THE TRUE NAVAL RECRUITMENT.
WE see in the press signs that the just alarm about the na- tional Naval defences may run wild, and by becoming irrational defeat its own object. " Spend money—judiciously if you can—but at all events spend money," seems tohe addressed to the Admiralty from all sides ; and unless Sir John Pakington be a Fabricius among First Lords, we shall have a strong pull at the public purse. We also think that the Admiralty Should spend money ; but before we give them the power of the purse we should like to know how they are going to use it. Let us look facts in the face.
Since the last great war, ended in 1815, the military art has con- siderably changed, chiefly through the introduction of improved machinery. We now have steam war-ships, Enfield rifles, more port- able and more powerful field-artillery, large guns of greater accuracy of aim and more extended carrying power, and defensive machines of a resisting power a hundredfold greater than any in the last war. All these improvements are scientific and mechanical, and Eng- land, which in science has a fair repute, and in mechanism excels all nations, has really kept apace with the first Continental powers in the modern race of competition to develope all weapons of war. When these are the facts it is merely idle talk to speak as if in ease of war breaking out, we are in any degree behind France, Russia, Austria, or the United States in the means of carrying it on. Let us, speaking of the Navy al ne, compare our fleet with that of our most formidable rival, France.
In estimating the British Navy, we exclude ships not " effec- tive " : in counting the French navy we make no such deduction
though we notice that Sir Howard Douglas and others in reckon- ing up the strength of the French navy include old ships like the Ocean (120) sixty-eight years old, the Diadem (86), fifty-seven years old, the 'Ville de Marseilles (82), and the Montebello (120), fifty-six years old, with many others built thirty-five and forty years ago, and though possibly very sound ships, yet probably ob- solete in build, even if not injured by long service.
The French have thirty-nine steam ships-of-the-line, we have forty-six--including here as in the subsequent statistics the ships being built by both nations. The French have forty-two steam- frigates : we have forty-eight. The French have twenty-one steam corvettes : we have the same number. When we come lower down in the lists of both navies the differences of accurate nomenclature prevent parallel comparison. The French for in- stance have no force eqivalent to our nine steam block ships : we have eight steam floating batteries against their five ; we have 163 gun-boats against their twenty-eight ; and on the whole, while our steam-fleet counts 386 vessels of all sizes, their steam- fleet comes up only to 280. Our sailing-fleet is capable of being developed in a very short time to an extent that would sweep the French from the Mediterranean. It is rather hastily supposed now-a-days that sailing vessels are obsolete in war ; that remains to be proved, and there are many points about that question still to be settled by naval men. But we have shown above that comparing steam navies alone we far excel the French.
We must not leave out of consideration that in any naval war- fare we have a reserve which no other nation except the United States can boast. We have an immense mercantile marine— steamers and sailing ships which, with the modern improvements in ship-building caused by the use of iron, and the facilities it gives for lengthening and altering ships, could be very readily transformed into ships of war. The French mercantile marine amounts in round numbers to 998,000 tons ; the English to over 4,000,000. The tonnage of our steamers is 380,000 that of the French 68,000. These are contrasts for those who dream that England has no longer the maritime supremacy of Europe.
The point, however, to be kept in view is not what would be the result of a long exhaustive naval war—for that France would, as in the last war, find its navies swept from the sea, is matter of little doubt ; but what short success, painful and humili- ating for us, France might find in a sudden invasion. Against that sudden invasion,—against the diplomatic " inconvenience " of being obliged to consider that sudden invasion possibly suc- cessful for a fortnight,—we should be prepared ; on land, as we have already said, by an organization of volunteers ; at sea by a strong Channel fleet. Now, we have plenty of ships for that Channel fleet; our harbours are full of good ships ; our dock- yards, public and, private, could double the number in a short time. But neither Government dockyards nor the private enter- prise which from one factory e us an engine a day during the Russian war, nor the aroused public spirit of the people, nor the whole nation up in arms to defend its hearths, could give us what we should want on a sudden increase of the active Navy. Impressment of merchant sailors would do something ; but it is a strong measure, and, besides, we should have something better than the mere merchant-sailor. The Volunteer Coast-guard, and other plans for keeping up a kind of Naval Militia, have compara- tivelyfailed. The young effective seaman is always a roving blade ; he may be at the same time on the books of the Admiralty, and on his own hook at San Francisco or Canton. When the Russian war broke out, what was our chief want ?—trained men. If a war broke out with France, tomorrow, what would the Admiralty first require and require for many months ?—trained men, to man the newly-commissioned ships. You may make a Militia a re- serve for the Army, because you can lay your hands on the militiaman; but you must have sailors under your own eye, under your own flag. A Channel Fleet of fifteen sail of the line fully manned could be developed in a fortnight into a fleet of thirty ships half-manned with trained seamen—half with mer- chant sailors suddenly called to your flag by a high bounty. But without a strong force of trained seamen always under your flag, you will be without the power to use the Volunteer force which on an emergency the spirit of the nation could supply. Besides we never should depend exclusively on what is called the spirit of the nation." If a neighbouring ally converted to a foe me- naced us tomorrow, the people would spring to arms, and would only want direction ; but, suppose a diplomatic quarrel of two years, as has subsisted between Austria and Sardinia up to the present time—could we trust that the ardour of the first month of excitement would continue ? No; we must have such a force in the Channel of ships and trained men as will put out of the question even the short success of an invasion.
We omit to consider this week, some points which ought to make us slow in building more ships ; but we may mention them. Several scientific men of eminence question the judgment of the Admiralty in the style of building ships adopted of late years ; and at all events it is a fact that there are no regular statistics of the results of shipbuilding kept by Captains of the Navy, so that ex- periments should be tested in full comparison of all the circum- stances. Besides, new inventions, such as Armstrong's gun, effec- tive at a range and accuracy five-fold any attained before, go far to make wise men pause in building ships on plans designed for very inferior guns. But on the broad grounds that in steam-ships we equal the French, and thatin the reservepower of our immense dock- yards, public and private, and our monster mercantile marine we have resources not known to them, we say,—instead of more ships, give us more trained men. Expend your increased funds, not on these elements of warfare, which change with inventions, buten the trained and skilful seamen, whom you should have always leady. In steam navies, as in sailing navies,—Sir Howard Douglas testi- fies to the fact,—able seamanship will still have immense weight. Let us, then, cultivate, in face of new facts, that old grand, beat fact we have, the British sailor.
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