TOPICS OF THE DAY.
M. POINCARE REVIVES.
WE hope that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald is not deceiving himself. He has spoken very hopefully of the possibility of coming to a full agreement with France, and his followers—though this is only natural and we do not complain of it—are continually saying that Anglo- French relations are much easier and more agreeable than they were when Mr. Baldwin or Mr. Lloyd George was Prime Minister. But, of course, the clash of prin- ciples has not yet come. Mr. MacDonald has much suavity and distinction in expressing himself, something, indeed, resembling a Gallic grace, which makes us wonder whether anything of the historic sympathy which existed between Scotland and France in the old days has crept into Mr. MacDonald's soul. Yet even that will not compose hard business differences. M. Poincare and Mr. MacDonald in their present stage remind us of the delight- ful ritual of the salute in a fencing tournament. How charming it would be if our Prime Minister could go on making stately passes without any danger of interruption from the antagonistic rapier, and no doubt he would like to go on doing it for ever ! Nevertheless, the time for the clash is coming nearer. The Expert Committees are about to report, and if a settlement of reparations and the Ruhr does not follow in the wake of those reports, then the hope which has been recently rising will become dimmer than ever.
In these circumstances, let us look at the latest material which can help us to form some expectation of what is likely to happen. When we wrote last week M. Poin- care had just fallen from power on a snap division. It is probable that several of the votes which were recorded against him would have been cast the other way if the Deputies themselves had been present. As it was the proxies voted, as is their way, automatically ; having their instructions, they voted literally in accordance with them. They could not be expected suddenly to vote so as to save the Government, since no one had ever foreseen that the Government would be in danger. At first it was thought that M. Poincare would insist upon maintaining his resignation, even though the President should " never so wisely " try to charm him back. And, indeed, if M. Poincare had really wanted to retire he could not have had a better opportunity to do so and at the same time to save his face. M. Poincare, however, is a wonderfully experienced tactician, and he at once perceived that by a reconstruction of his Cabinet he could retrieve the ground which he had been steadily losing in the past few weeks.
There was in M. Poineares mind a conflict of loyalties complicated enough to give Mr. Galsworthy the material for a new play on an old theme. First of all, M. Poincare was under a deep obligation to his supporters who had carried him through the recent financial debates. No doubt he was conscious of these obligations, for he would have to be insensitive indeed to forget the energy and resolution which his followers showed through many anxious days. On the other hand, he owed a loyalty to his foreign policy. This loyalty suggested that he should get rid of many of his former supporters, for as a body they were known to be incompetent, and time and again M. Poincare had retrieved their mistakes by his personal force. The conflict went in favour of the major loyalty ; M. Poincare without apology bundled most of his colleagues out of office when he reconstructed his Cabinet. Only two of his old comrades remain.
The new Cabinet may be described briefly as being " more to the Left," though this may not mean very much, as the conunanding positions are held by politicians of the Right. The Leftward movement is, however, appreciable enough to provoke the resentment of M. Poineare's supporters of the Right and the Centre. It is easy for him to say that he has not gone to the Left but that the Left has come to him, but wounded hearts are not much soothed by such truths.
From the British point of view the all-important question is what the effect of this reconstruction will be upon French policy in the Ruhr. We may accept the formal if partial movement to the Left as having a distinct value. The truth is that M. Poincare no longer feels that he can force his Ruhr policy through without reserve. The elections are almost upon him, and, in including more liberal minds in his Government, he has shown a shrewd appreciation of what parties need to be placated. A few days ago he even modified his familiar phrase about not evacuating the Ruhr until payment in full had been made. On Wednesday, in the Chamber, unfortunately, he returned to his old formula.
Perhaps he was compelled to do that because the French President, M. Millerand, had seemed to be less yielding than himself. It was a remarkable manifesto which the President sent to the Main on Thursday, March 27th. We cannot recall anything quite like it in modern politics. We take it for granted that the President sent this message or authorized it to be sent to the newspaper, as it is preceded by the words : " We are directly authorized to declare what follows." The President says that France will not evacuate the Ruhr before the total payment of reparations. He then adds that if M. Poincare should not be able to reconstitute his Ministry, he, the President, would not call to power any Cabinet that was not absolutely resolved to carry on M. Poincare's policy. If the nation declared its hostility to a con- tinuation of that policy, the President would immediately take such steps as he thought appropriate. The last menacing words might be taken to mean that M. Millerand contemplated a dictatorship, but there is little doubt that he merely implies that he would resign.
So much for French policy. What do we yet know of Mr. MacDonald's opposing or converging policy ? In the debate in the House of Commons on Thursday, March 27th, the Prime Minister sketched a broad but vague scheme of settling reparations, of making Germany a member of the League of Nations, and of summoning an international conference on disarmament. He dis- missed as undesirable any idea of guaranteeing the military security of France. Curiously enough, he gave away a point to M. Poincare, quite unnecessarily as we think, when he said that no pact of security would be of any value unless it contained a military convention with precise pledges as to the number of troops, &e., to be provided. In fine, the Prime Minister did not come to very close quarters with his subject, and at the one point where he did—in reference to military security —he said something which has, of course, been badly received in France.
Nevertheless, we are convinced that M. Poincare thinks that his right line is to get a settlement on the basis of the Expert Committees' reports. If we may judge from his recent expositions, and notably from the article which M. Jules Sauerwein contributed to the Spectator of March 22nd, he will not object to yielding on points of form so long as Great Britain pays the bill.
We do not say that a peace is not worth paying for ; we think it is ; but Mr. MacDonald will have to be very wide awake to the danger that we may get for ourselves neither money nor peace.
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