ENGLAND IN EGYPT.
THE new feature of the situation in Egypt is the increasing danger of our having to deal there with Turkish allies on whom it will be impossible to count for help,—and not to count for mischief. The Sultan is at last as ostentatiously eager to send troops, as—before he was convinced of our real intention to put down his instrument, Arabi—he was eager to hold back. He sees now that the moment has passed in which a policy of obstruction can serve his purposes. If he is to regain any command of the situation, he must be in a position either to thwart what we are doing in Egypt, or to help it, as occasion seems to render most desirable ; and we need net say that his wish would be to thwart it, rather than to help it. As Mr. Cowbell warned us, the Porte has never contemplated with the smallest satisfaction the extension of Western influence and Western methods of government to Egypt. In the first place, nothing is better calculated to diminish the respect for the Porte, and for the Mahomedanism which is the living principle of its Government, than the recovery of its own most import- ant provinces directly they are withdrawn from the influence of their native rulers, and placed under the guidance of European politicians. In the next place, no gap so serious in the chain of Mahomedan communications could be established as that which would result from snatching Egypt from the sway of Mahome- dan principles and the contagion of Mahomedan delirium. We may be sure, then, that whatever course the Porte actually pur- sues in Egypt, its main object would be to embarrass England—to resist us as much as it dared,—to checkmate us if it could. Now, it seems to us a most alarming price to pay for a proclama- tion by the Porte that Arabi is a rebel, and no true subject of the Rhalif—even if we get it, and it will be a strong, though it would be a most necessary, act to instruct our Commanders that the Turkish transports are not to be allowed to land until a fully satisfactory proclamation has been issued,—that we should have sonic 5,000 or 0,000 Turkish troops to watch and keep in check, secretly sympathising with the foes they come to put down, and, probably commanded by Pashas with full knowledge that the Sultan does not wish them to further our objects in Egypt, but if possible to undermine and defeat them, Yet, this is the prospect we really have before us, if we allow the Turkish troops to land at all. And if we do not allow the Turkish troops to land at all, a quarrel with Turkey, in which Europe will certainly be neutral, seems inevitable. For our own parts, we should not in the least dread the results of such a quarrel. In our opinion, the Government would be prudent as well as bold, if they gave the order that the Turkish transports should not be allowed to land troops at all, until a satisfactory proclamation, from which there could be no going back, declaring Arabi a rebel, had been .issued, and until arrangements land been made perfectly satisfactory to Sir Garnet Wolseley for placing the Turkish troops where they could not do any harm, and might be held in check by our Fleet. We do not fear in any way the result of. a quarrel with Turkey out of Egypt. But we do fear very greatly the result of a quarrel with Turkey in Egypt which might give the Turkish troops the opportunity of deserting to Arabi, and swelling high the tide of Mahomedan f anaticism. Even the best distribution of the Turkish troops that we could well imagine,—one that would convince the Egyptians that they were on our side, without giving the Turks any opportunity of treachery, which the fire of our Fleet could not render innocuous,—would be a very great embarrass- emeent, for it would necessarily spend a great deal of our energy and disposable force on the comparatively useless task of watching and checking their manoeuvres. One thing we must strongly join the Times in pressing on the Government,, The first consequence of a Turkish expedi-
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,—• it is to be allowed to land troops,—ought to be a great addition to our own force. It is a relief to think that Alexandria and Suez are, at all events, well under English con- trol, and that we guard the gates of Egypt on both the Indian and the Mediterranean side. But we have heard this week with ex- treme regret that the Indian expedition, which was to have been one of 10,000 men, is now reduced to 5,000, with 1,500 reserves, and we do not hesitate to say that that force is a great deal too Retell, especially if the duty of watching Turkish allies is to be added to the duty of fighting military mutineer's. We think the Government might have avoided the whole difficulty,if they had made the proper use of the decoration of Arabi by tlie Sultan, and declared at once that this seemed to them proof positive that the Turkish influence in Egypt was sinister, and could not, therefore, be allowed to intervene at all. Why Lord Gran- ville did not take this line, it is now idle to inquire. But it seems the great blot in his conduct of the question, and the one which he will be most likely ultimately to regret and repent. Still, much may be done by resolute and vigorous action. If the Turks are to be allowed to land at all, and they should only be allowed to land after the issue of a thoroughly satisfactory proclamation concern- ing Arabi, and the agreement to place the troops where they could be effectually watched, the forces to be Lent from India should be doubled at once, and the forces to be sent from England considerably increased, Sir Garnet Wolseley should be instructed to take care that the Turks are net sent into the intoner, that they are not placed at any point where a march into the interior without our consent would be possible and that they are made to understand their com- plete subordination to the English military operations. Without conditions of this sort, we are absolutely convinced that an open quarrel with Turkey,—war with Turkey even, so far as it might, be necessary, inopportune as such a war would be, —would be far preferable to an alliance in which our ally
was more dangerous than our foe. Of course, it is a very inopportune moment for war with a Mahomedan Power, and if a quarrel can be avoided without saddling ourselves with a treacherous and dangerous partner in a very delicate undertaking, a quarrel ought to be avoided. But nothing is much more certain than that Arabi has all along been acting as the secret instrument of the Port e, nor th.an that he himself believes that the Porte will use all the power it can get to protect the Egyptian army from extinction, To open our arms for such co-operation as this would be imbecility, and. we have no doubt that the Government are as anxious as they can be to keep the unwelcome " assistance " at arm's-length. But they are hampered by their own language, and by their omission to brand the Sultan's conduct as it ought to have been branded long ago ; and they may feel obliged to. accept the gifts, though they fear the givers. If so, the only remedy is the one we have indicated,—to get strong hold of the most important positions before the Turks arrive ; to in- crease the contingents both from England and India ; to insist on the Turkish troops being assigned to positions which our Fleet can watch ; and to impress on General Wolseley and on General Macpherson the immense importance of swiftness in a campaign in which time is everything, and a reasonable audacity almost as essential as coolness itself. In General Macpherson, at leagt,—if report does not belie hine,—we shall find no want of military audacity.
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