AMERICA TO-DAY : M. WAR AND NEUTRALITY
By M. J. BONN
THE foreign policy of the United States has been a curious medley of fear and arrogance. The Monroe doctrine expressed this clearly ; in it fear of Europe was blended with contempt for the tortuous ways of her diplomacy and the wickedness of her governments and even her people. Its object was to keep the militarist European Powers out of the Americas and to protect the U.S.A. by a policy of isolation from their contam- inating influence. This timid attitude contrasted strangely with the role of " chosen people," in which American statesmen loved to sec their people. They were inspired with missionary fanaticism and guided by manifest destiny, whenever they wanted something on the American continent. Providence had laid upon them the burden of lifting mankind to the rarefied level of American per- fection ; Latin America and the Far East were the nearest fields to practise in. This " missionary spirit " was clearly reflected in the shifting aspects of the Monroe Doctrine, which was slowly changing from a doctrine of defence against European encroachments to a gospel announcing exclusive American exploitation. It burst forth in all its glory when the World War had to become a crusade, to make the world safe for democracy in order to raise the enthusiasm of the American people. It died down in gloomy disillusionment when actual contact with Europe had neither endeared to the soldiers that continent at the front nor to the statesmen who sat at the Council table. Europe was hopelessly egotistic, short- sighted, immoral. George Washington's advice to " keep away from entangling alliances " ought never to have been set aside.
So the United States retired in disgust from European affairs ; they disclaimed the responsibilities for the world conditions which their financial and -military help had brought about ; they refused to sign the Peace treaties and to join the League.
But the War had been immensely profitable to their business men ; it had enormously enhanced the inter- national economic position of the country. They were not going to give up international business, however loathsome international politics might be. They denied in a bout of fatuous legalism the connexion of the Inter- Allied debts with German reparation payments ; but they cheerfully lent to private German enterprises and to German municipalities the capital of which these pay- ments were depleting Germany. They meant to civilise Europe by American cash and American bUsiness methods, —they had just discovered the secret of permanent pro- sperity. They would not recognise the highly political nature of foreign loans. International .economic co- operation was profitable ; it had nothing to do with political entanglements. The inevitable crash made them very angry ; they blamed it on the dishonesty of their debtors and the rapacity of their business men. Europe was not merely wanting in political decency ; she did not even understand commercial honesty. She had flouted other people's ideas and wasted other people's money.
The American people searched their hearts ; they finally jumped to the conclusion that America- had not joined in the Great War for the defence of democracy, but for the safety of the huge armament credits that big business had given to the Allies. Big business was in bad odour anyhow, even when not connected with arma- ments, and public opinion turned resolutely to a neutrality policy which would prevent a recurrence of such events.
For over a century the U.S. had insisted on the " Free Sea " doctrine. Belligerents, they contended, must not interfere with the general trade of neutrals, whose rights come before their rights. They had successfully upheld their views against the Germans and unsuccessfully against the Allies. They were now seeking peace at any price by scrapping old creeds and by making the duty of neutrals, not their rights, the corner-stone of their policy. Up to now they had insisted on " butting in"; in future they were going to " contract out." Their citizens must not give financial aid to belligerents nor fur- nish them war material. They must even be willing to lose their regular trade in commercial goods. The belligerents wanting them must pay cash in the United States and pick them up in their own boats in United States ports. American passengers must not travel on belligerent ships. Peace before Profits !
America's hatred of war, of big business and the 'armament trade may lead to a kind of economic world revolution. For foreign countries must do without supplies from the United States in peace, if they cannot rely on their continuation in war (they can scarcely accu- mulate large enough reserves to carry them through a lengthy war). And if they cannot get them from other countries they must try to become self-sufficient. The rest of the world cannot depend on an international system of supply from the Americas, which may work in peace, but collapses at the outbreak of war. Those European countries which possess dependencies will shift the bulk of their demand to those dependencies ; those who do not must try to acquire some. And as they cannot pick them up in the seven seas, they must either take them from other countries by war or pressure or become self-sufficient, relying on organisation and substitutes. As this must reduce standards of comfort considerably, tension in the less favoured countries is bound to increase. The policy of isolation as outlined by the United States will add enormously to the strain froth which the world is suffering.
This Policy is supported today not only by genuine liberal pacifists, but by rampant Nationalists and fanatic planriers as well, who recognise that a completely closed economic system in the U.S.A. must be organised in peace, if it is to function in war. They have not, it is true, reasoned out the ultimate consequences of their policies, but they are conscious of their responsibilities, whilst their predecessors frequently acted from arrogant ignorance. They butted in when the missionary urge welled up in their breasts and contracted out regardless of the havoc they had played when it settled down. The " Isolationists " have not recognised the danger of America's withdrawal from the world's economic system to the peace of the world ; they imagine that one can avoid all daziger and enjoy peace and happiness ever afterwards merely by turning one's back on the rest of the universe, and letting it go up in flames.
But there are wiser counsellors who recognise the political and economic responsibilities of America's great power for good or evil. They stand round Secretary Hull, who, a lonely figure for a long time, kept the torch of economic liberty burning even after England had dropped it. They do not see the U.S. as a closed commercial State —a kind of Ark, the inmates of which can wait complacently until the flood has subsided. They recognise the risks of withdrawal and of ignoring the existence of a discontented world. They want to throw the economic weight of the U.S.A. on the side of international economic co-operation ; they want them to break down tradetbarriers and to be leaders in currency stabilisation. They desire to pool their country's natural resources with those of other nations by trading freely with them and by helping them to overcome economic nationalism. They have had a very uphill fight ; up to now the main support has come from the smaller European nations, whilst most other countries have been fostering economic exclusiveness by their actions, though they may have condemned it in their speeches. The United States have been a highly Protectionist country, until lately strongly wedded to economic nationalism ; now they are slowly setting their face against it, unfortunately at a time when British policy is going the opposite way.
The U.S. might be strong enough to follow a policy of economic isolation, which might secure them against war and keep them safe in war. No other country outside Russia can do it. But all countries may be endangered by an attempt of the U.S.A. to contract out of all economic as well as political responsibilities. America's leading statesmen are aware of this danger and the risk of repercussions ; they know that one-sided prosperity is no insurance against the menace of war. But whether they succeed in the face of opposition at home or abroad will depend on the response of their European colleagues.
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