SUMMARY OF THE NON-OFFICIAL REFORM PLANS. Tax Reform Bill of

Ministers is announced for an early day. Its authors, and those whom they have consulted, have kept the secret so well, that no description of the measure has oozed out. Various reports have crept into circulation respecting particular details, generally tending to make the public expect an honest and liberally conceived measure ; but the bill will soon speak for itself. Last week we gave the schedules of Sir Eardley Wilmoes plan, and we shall have to recur to that as a standard for comparison —the best we have yet seen for the natural development of our constitution in all its parts. Meanwhile it may be convenient for the reader to have a summary of those plans which have origi- nated with the public' as a fair starting point for the discussion. Mr. Bright was first in the field ; and, unlike all the other schemes since published, his plan embraces the whole United Kingdom. To clear the ground, he totally disfranchises all bo- roughs with less than eight thousand inhabitants, namely, fifty- six in England. Lord John Russell's bill of 1854 disfranchised only boroughs under five thousand inhabitants ; and of the fifty- six swept away by Mr. Bright it preserved thirty-eight, twenty-one of which were retained by reducing their representatives from two to one' while others were married to neighbouring boroughs and saved by the alliance. Mr. Bright, however, in his reforming fire, thinks it better to burn than marry, and to show his zeal by consuming some poor little Scotch contributory boroughs, some of which have fourteen electors, and return one-fifth of a Member of Parliament. He totally disfranchises nine Irish boroughs. He then takes one Member each from thirty-four English boroughs now returning two each (twenty-two of these were allowed by the bill of 1854 to retain their privilege). The total disfranchisement of sixty-five boroughs, the partial disfranchisement of thirty-four boroughs, and the addition of the four seats once held by Sudbury and St. Albans, gives Mr. Bright one hundred and thirty-four seats to give away. He gives the lion's share—one hundred and eight—to cities and towns' and twenty-six to the counties. In his distribution amongst the cities and towns he favours the large towns. Of his one hundred and eight gifts, the forty-three towns under fifty-four thousand receive only sixteen amongst them all ; while twenty-three large towns receive twenty-three new Mem- bers; twelve larger cities and towns obtain twenty-four Members, and five largest have twenty additional Members amongst them. The bulk of the loaves and fishes has thus gone to the big cities

and towns. To favour boroughs above counties, to favour big towns over small ones, are the general characteristics of his scheme. When we add a ten-pound county franchise for coun- ties, a rate-paying franchise for boroughs, (which would just ex- clude the humbler artisan and give the vote to the foreman and overlooker class,) and the ballot, we have described Mr. Bright's bill.

The Times newspaper has published a bill not proceeding on population and assessed taxes, but on population and income tax, without losing sight of the consideration that some compara- tively small towns are county towns. It totally disfranchises forty-nine boroughs (seven less than the Bright bill) and from forty-three other boroughs now returning two members it takes one member each. This gives one hundred and nineteen seats for disposal, of which fifty-seven are allotted to counties and fifty-one to the larger cities and towns, leaving eleven unallotted. It differs from Mr. Bright's scheme in that it does not proceed entirely on population, and that as regards population it respects populous counties as well as populous towns. Some letters carping at the correctness of the statistics of population have appeared—but the principle of regarding population in counties as well as in boroughs is the main distinctive point of the scheme. Before considering some other schemes, we may, as we have stated schemes involving the principles of " populalion " and of "income-tax," put on record some figures that as regards the principal districts of England,—lumping town and county consti- tuencies within each district,—show the results of the rival schemes. We first take Middlesex. An income-tax representa- tion would give it sixty-four members : the population principle would give it fifty-one, Mr. Bright gives it thirty-four ; the Times gives it twenty-eight, and at present it has fourteen. Lan- cashire would get fifty-four members if the income-tax principle prevailed ; fifty-five according to population ; fifty-six according to Mr. Bright; thirty-nine from the Times ; and it has twenty- six members. Other districts that would gain under any of the schemes we have described (the four of which are based, though to a different extent, on population and taxation) are Cheshire, Dur- ham, Kent, Leicestershire and Northumberland (slightly)' and Gla- morganshire. The counties that would lose would be Cornwall, Devonshire, Dorsetshire Gloucestershire (slightly), Ham

