The Trouble WitH NATO
By PHILIP DE ZULUETA
Nevertheless—and largely because of France- s serious, if muted, debate is going on in Wash- ington about NATO's future. In the Senate, senator 'Scoop' Jackson, true to his nickname, has got in ahead of Senator Fulbright's Foreign Affairs Committee. With the aid of his redoubt- able staff director, Miss Dorothy Fosdick, his Sub- Committee on National Security and International Operations has for the past four months been holding an inquiry into the Atlantic Alliance. The hearings contain .top testimony from a group of star witnesses including Dean Acheson, Christian Herter, Lauris Norstad and the Secre- taries of State and Defence. Not to be outdone, Senator Fulbright has started his own committee investigation with a tour de force by Mr McGeorge Bundy. This 'great debate,' like so many others, may just talk itself out, but there is always the chance that it may end by pro- ducing a major change of US policy. But produc- tive or not, the reappraisal is on in the US.
In Britain, however, in spite of the fascinating debate initiated by Lord Avon in the House of Lords last month, the NATO problem is barely acknowledged, let alone seriously dis- cussed. This is a pity, because the genuine goodwill in the US is not always matched by equally full comprehension of European feel- ings. Britain ought to be filling this gap and contributing something more helpful than snide remarks about the French. It is true that one school of thought in Britain looks on President de Gaulle as a sort of political unicorn in- capable of parturition; a man quite out of tune with the modern world. To these people the General's views about NATO are an aberration which will be forgotten when he goes and the only possible policy is that of the `empty chair' for France in NATO. A more serious group believes—rightly—that the basic purpose of NATO was to prevent Soviet aggression in Europe by securing an American military presence on the Continent. The danger of Soviet aggression is not past. These people believe that it could quickly revive if the deterrent of NATO, and especially of US physical presence in Ger- many, were removed. Consequently, it is foolish to do anything which will weaken NATO's mili- tary strength or encourage the United States to disengage from Europe. Finally, there are those who primarily fear a revival of German mili- tarism and to whom the integrated NATO com- mand and the stationing of allied troops in Europe is the best protection against an aggres sive or overwhelming Fifth Reich.
To all these three groups, the present malaise in NATO is due purely to unwise French policy, and their aim is to preserve as much of the status quo in NATO as can be saved, granted the French action in withdrawing their forces from the NATO command structure and ex- pelling SHAPE and AFCENT from French soil. This point of view is not only a British one. It dominated the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in June and is the basis of the com- muniqué issued after it. As this document repre- sented the official views of fourteen governments, it must command respect. It may even be the only possible approach for the time being. Yet the communiqué conspicuously failed to probe the two fundamental issues: what is NATO for? If its purposes are valid, is its organisation right?
When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, its purpose was clear: it established an alliance to defend member countries against aggression, primarily, of course, Soviet aggression. The Treaty contained one clause, Article 5, of par- ticular significance. This provides that in the event of armed attack on one signatory the other members will take the steps necessary to restore and maintain the security of the area. In short, an attack on one member will be deemed an attack on all. This engagement by the United States and the rest was an extraordinary assur- ance of united action; a remarkable departure from the previous practice of most states and, in. particular, of the United States. It was in order to give practical effect to this mutual under- taking that NATO was established with its politi- cal and military organisation and, in particular, the integrated command structure.
It is important to distinguish between the pur- poses of the Atlantic Treaty and the organisation designed to give effect to them for two reasons. First, because some people confuse the two; and, secondly, because others wish to extend the pur- poses of NATO beyond their original scope and envisage some form of federal Atlantic society. So far, no member of NATO appears to have chal- lenged the basic, and admittedly limited, pur- pose of the Treaty. President de Gaulle, for example, has indicated that France will not withdraw from the Atlantic Treaty; his objec- tion is to the organisation set up to implement it and also, although this is not so clearly stated, to any extension of its scope. In his reasoning, one may suppose that there are several threads of thought. Fundamental is perhaps the idea that NATO as it is fetters the members whose forces are primarily stationed inside the NATO area more than it limits the United States. Given the change in Soviet attitudes and European strength since 1949, this is now an unnecessarily high price to pay for US protection. Then there is the consideration that integration of European anted American forces in peacetime militates against the growth of European feeling and itobably harms the European armaments in- dustry; protection demoralises the protected. Optimists claim that de Gaulle might have accepted the principle of military integration in NATO if America and Britain had accepted the proposal for a tripartite world policy direc- tion which he made almost as soon as he came to power.
But as Dean Acheson recently pointed out, the US government is itself an alliance of When you go on holiday, at home or abroad, we can post your 'Spectator' to you each Thursday. Send your address and Is. 5d. per copy to the Sales Manager, The Spectator Ltd., 99 Gower Street, London. WCI. IfitTerent power groups and was probably unable and certainly uriwiMng to admit its allies, except marginally the British, into the making of world policy, more particularly strategic nuclear con- trol. Consequently, the war in Vietnam, for example, is an American, and not an allied, policy. While this situation continues there is a remote possibility that US policy outside the NATO area may end in an attack on the US itself, which, under Article 5 of the Treaty, would automatically involve all the NATO countries.
It is this thought which seems to have prompted the recent reference by President de Gaulle to France supporting her allies if they were sub- ject to 'unprovoked attack'—a potentially sig- nificant gloss on Article 5. In short, the French argument appears to be that, while the purpose of the Atlantic Alliance is still valid, military integration is no longer militarily essential and carries political disadvantages for Europe.
Whether one agrees with this argument or not, it is neither frivolous nor purely selfish. The only reason why the fourteen can still pretend to ignore it is the unhappy position of the West Germans. It is all very well for the British or French to take the view that US nuclear strength and the strategic importance of Western Europe are together a sufficient guarantee against major Soviet aggression, but the Germans understand- ably feel that any conventional test of strength will take place on their soil. Naturally, therefore, they want as many allied, especially US, troops as possible in their territory and as near the East German frontier as possible. Military inte- gration is a small price to pay for having allied forces in Germany. While the Gentians take this view NATO can certainly continue to grind along in a lower gear more or less as at present. But this is a negative and unhappy prospect.
Progressive possibilities for the Atlantic Alli- ance, about which the British government ought to be doing some serious work, nevertheless exist. The purpose of the alliance is still valid : this is generally accepted and cannot be too strongly stressed. But the present military organi- sation has disadvantages—not least for the pound. It would not be possible if West Ger- many did not accept it, nor necessary if Ger- many were not so sharply divided. The first objective of the NATO partners must therefore be to work towards a situation in which the brutal division of Germany can be ameliorated and perhaps one day peacefully ended. The second objective, at once more immediately prac- tical and more intangible, should be to improve the political contacts between the US and her European partners about policy outside the NATO area.
This requires a serious effort by the Euro- pean members of NATO as well as by the United States. In particular, the Europeans must accept that their views can be most effec- tively presented in Washington during the pro- longed birth pangs of US policy rather than later in the NATO Council when the US is proudly displaying• its squawling new-born creation. And the Americans must welcome European ideas as an essential element in their own formative consensus. Finally, and most fundamental, all NATO should recognise the need to build a European community, including Britain and the other non-EEC members. Only when this is a reality will Europe's self-confidence —and therefore her constructive value in the Atlantic Alliance—be fully restored. In all these three areas of future progress Britain happens to have special experience or responsibility. It is high time for Her Majesty's Government to start a constructive effort.
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