[To the Editor of THE SrECTATOR.1 ' SIR,—Arising out of
Dr. Matthews'. very interesting article, may I be permitted to offer a suggestion ?
I assume " reason " to be the intellectual faculty by which conclusions are drawn from premises." If that defini- tion is correct, no conclusion reached by reason can be more than probable. Probability may be of a high or low degree. A high degree may be so very high as to be equal, in everyday life, to demonstration. For example, we do not doubt that the sun will rise tomorrow.
Probability, however (to whatever high degree), is not absolute, metaphysical certitude. A metaphysical philosopher would not be justified in assuming, as an axiom,. that the sun will rise tomorrow : for such a philosopher is concerned with abstract truth. He could say only that it is extremely probable that the sun will so rise.
I take it that the essence of Rationalism is insistence on the distinction between probability and certitude. That distinction would leave us in full possession of those high degrees of probability needful for life ; but would discredit all attempts to impose any dogmas as sacrosanct and im- mutable. History, shows how needful is that discredit. How many religious wars, persecutions, how much social and domestic misery, would have been prevented but for attempts to impose sacrosanct dogmas ! The office of Rationalism is very much needed today.—Yours faithfully,
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