the Foreign Secretary our united support. And if we are to do this, we must remind ourselves frankly of the principles involved. It is not a British interest that the Eastern Mediterranean should fall entirely under Russian domination. I do not see that this is a discreditable admission ; it seems to me a realistic admission of a geographical fact. It is necessary also (and how strange it is that it should be necessary!) to remember that, when all others failed us, Greece remained our staunch ally ; that Albania under its present Communist dictatorship is an artificial anomaly created and main- tained by the Slays ; and that Bulgaria has been our enemy, and Russia's enemy, in both the German wars. Our support of Greece, therefore, is not only a strategic necessity but a moral obligation. To allow these quite simple and incontrovertible issues to be clouded by doctrinal affections or prejudices is to ignore necessities which are absolute necessities. And if Russia is to understand that our attitude in this matter is a determined attitude, then there must be no sniping at Mr. Bevin behind his back.
* * * *
I do not question that the Slays have a good claim to an economic access to the Aegean. The Yugoslays before the war did in fact enjoy extensive port facilities at Salonika. The Bulgarians were offered similar facilities at Kavalla and Dedeagatch, but preferred to nurse their grievance. Hew well do I remember a discussion which took place on this subject between Lord Curzon and M. Stamboliisky, the Bulgarian seasant leader! Lord Curzon was always attracted by rugged, massive people, and he took an immediate liking to Stamboliisky. He urged him in the utmost amity to accept the economic outlet which the Greeks had offered : Stamboliisky insisted that he must have everything or nothing. When he left, Lord Curzon accompanied him to the lift and placed a friendly hand upon his shoulder. "Tai explique," the Bulgarian Minister in London said to me afterwards, "au President du Conseil que cs geste-la emit rare pour un lord." " Et quel lord! " I answered.
Previous page
