BOOKS.

NAPOLEON BONA.PAHTE'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH HIS BROTHER JOSEPH.*

struction—to the politician, of what in a great measure to avoid— to the soldier, of what to master till the principles enunciated become a portion of his mind. to our standard literature: To the idle reader indeed, the work will only.have a limited attraction. To the student of history, and still more to the military man, it is a book of profound in- from the Mentoires du _Rol Joseph, is a very valuable contribution or of human character, it is full of deep interest ; to the politician, Tins selection of Napoleon's letters to his brother " the King,"

By far the larger part of Napoleon's letters refer to the time, 1806-1808, when Joseph was King of Naples ; and 1808-1812, when he was transferred to the throne of Spain, with less cere- mony than an elder brother would require a younger brother whom he supported to shift his residence. A good many letters be- long to the first three months of 1814, when- Napoleon with raw and diminished forces was struggling against the Allied armies on the soil of France, and Joseph was acting as a sort of co-regent with the Empress, till Paris capitulated, on the 31st of March. The correspondence during the Hundred Days is very brief : that relating to Napoleon's obscure condition in Paris, and to his early career as commander, is also brief. It is, however, full of interest, for, the insight it -gives into his circumstances, and still more into his character before it could have been influ-

enced by his extraordinary elevation. •

The first chapter contains thirty-nine letters,- all of which save two were written in 1795, and the thirtieth of which de- scribes the turning-point of Napoleon's career—his success on the day of the Sections, when he defeated the National Guards who were marching to overthrow the Government. These early letters are important .to his biography, as showing that the alleged difficulties of his youth are problematical, at all events as concerns this period, and that the story told by Scott and others about the patronage of Barras is not -likely to be true. His letters speak of frequent offers of employment, —a command in Holland, in La 'Vendee, a commission to form the Sultan's artillery ; he did replace Carnet as a member of the topographical board of the Committee of Palk Safety.; and a few weeks later he describes hiiiiself as about to keep three horses. These facts were in part known, but an erroneous conclusion was drawn from them. Biographers compared General Bonaparte not with the military student and sous-lieutenant of a few years earlier, but with the Emperor Napoleon of after years, and then talked.of sordid obscurity and the accidental patronage of Barras.

These few letters are also strikingly illustrative of Napoleon's character. There is in the narrow sphere of a candidate for em- ployment the same activity of mind, the same prompt decision of judgment, the same or perhaps greater clearness, terseness, and comprehensiveness of style, as he afterwards displayed on a far wider field. He also seems to haie had from nature a cpiality of wonderful use to a man of action—the power of dismissing the st, and concentrating his attention on the present and the

tune.' The thing may have been unlucky7-very ; but it is past, and -done with—turn to something else. He also exhibits the kindly family feelings :which seem to have accompanied him through life when his own interest did not stifle all feeling. There are also some striking glimpses of the state of public credit and of society. 'Paris must have been a paradise for bullioniste with a speau4tive turn. At one time agold louis was worth 750 francs assignats, and the value of real property frightfully depre7 eiated ; but the fluctuations upwards were rapid on the receipt or report of good news with a prospect of peace. Joseph had mar- ried a lady of large property, -and-Napoleon was urgent with his brother- to invest some of it in an estate on favourable terms. His opening letter is upon this theme, with advice to Joseph, who was living at Marseilles. " May 23, 1795. "I went yesterday to Ragny, the estate of M. de Montigny. If you were the man to make a good hit, you would come and buy this estate for eight millions in assignats. You might invest 60,000 francs of your. wife's for- tune in it: I wish and advise you to do, so. Remember me to your wife, to Desiree, and to not youi family. "France is not to be found abroad. Living about in seaports is rather after the manner of an adventurer, or of a man who heath fortune to make. If you are wise, you have only to enjoy yours. I have no doubt that you aught have this estate for 80,000 francs in specie. Before the Revolution it was worth 250,000. I consider this to be an unique opPortunity for invest- ing part of your wife's fortune. Assignats are losing in value every day." -

• Five months later, he was harping on the same theme ; but Property had risen, at least on his estimate.

