Enter Kosygin
P. J. HONEY writes : Major changes in Soviet policy towards Vietnam have taken place almost unnoticed over the past two months. Mr. Khrushchev made it abundantly clear to Mr. Butler during his visit to Moscow last August that Russia regarded the dangers of escalation of the Vietnamese war as very great. Confessing Soviet inability to control developments in the area, he indicated that Russia would prudently shed her residual responsibilities there and advised Britain to .do the same. This Soviet policy of disengagement was still in force at the ,end of November, when the Russian dele- gation to the mammoth solidarity conference in Hanoi was so lightweight that it was insulting to the hosts.
During December, the Soviet leaders adopted a new and very different line. For the first time, Russia pledged herself to provide all necessary aid to North Vietnam in the event of an American attack. Almost simultaneously, the Soviet govern- ment agreed to the establishment in Moscow of a permanent office of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV), the puppet organisation through which Communist North Vietnam controls the war in the South. Moreover, Russia broke with precedent in publicising North Vietnamese notes without first consulting Britain, her fellow co-chairman, thereby appearing to shrug off this role which would prove embarrassing were she to supply arms to the Vietcong guerrillas. A few days ago she announced the forthcoming visit to North Vietnam of Mr. Kosygin, and the presence of Vershinin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Force, in the party strongly suggests the possibility of providing the North Vietnamese with Soviet warplanes.
The North Vietnamese, who aligned themselves closely with China in the Sino-Soviet dispute in mid-1963, are known to have been quarrelling fiercely with the Chinese during recent weeks over the conduct of the war in South Vietnam. Commander-in-Chief Vo Nguyen Giap and Premier Pham van Dong are eager for a strong military push, which they believe would achieve an early victory. The Chinese, mindful of their Korean experience and apprehensive over pos- sible escalation, argue that the Americans cannot be defeated in full-scale warfare and urge a return to guerrilla tactics. Giap accuses the Chinese of interference and failure to understand the situation in South Vietnam, alleging for good measure that many of the arms received from China have been defective. This heated debate continues.
It is possible that the new Soviet leaders are -taking advantage of this quarrel to regain some of the ground Russia has lost to China in Asia, and they feel encouraged by President Johnson's vacillation over Vietnam. If, however, recent Soviet behaviour towards the Congo is taken into account, it would seem more probable that this is the beginning of a new hard Soviet line. The dangers inherent in the new Soviet policy towards Vietnam arc very considerable, and it could lead to direct military confrontation with the United
States. Russia might well find herself in a second Cuban situation, and the Chinese would not be slow to accuse her of 'adventurism' and 'capitulationism' again.
Ironically, the new Soviet policy is one of full support for 'people's liberation war,' while the Chinese counsels are closer to 'peaceful co- existence.' The North Vietnamese would agree to attend the MoScow preparatory conference in March only if their own terms are met, and the most important of these would be the supply of military aid for the South Vietnamese war coupled with economic aid for North Vietnamese industrialisation. In other words, to win North Vietnam away from China, Russia will have to provide her with the very things she now refuses to China. Even if she does so, she can have no guarantee that the North Vietnamese will not resume their former—and economically bene- ficial--rOle of Communist neutrals.
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