TOPICS OF THE DAY.
COUNSELS OF MODERATION.
lATE notice with no small satisfaction that there seems a reasonable prospect of counsels of modera- tion prevailing in the Liberal Party in regard to the question of the Lords. No doubt we shall be told that we are premature in saying that such counsels will obtain the ascendency. Nevertheless we hold that opinion, in spite of the fact that there are a great many powerful influences at work in the other direction, and of the attempt which is being made in certain quarters to " rush " projects of a revolutionary character. The moderates in the Liberal Party will gain the day, not only because in the end moderation is what appeals to the great bulk of Englishmen, but also because, as we think we can show, the force of circumstances is on that side. Even when such a veteran in the Liberal army as Sir Edward Russell of the Liverpool Post, and a man so able and usually so clear-headed as Mr. Charles Mallet, the Member for Portsmouth, range themselves on the side of violent courses and call for drastic and immediate action, we are not alarmed. In the first place, we may note that the Westminster Gazette is now giving a very strong lead in the moderate direction. This sign of the times would not be so important if the Westminster Gazelle were what many superficial observers believe it to be, representative of the Whig section in the Liberal Party. On the contrary, we have little doubt that the singularly able publicist who is responsible for its conduct and management is personally on the side of the Radicals. He is, however, essentially what French political analysts have called a " possibilist,"— a man who looks first of all at the facts, and then asks himself, not what part of his party's and his own pro- gramme he likes best, but what part it is possible to carry into practice. When he has ascertained this, he concentrates all his energies thereon. He has the wisdom to throw out one half of his cargo rather than lose the whole. When, then, the arch-possibilist of our politics in effect tells his party that they will get nothing unless they go slow and only attempt reasonable measures, we may be pretty sure that he has good ground for his belief, and does not speak without having taken a very accurate and careful survey of the situation. The Westminster Gazette, instead of counselling the holding of a pistol to the King's bead in order to obtain guarantees for the making of Peers, indicates as an alternative what we may, we think, without unfairness describe as the policy of going along quietly and doing the best that can be done in very difficult circumstances. Now we venture to say that this view of the situation was arrived at by the Westminster Gazette, . not only after grave reflection, but also after consultation with not the least powerful, though no doubt not the most vocal, of the statesmen who control the destinies of the Liberal Party. But even if we put aside the suggestion that the Westminster Gazette is speaking from inspiration, and if for the moment we regard its views as repre- senting nothing but the individual opinion of the editor, we nevertheless must maintain our view that the force of circumstances will be found to be working in favour of moderation.
The whole problem turns upon what the Government have power to do. It is necessary to settle that first before discussing whether they ought or ought not in the interests of the country to do what the extremists desire. Perhaps the best way of ascertaining what the Government can do is to point out what they cannot do. In the first place, we say without hesitation that they cannot send an ultimatum to the King demanding that he shall pledge himself to create four hundred Peers, or whatever the necessary number may be, if the Lords should reject the Government's policy in regard to the Upper House,—a policy, remember, which has not yet been disclosed to the country. The notion of such an ultimatum has only got to be considered for a very few minutes to be seen to be ridiculous. But before discussing this point let 1113 make it quite clear that we do not say that the notion of presenting an ultimatum to the King is absurd because it must be assumed that the King would be personally opposed to the Government policy and on the side of the House of Lords. As to what the King's private view may be we have not the slightest idea, nor do we intend to inquire. It is worth while to remark, however, that it must not be taken for granted, as some Radicals imagine, that he is "a End of glorified Duke" or super- nobleman, a Lord raised to the nth power, and necessarily has the feeling about the Upper House which its own Members may be supposed to possess. If the Kin(' is like other Kings, he is by no means likely to take King view that the Peerage is absolutely necessary to national salvation Kings have very seldom been blind admirers of the aristocracies of their kingdoms. But, as we have said, it is idle to speculate on this point. All that we can be sure of is that the King will look at the whole question in a very different way from that in which the bulk of his Subjects in either camp look at it. The King is by temperament and training essentially a Constitutional Monarch, and knows that he must exercise his very delicate functions in the State judicially,—in the spirit, that is, in which Judges try an election petition. They banish from their minds all notion of whether it is for the good of the country that this or that seat should go to the Liberals or the Tories. Their duty is of a very different kind. The King will look at the question, we may be sure, purely from the point of view of his Constitutional duty. But unless we are altogether mistaken, he would, if the sug- gested ultimatum were presented to him at the present moment, feel obliged to tell his advisers that he could not interpret the verdict of the country as a declaration that the existing Constitution must be altered by a revolutionary use of the Royal prerogative. "There must be a clearer and stronger indication of the popular will before I can accept advice of the kind you now give me." That, in our opinion, is the almost necessary standpoint of a King determined at all costs to maintain a strictly Constitutional attitude. As a matter of fact, however, we do not for a moment suppose that Mr. Asquith or the majority of his colleagues would dream of presenting anything in the nature of an ultimatum to the King To begin with, that is not the way in which the Constitution works. If the King believed that the country had decided in favour of swamping the Lords by what may be called extra-Constitutional means, he would not, we venture to think, wait for pressure from the Government, but would himself let both his Ministers and the Peers know how he interpreted the popular vote. At present, however, it is enough to feel sure that Ministers know they would not be justified in insisting that the King must promise to make Peers. Remember, too, that it is no good to despatch ultimatums unless there is an alternative, and in this case the alternative must be resignation, followed by an immediate Dissolution. But that is an alternative which we do not believe the present Ministry have any intention of accepting. We say this, not because we would suggest for a moment any unworthy clinging to office, but because we believe they feel as patriotic men that such a course would not be in the interests of the country, and also as party men that the risks would be too great. The Government will not dissolve out of pique, or because the King cannot feel justified in interpreting the situation as, say, the editor of the Daily News or the Nation interprets it.