• The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte with his Brother Jo- teph, sometime King of Spain. Selected and translated, with explanatory Notes, from the " Itemoires du Boi Joseph." In two volumes. Published by Murray. " Paris, Sept. $, 1795.

"The estate, nine leagues from Paris, which I thought of buying for you, was sold yesterday. I had made up my mind to give 1,600,000 francs [assignats] for it ; but, strange to say, it went for 3,000,000. We are be coming quiet here : there will not be any disturbance ; the Constitution will make the people happy. "National preperty and emigrants' estates are not dear, but those be- longing to individuals go for extravagant prices."

During this period of his life Napoleon was engaged to Joseph's sister-in-law, the Desiree of his first letter, afterwards Madame Bernadotte and Queen of _ Sweden. They neither of them seem to have been very ardent lovers : the lady did not write, and though Napoleon mentions the neglect, it is as philosophically as he would speak of prices or news. He is equally cool in breaking off the engagement, and contemplating a new one, apparently with Josephine.

" If I stay here'it is possible that I may be fool enough to marry : I wish for a few words from' ou on the subject. Perhaps it would be well to speak to Eugenie's brother. Let me know the result, and all shall be settled."

Three months earlier, he is equally cool about his portrait, which it seems the lady had asked for. There is also a touch of fatalist philosophy, more sentimental than that which charac-. terized Ills day of power. • -

" June 25, 1795.

"I will execute your wife's commissions immediately. Desiree It-As me for my portrait : I am going to have it painted. You will give it to her if she still wishes for it; if not, keep it for yourself. In whatever cireum- stances you may be. placed by Fortune, y know .ow well, my friend, that you cannot have a better or a dearer friend than myself, or one who wishes more sincerely for your happiness. Life is a flimsy dream, soon to be over. If you are going away, and you think that it may be for some time, send me your portrait. We have lived- together for so many years, so closely united, that our hearts have become one, and you know best how entirely mine belongs to you. While I write these lines, I feel an emotion which I have seldom experienced. I fear that it will be long before we see each other again, and I can write no more."

Although ambition, not avarice, was Napoleon's ruling passion, he seems to have had none of the severe incorruptibility which distinguished Itabespierre, Cannot, and a few other jaeobins. In fact, he was too' much of a practical man for that elevation. After the day' of the Sections, he not only " tasted the honey of public einployment," but made others taste it too.

" The multiplicity and the importance of my business prevent my writing to you frequently. I am happy and contented. I have sent to our family from 60,000 to 60,000 francs in money, assignats, and things. I continue satisfied with Louis. He is my aide-de-camp capitaine. Mamma and Janet are my two aides-de-camp chefs de battalion. Jerome is at school learning Latin, mathematics, drawing, music, &c.

"I see no objection to Paulette's [his sister's] marriage, if he is rich. * •

"You will, certainly have the first consulship that suits you. In the mean time, keep house for yourself in Genoa. Balieetti, who is the Com- missioner of the Government at the army, and Chauyet, who is Commissary- General, will employ you at Genoa, so as to render your residence there neither expensive nor useless. "Lucien starts tomorrow for the Army of the North. He is made a Com- missariat officer. Ramolinols here, in the Conimissariat. Orden° is Lieu- tenant in the .Legion of Police. Our family is provided for. I have sent to

them eve that they can want. Pesch will be well placed here. Ba- licetti be zealous in your service. He has been much pleased with me.

I wish you to remain at Genoa, unless he employs you at Leghorn. All this is only provisional. You will soon ben consul."

On Ms -return from Italy, he was in "full feather," buying largely—if, as seems probable, the following order is for himself. "I hope that you have bought Rise. I should like you to add to it one of the two estates near Roche, in Berry, which yon proposed to me, and which I saw on my road, of the probable value of 300,000 or 400,000 francs. I should prefer that of M. de Montigny, which I looked at four-years ago for you. Inquire if the title is safe and write to Junot's father about one or the other. (Inc of these, with Rise, will do."

