Russia plays it cool
MIDDLE EAST-2 DEV MURARKA
Moscow—Consolidate and diversify : this is the spirit in which Soviet diplomacy is dealing with the supercharged atmosphere of the Middle East.
The latest round of Israeli-Jordan fighting has come as no surprise to Moscow. Given the Israeli military superiority and the euphoria in Tel Aviv following the victory in the June war, it was inevitable that Israeli leaders should believe they have got the Arabs on their knees forever. The Arab frustrations, on the other hand, inevitably point towards guerrilla war; the Arab leaders and rulers cannot prevent it even if they wished to do so. A long period of Arab-Israeli skirmishes now lies ahead and, in fact, what is surprising is that it has taken so long after the June war for a serious incident to blow up.
The incident, however, has demonstrated that Russia is more irrevocably committed to the Arab cause than ever. The Soviet demand in the Security Council for sanctions against Israel is not a purely tactical move. In fact, in Moscow there is growing anger and frustra- tion. The Russians make it clear at all stages, of course, that they will not fight against Israel and there must be a peaceful solution. The Arabs are in no position to fight another war with Israel. They know, too, that the Arabs are no Vietcong. In the circumstances, Moscow will go on shoring up the battered Arab military machines and using its influence to urge moderation and circumspection till better times come.
If Russia is, understandably, unwilling to fight Israel for the Arabs, it is not averse to taking advantage of the present situation. After the June war, Moscow emerged as the one source of arms and political support for the Arabs. This has brought about a perceptible change in the balance of power in the Middle East.
For the first time in history, Russia has a naval presence in the Mediterranean. The Russians are naturally keen to consolidate the political advantages of the unique position which they now occupy in Arab affairs. It is not, however, without difficulties. The insta- bility of Arab politics inevitably involves them in inter-Arab antagonisms. They can rely only on the tJAR for some degree of con- sistent and, reliable political support. The other Arab countries, despite the aid given to them by Moscow, are at best indifferent or hostile. This is unlikely to change.
For this reason, the Russians have long searched for détente with the so-called 'northern tier' states of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. With Afghanistan they have enjoyed good relations for decades; and Iran is of key importance in this context—the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr Kosygin, is visiting there this week.
Iranian-Soviet relations have steadily im- proved in recent years, with an impressive and rising scale of Soviet industrial and financial aid. The turning point, after the postwar years of hostility, was an Iranian assurance given to Moscow in September 1962 that it 'would not allow any foreign power to establish rocket- launching sites of any kind on Iranian terri- tory.' The Iranian note also said that Iran would never be a party to any aggression against the Soviet Union. The Russians see several advantages in having friendly relations with Teheran. It relieves them of worry about a hostile presence on their frontier. The compara- tive stability of Iran, and the growing an- tagonism between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the oil sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf area, provide them with an extra outlet for influence in the Middle East.
Even by itself the Iranian-Soviet détente is an important development. Its particular relevance at the moment is that the Saudi Arabian King Faisal has emerged as a focal point for anti-Soviet manoeuvres in the region, and Moscow naturally wants to restrain him from acquiring new oil wealth in the Persian Gulf area. Herein lies a proximity of interest between Teheran and Moscow. With Nasser preoccupied with domestic problems and Israel, only Iran is in a position to stand up against pressures from Riyadh. The Russians are not supporting Iranian claims in the Gulf as such, but merely acquiescing in maintaining the status quo after the British withdrawal from the area. This explains why an official Soviet statement issued by Tass on 3 March declared that any grouping like the 'Islamic Pact' will be 'also directed against the security of the southern frontier of the USSR.' Rather unusually, it quoted from a statement by the Iranian Prime Minister, Hoveida, who had declared that 'Britain's withdrawal through one door should not lead, for example, to America entering through another door or even to Britain returning in some new form.' The meaning of the Soviet statement could not be made more explicit.
Thus, if consolidation of the existing ties is one preoccupation of Soviet policy in the Middle East, diversification to spread the risk is another. How they will coalesce is another problem. A glance at the map will show that given effective Soviet presence in Arab coun- tries of the Mediterranean, and growing influ- ence in Iran, Russia now has a real possibility of reaching to the Indian Ocean and beyond. Although these ties have to be con- solidated, for Russia the present situation still offers a rare opportunity of making its influ- ence felt in Asia, from Turkey to Indonesia, variable though the degree of this influence will be in various countries.
To achieve this, Russia did not fire a single shot. Basically, it was achieved simply by
backing the Arabs against Israeli attempts to enlarge her territory, a support none of the other powers gave. It did not save the Arabs from a humiliating defeat; but the Russians know that defeat makes men desperate and desperate men will sooner or later become fighters, even good fighters. And Moscow calculates that the Israelis' support from Washington will diminish once the presidential election is over and that, in the long run, therefore, Israel cannot escape from being 'reasonable.' The Russians just have to wait and watch and give all the support they can to the Arabs. Diplomacy, after all, is a sort of war by peaceful means. The Russians are providing a good example of it in their tenacious advocacy of the Arab cause in forums of debate like the Security Council, and en- couraging the Arabs to hope for the future while restraining them for the present. But even the Russians cannot prevent the inevitable flare- ups so long as the Arabs have not got over their humiliation and the Israelis persist in provoking them to even greater bitterness.
Previous page