The next thing that the Government cannot do is both to reform the Lords and destroy their veto,—that is, destroy the function for which an Upper House exists. No doubt it is easy to say that the House of Lords is so bad and so incapable of improvement that its veto must be taken away, and therefore in effect the Second Chamber be abolished. It is not " business " elaborately to repair and improve a building and then to burn it to the ground. Whatever else the country consents to in regard to the Upper House, it will not consent to "mend them" and "end them" both at once. Yet, strangely enough, this is exactly what a great many Liberal writers are demanding.
Another of the things which the Government cannot do, but which they have often light-heartedly assumed that they can do, is to bring in a Bill for the abolition of the veto, and then expect the Peers to pass it offhand and in a single Session. Remember that the Bill, assuming that it is on the lines of the Resolution already adopted by the House of Commons, will declare that though the Lords may reject a Bill the first time it is presented to them, and may further reject it if it is sent to them again in a second Session, they are bound, if it is sent to them in the third Session—that is, two years after the first time of asking-- to accept it. If they do not it may become law without such acceptance. Now if there is to be this delay in the future over all Bills, great or small, about which the two Houses may. differ—over, for example, legislation for controlling London road traffic—it surely would not be right for the House of Commons to grant less delay in a matter of such vast importance as the virtual abolition of the Upper House. But if this principle of action is granted, it means that, supposing the Government introduce their Bill for the limitation of the veto this spring, and that the Lords reject it, as they most certainly would, the circumstances in which the question of forcing the Bill through the Lords by extra-Constitutional means becomes Lethal cannot arise till the spring of 1912. The first summons to pass the Bill on the principle embodied in the Resolution will be in 1910, the second summons in 1911, Lad the third summons in 1912. No doubt hot-headed people will declare that there is no possible reason for such delay, but we very much doubt whether the country as a whole, which certainly keeps a cooler head than the ordinary party man, will agree. After all, to give two years' time for consideration is not very much when an absolute revolution in the Constitution is under consideration. Mark what happens even in the case of an American State Constitution. The Constitution may have been made only some ten or fifteen years ago, and yet if a serious alteration is proposed in it a most elaborate pro- cedure has to be gone through. First the two Houses of the Legislature are consulted ; next, in all probability, a Constitutional Convention is summoned which debates all the points at great length and in full detail ; and finally the question whether they will accept the amend- ment to the Constitution or not is referred to a vote of • the whole of the people of the State. If such a procedure is not thought too deliberate for a Constitutional amend- • meat in the State of Nevada or Oklahoma, can it be thought too slow in the case of the United Kingdom ? To changes in the Federal Government we do not refer. It is notorious that it is almost impossible to achieve them short of some cataclysm like the Civil War. We feel justified, then, in saying that one of the things which the Government certainly cannot do is to rush through a .Constitutional revolution in the first month or two of the present Parliament. They must agree to run their attempt at a Constitutional revolution on the lines they have themselves defined as just and reasonable.
There is another thing which, in our opinion, the Govern- ment will find they cannot do, assuming that the question of the House of Lords is not to be settled by agreement between the two parties, but by methods of political warfare. Suppose that after the three summonses a Bill for abolishing the veto is presented to the Lords, and suppose, further, that, owing to various reasons which we need not discuss, the King should ultimately have been persuaded that he must make sufficient Peers to carry the Bill if the Lords on the third summons refuse. Suppose in that case the Lords pass the Bill, but pass it with a Referendum clause. 'This Act shall not have effect until it has been referred to a poll of the people in the manner indicated in the schedule thereto." Does any one really believe that, in the event of the Lords adopting such a course, the Government would feel justified in still advising the King that he must abolish the Upper House by swamping it. Is it not certain that he would adopt as an alternative so legitimate a use of the Referendum ?
If we are right in thinking that the things we have named are things which the Government cannot do, what they can do—i.e., what are the actual limits of their powers in the present Constitution and with their existing majority —may be easily thought out. We will, however, only trespass on this ground so far as to say that, in our opinion, much the best way will be to introduce a Bill for reforming the House of Lords, but leaving the veto alone. Such a Bill, even though it were of a very drastic kind, would, we believe, be popular with the country, for public opinion not only desires a Second Chamber, but desires one a great deal stronger, and more able to exercise its functions effectively, than the present House of Lords. The difficulty here, of course, is that though the country may wish for it, the House of Commons is distinctly against any drastic reform of the House of Lords. What it likes is a weak Upper Chamber,—something which can be called an Upper Chamber, and thus will to some extent satisfy the instinctive dislike of an unchecked single House, but which at the same time will provide no real barrier to the will of the Commons. But though this, we fear, is the attitude of the House of Commons, - it is of course just possible that it may be compelled under popular pressure to agree to the creation of a strong Upper House. In any case we have no hesitation in declaring that if the Government are wise they will become menders rather than enders of the House of Lords.
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