Notwithstanding Napoleon's calm and accurate judgm.ent, hii immobility when public objects—that is, his own interests—were at stake, and his ingrained selfishness, he had a Southern warmth and impulsiveness. His character had much more of the Nel- ion than of. the 'Washington or Wellington caste. This to some degree explains the falsehood of which he was habitually play, and his =policy in shutting his eyes to what was reported -to him, and seeing things as he wanted them, not as they were. This was also the source of his kindness and good-nature ; perhaps of his justice, which he exercised truly when not warped. How few rulers, just commencing a campaign like that of Marengo, would have troubled their heads about the circumstances of a priYate indiVidual : yet such a topic forms the first letter of the Consulate. His dislike to Madame de Steel which broke out after-

wards, -might, however, have prompted his interposition. -"March 19, 1800. "M. de Stael is in the deepest poverty, and his wife gives dinners and balls. If you still visit her, would it not be well to persitade her to make her husband an allowance of from 1000 to 2000 francs a month ?, Or have we already reached the time when not only decency, but duties even more sacred than those which unite parents and children, may be trampled:under foot without the world's being scandalized ? Let us give /inflame de Steel the benefit of judging her morals as if she were a man; but would a man 'm had inherited M. Neeker's fortune, and who had long enjoyed the pri: vileges attached to a distinguished name, and who allowed Lis wife to re-

main in abject poverty whilst he lived in luxury, would such a man be re- ceived in society ? '

In an historical point of view, the correspondence mkt' to Spain will perhaps have the greatest interest for English readers, from its direct bearing on the Peninsular war. The most politi- cally suggestive part, and that which most fully brings -stut the opposite characters of the two brothers, are the letters relating to Naples. Joseph, kind-hearted, truthful, and what would now be called liberal, looks to the interests of his subjects, aims at ac-* = nig their affections, and seems to have been willing to trust himself, perhaps too implicitly, in their hands. For these notions he is continually "-snubbed," thwarted, and overruled, by his younger brother, who made Joseph King of Naples, not to serve the Neapolitans, but France---that is, the Emperor of the French. Napoleon's most striking traits are exhibited in almost hideous nakedness : his promptness displays itself in reckless disregard of rights or blood-shedding; his policy degenerates into lying as a system, and absolute dishonesty when convenient. Despotism, absolute and perfect despotism everywhere and over everybody, is the only principle he admits ; carried out, however, with un- ceasing vigour clearness, and directness to results, considered solely from his own point of view. How his successes finally ended, we all know : still there is a promptness, clearness, and resolution in his orders, that, if all sense of justice or mercy were put aside, would be admirable. From the outset he had im- pressed upon Joseph one thing—" Be master." The nature and conscience of Joseph, however, prevented him from being the sort of master his brother meant. He wrote to the Emperor, that he could only maintain himself in Naples by the assistance of public opinion. To which the Emperor replies.

"In all your calculations assume this : that, a fortnight sooner or a fort- night later, you will have an insurrection. It is an event of uniform occur-

rence in a conquered country." * •

" Whatever you do, the mere force of opinion will not maintain you in a city like Naples. Take care that there arc mortars in the forts and troops in reserve to punish speedily an insurrection. Disarm, and do it quickly. ♦ • •

"Let the lazzaroni who use the dagger be shot without mercy. It is only by a salutary terror that you will keep in awe an Italian populace. The least that the conquest of Naples must do for you is to afford supplies to your army of 40,000 men. Lay a contribution of 30 millions on the whole kingdom. Your conduct wants decision : your soldiers and your generals ought to live in plenty. Of course you will call together the priests, and de- clare them responsible for any disorder. The lazzaroni must have chiefs ; they must answer for the rest. Whatever you do, you will have an insur- rection. Disarm. You say nothing about the forts : if necessary, do as I did in Cairo ; prepare three or four batteries whose shells can reach every part of Naples. You may not use them, but their mere existence will strike terror. The kingdom of Naples is not exhausted ; you can always get money, since there are royal fiefs and taxes which have been granted away. Take care not to confirm these ancient abuses. In a fortnight or three weeks, by a decree of yours or of mine they must all bo repealed. Every alienation of the royal domains or of the taxes, though its existence may be immemorial, must be annulled, and a system of taxation, equal and se- vere, must be established. Naples, even without Sicily, ought to give you

