GERMANY

Exits and entrances

Malcolm RUTHERFORD

Bonn—West German elections have come superficially to mirror those of Britain so closely that it is probably more intelligible to drop all those confusing initials by which everyone is referred to as some sort of democrat, and talk simply about the German Conservatives, Socialists and Liberals. Thus the main political argument in Bonn today, after the general election on Sunday, is over the possibility of forming a Lib-Lab alliance, just as it was in Britain after the indecisive result of the general election of 1964. Herr Willy Brandt, however, the Socialist leader, suffers from one major disadvantage not shared by Mr Wilson : he cannot rely on be- ing able to choose his own time to go to the country again in order to strengthen his posi- tion. It is going to be extremely hard to force a new general election much before the sixth session of the new parliament expires in four years' time. This is a pity, because in terms of an evolving political system, Sunday's results were very nearly perfect : they all but completed the process whereby Germany is moving towards a two-party system, thereby eliminating the need for unstable or preposterously large coalitions. Another election soon might have clinched it.

The results have confirmed the trend established in every general election since 1953, whereby the small parties go steadily under, while the Socialists come steadily up.

The Free Democrats, or Liberals, who have ad ministers in every Federal government but two, only just made it, with 5.8 per cent of the vote. The Socialists, on the other hand, roke the 40 per cent barrier for the first

time ever and reached 42.7—a rise of 3.7 per ent over_1965. Their share of the vote has ow risen so consistently for so long that

hey would have every excuse for hoping hat one more trip to the polls would do it. oreover, their performance can be put ven more impressively. This was the first ime that they have gained more members 'reedy elected to parliament than the Con- ervatives (or Christian Democrats), by 127 o the Conservatives' 121; this time the onservatives gained only one new con- tituency by direct election, while the ocialists gained thirty-four. Last time, in 965. the Conservatives won 154 seats meetly against the Socialists' ninety-four. This is not to belittle the remarkable erformance of the Conservatives in remain- g the largest party after having been in

• ffice for the lifetime of the Federal epublic. It is simply to say that because e trend to a two-party system has not been une completed the situation is in a mess. e Liberals, whose share of the vote was !most halved, have been returned to parlia- ent with thirty seats. A Lib-Lab coalition ould have a majority of twelve, and this s. been the object of Herr Brandt's first !res. Twelve would be a perfectly work- le majority in Britain because of the ever- esent possibility of calling new elections the event of deadlock. In Germany it is uch more complicated. For according to e basic law' relating to parliament, vir- ally the only ways of forcing elections fore the sixth term is up are either if filament is completely unable to elect a

Chancellor. or if a vote of no confidence is moved against the Chancellor and defeated, in which case the Chancellor can—if he wishes—advise a dissolution. There are a number of reasons why neither of these possibilities is very likely, but the most important is that new elections would hardly be in the interest of the Liberals, who will, effectively, have the power to prevent them. They know that the process of elimi- nating the small parties could well be com- pleted next time.

The Liberals are, in any case, like their British counterparts, a very mixed lot. About a third of them would prefer a renewal of the alliance with the Conserva- tives in which they helped to govern Germany until the fall of Dr Erhard, to a coalition with the Socialists. Their leader Herr Scheel. is far from secure. Their willingness to change horses in midstream, that is to walk out of one coalition and into another without elections being called, is notorious, and Herr Brandt's overtures to them are palpably motivated by the knowledge that it is only with their support that he can become Chancellor. In other words he needs them more than they need him. His principal interest is in using them until his own party is in a position to govern alone. In the event of strains the Liberals could always reckon to switch allegiance to the Conservatives and help elect a new Chancellor again without elections being called.

Strains in a Lib-Lab coalition are more than likely, for the issues which unite the two parties are almost entirely confined to foreign policy, on which there will be very few votes in the next parliament. It is the social issues which inevitably hog the parlia- mentary limelight and on these the Liberals (for all their worker-director leanings) remain a basically right-wing party.

The Socialist leaders are well aware of this. It explains their reservations about the alliance, despite Herr Brandt's apparent eagerness. The trouble is that the alternatives also have drawbacks to them. A Conserva- tive-Liberal coalition would have a parlia- mentary majority of forty-eight, and not unnaturally the Conservatives have moved in almost as quickly as the Socialists with their own offers, though they have been doing it less publicly. It would face the Socialists with the strong possibility of four years in the wilderness. This may be attrac- tive to some of the more hard-line party supporters, who believe opposition could be used to return to the left. But it has no appeal to the party leaders, who have striven for so long to achieve respectability.

The third possibility is a new grand coalition. It would have a parliamentary voting majority of 436, and in that sense it may seem ludicrous that it should even be considered. It would have the advantage, however, that it would be one way of changing the electoral system in order to prevent such a messy situation ever rising again. The Liberals could never be expected to agree to electoral reform in coalition with anyone, because they owe their continued existence as a parliamentary party to proportional representation.

The need to reform the voting system was one of the chief justifications for the forma- tion of the grand coalition in the first place. The attempt failed partly because the Socialists believed that proportional repre- sensation also helped them. They thought from experience that they could never get more direct seats than the Conservatives, and would thus have been permanently dis-

abled by a switch to the British system of majority voting. Sunday's results have shown this belief to be unfounded. They have removed socialist objections to reform.

Even before the election took place, Chancellor Kiesinger was suggesting that the coalition ought to be continued for a while to get reform through once and for all. For the Socialists to accept it would mean accepting him again as Chancellor. They could probably only do so if it were for an agreed time limit—say, one year, after which both parties would call for new elections, on the pretext if necessary that they could no longer agree on who should be Chancellor. It would be difficult and risky, but although the alternatives, because of Sunday's results, may be recipes for weak government and frequent crises, a Lib-Lab small coalition looks like being a chance.

But looking still further ahead, anyone who doubts whether the two big parties still have the will to cooperate ought to look at what happened at the cabinet meeting on Monday morning, only a few hours after the election results were known. Having fought the campaign almost entirely on the issue of the exchange rate of the Deutschemark, the cabinet decided with minimal dissension to allow it to float, and the quarrel was suddenly over.