Hertfordshire HereforChrhire, HuntingdonAire Linoo

(slightly), Shropshire, Somersetshire, Staffordshire, Sussex, Wiltshire, and Worcestershire. In fact, all agricultural 00114- ties not having large towns within their borders would lose under any scheme drawn up according to "income-tax," " po- pulation " Mr. Bright, or the Times.

A Conservative" Reform Bill has been published by a con- temporary of some semi-official pretensions. The author is clearly the mildest mannered man that ever drew a bill. He totally disfranchises only eight small boroughs ; the other "little ones') ruthlessly swept away by rival reformers are saved by grouping

them with neighbouring boroughs. This principle of grouping burghs has been supported in the Economist (in some degree re- presenting the late Ministry), with arguments worthy of considera-

tion. The writer does not entirely admit the additional expense of canvassing the separate towns ; but claims, as a compensation, that when once a seat for a group of burghs is obtained, experience shows that the Member is rarely turned out on caprice, as frequent in compact boroughs, but loses it only on some great public question. It is also claimed that while one small burgh may be ruled by a local magnate, three small burghs will have three local magnates, and the rivalry will induce each to propose a. better candidate, so as to secure the independent votes in each burgh. The " Conservative " scheme we have mentioned allots the fifty-eight seats at its disposal in the following manner : Twelve to populous towns now unrepresented, (Chelsea, Birken- the fifty-eight seats at its disposal in the following manner : Twelve to populous towns now unrepresented, (Chelsea, Birken- head, &c.,) seven. to large towns, three to the Inns of Court and to London University, and the remaining thirty-six to the counties, almost exactly reversing the tendencies of Mr. Bright's distribu- tion. Compared with the population theory this scheme would

give to the ten millions of our county population 195 seats, and to the eight millions of our town population 301 seats. It extends the franchise to 25/. occupiers in counties ; 61. householders in boroughs ; to all Graduates of Universities ; payers of 2/. a year assessed taxes, and to all barristers and attormes.

Independently of actual schemes for new bills we have import- ant contributions to the general discussion. Mr. Edwin Chadwick, knowing from experience how often " facts " are assumed, and how often social and political 'untruths are accepted for years until some happy sceptic suggests a doubt leading to discovery, proposes that, before we construct a Reform Bill we should intitute careful inquiries as to the extent and "qual-

ity," if we may so speak, of the Classes likely to be enfranchised by any proposed extension of the vote. In short, Mr. Chadwick says :- Before you give the franchise to rate-payers, savings-bank de- positors, or Si. householders, know first what you are about, find out who they are, and then give it or withhold it if you like. The principle that minorities should not be unrepresented has also turned up again. The Scotsman pays special attention to it,

sometimes putting forward plans whereby each voter should vote for one less than the members for the constituency, and sometimes

ventilating schemes having the same end in view, whereby each voter could accumulate his vote on one member—as if, for in- stance, all Lord John Russell's admirers in the City could, if they liked, give him their four votes. This, it will be seen, would enable the minority to unite and at least return one man.

Mr. Ellice hints that when the small boroughs are swept away, a minister cannot find seats for rising men fitted for official posts, and thus his choice of such officials will be limited to the men who have chanced to please a popular constituency. To meet this evil he proposes that certain offices—Under-Secretaryships, &c.—should carry with them the right of sitting and speaking in the House without voting.

Mr. G. J. Holyoake publishes, with some lucid arguments in support of it, a suggestion for an intelligence franchise based on a simple examination in a few books of political economy and Eng- lish constitutional history.

We simply place these schemes and suggestions on record for consideration another day.