100 inillions. *

"My Brother—I have received your letter of the 16th May. You are not well acquainted with any populace, still less with that of Italy. You trust too much to their demonstrations. Take your precautions well, but without causing alarm. At the least disturbance on the Continent, that is to say, at the very instant when you require proofs of their attachment, you will see how little you can depend upon them. I shall not answer you on the sub- ject of the body-guard. You must not suppose me to be so ignorant of the present disposition of Europe as to believe that Naples is too philosophic to have any prejudices in favour of birth : and if Naples seems so to your ey.es, it is because all conquered nations put on the same appearance, disguising their sentiments and their habits, and prostrating themselves with respect before him who holds their fortunes and their lives in his hand. You will admit that there are prejudices as to birth in Vienna. Well, the princes there invited private soldiers to their tables. Besides, what I do is less for the sake of Naples than for that of France, where I wish to unite all classes and all opinions. As for the army, when they are told that it is my com- mand, I hope that they will have the goodness to approve of it ; I have not accustomed them to interfere with what I do."

He continues his homily in a style that resembles Iago's advice to Roderigo—" Put money in your purse."

"You have no money, but you have a good army and a good country to supply you. Prepare for the siege of Gaeta. You speak of the insufficiency of your military force : two regiments of cavalry, two battalions of light in- fantry, and a company of artillery, could put to flight all the mob of Naples. But the first of all things is to have money, and you can get it only in Naples. A contribution of thirty millions will provide for everything, and put you at your ease. Tell me something about the forts. I presume that they command the town, and that you have put provisional commandants into them. You must set about organizing a gendarmerie. You feel on entering Naples as every one feels on entering a conquered country. Na- ples is richer than Vienna, and not so exhausted. Milan itself, when I en- tered it, had not a farthing. Once more, expect no money from me. The 600,000 francs in gold which I sent to you are the last that I shall send to Naples. I care not so much about three or four millions as about the prin- ciple. Raise thirty millions, pay your army, treat well your generals and commanders, put your materiel in order."

In a letter two days later, he continues on the same theme.

"My Brother—I see that by one of your proclamations you promise to impose no war contribution, and that you forbid your soldiers to require those who lodge them to feed them. It seems to me that your measures are too' narrow. It is not by being civil to people that you obtain a hold on theta. This is not the way to get the means to reward your army properly. Raise thirty millions from the kingdom of Naples. Pay well your army; remount well your cavalry and your trains ; have shoes and clothes made. This cannot be done without money.. * * * * I do not hear that you have shot any of the lazzaroni, although I know that they have used their dag- gers. If you do not begin by making yourself feared, you will suffer for it. The imposition of a land-tax will not produce the effect which you appre- hend; everybody expects it, and will think it quite natural. At Vienna, where there was supposed not to be a farthing, and they hoped that I should not levy a contribution, a few days after my arrival I levied one of a hundred millions : it was thought very reasonable. * * •

" Confiscate all ships in the ports of Naples bearing the flag of the Ionian Republic, and dismisv all the commissioners of that-republic who are in your kingdom. Have a skilful seaich made into the books of the merchants who have transactions in money for the Misdates and Ionians, and seize that money. With a little address, this operation ought to yield you several millions." . .

His plan for consolidating the throne was 'something like that of William the Conqueror in the dark ages, without the excuse of resistance,. which William encountered.

" You must establish in the kingdom of Naples a certain number of French families, holding fiefs either carved out of domains of the Crown, or taken from their present possessors, or from the monks by diminishing the number of convents. In my.opinion, your throne will have-no solidity un- less you surround it with a hundred generals, colonels, and others attached to your house, possessing great fiefs in the kingdom of Naples and Sicily. Bernadotte and Massena should, I think, be fixed in Naples, with the title of. princes, and with large revenues. Enable them to found great families : I do this in Piedmont, the kingdom of Italy, and Parma. In these countries and in Naples 300 or 400 French military men ought to be established, with property descending by primogeniture. In a few years they will marry into the principal families, and your throne will be strong enough to do without a French army ; a point which must be reached."

And to cap all, a year afterwards he writes—" On looking at M. Rcederer's report, I am convinced you have immense resources. When you have to pay twenty-six millions on account of a na- tional debt, there are at once twenty-six millions to be got by merely stopping payment for one year" ! "Like master, like man" : the Emperor was surrounded by civilians and soldiers who were but too ready to follow his dishonest example. Indeed, the social disorganization, the terror, and the wonderful changes of the Revolution, had introduced a - general laxity and corruption, for which allowances should be made. Napoleon, however, made none for other people ; he would. allow no one but himself to plunder. When he returned from the campaign of Austerlitz, he found some financiers had been peculating at Paris, and Massena, suo more, levying contri- butions in Italy.

"I am well pleased with my affairs here [Paris] ; it gave me great trou- ble to bring them into order, and to force a dozen rogues, at whose head is Ouvrard, to refund. Barbe-Marbois has been duped just as the Cardinal de Bohan was duped in the affair of the necklace, with the difference that in this case more than ninety millions were in question. I had made up my mind to have them shot without trial. Thank God, I have been repaid. This has put me somewhat out of humour. I tell you about it that you may see how dishonest men are. You, who are now at the head of a great army, and will soon be at that of a great administration, ought to be aware of this. Roguery has been the cause of all the misfortunes of France. * *

"Messina has robbed wherever he could. Let him be advised to return three millions. Salicetti will do this for you. Let him see Massena, and tell him that S— has formally admitted that Massena received three mil- lions as a gift ; that if they are not returned in the accounts which I shall publish in May of the contributions levied by the army, I shall debit him with this sum, and add the proofs, and name a commission of seven officers to oblige him to restore it. It is a very serious matter. * * *

"Let Massena be advised to return the 6,000,000. To do so quickly is his only salvation. If he does not, I shall send a military commission of inquiry to Padua, for such robbery is intolerable. To suffer the soldiers In starve and to be unpaid, and to pretend that the sums destined for their use were a present to himself from the province, is too impudent. Such con- duct would make it impossible to carry. on a war. Let S— be watched. The details of their plunderings are incredible. I learn them from the Austrians, who themselves are ashamed of them. They allowed corn to go to Venice. The evil is intolerable."

From Joseph's total inexperience in war, the directions are of a different kind from what would have been given to a military man, especially in the outset. Here are some of Napoleon's axioms, though not in the axiomatic form.

Inferiority of Composite Armies.—"An army composed of men belonging to different nations will soon commit blunders. The thing to be done should be to watch for them, and turn them to account ; but you have no- body about you who can direct you how to do this. A week more or less is not of importance. Besides the three corps which I have mentioned to you, keep in hand a strong body of cavalry and light artillery, to be sent wherever it may be wanted : but it is difficult to believe that the Russians and Eng- lish will not retire as your army becomes strong and well organized."

Danger everywhere.—"Disregard those who would keep you out of fire : you have your reputation to make if there should be an opportunity.; Place yourself conspicuously : as to real danger, in war it is everywhere.'

Returns Wapokon's most agreeable Reading.—" Be strict with everybody. The return which you have sent me is not clear. I do not see the position of General Gardanne's division, nor his force. Let Caesar Berthier take the trouble to give me regular returns, with the artillery, the horses, &c. &c, and not mere results, which tell nothing. The returns of my armies form the most agreeable portion of my library. They are the volumes which I read with the greatest pleasure in my momenta of relaxation. I see already in those which you have sent to me traces of the disorder which Massena produces everywhere. I see companies that do not properly belong to the army of Naples. This carelessness will at last derange the administration of the army, and destroy its discipline. Send me perfectly accurate re- turns."

Do not Scatter.—" Your army should not be scattered ; it is better to have a corps of 600 men, who make six excursions to different points, or who may send patrols everywhere, but so as to keep the main body in one place, than to divide such a corps into six companies of 100 men at each post. Endeavour to keep your battalions together. There is no use in your position, in making the troops serve in pickets, nor in forming battalions or large detachments exclusively composed either of light infantry or of grenadiers. That breaks up the different corps, and withdraws the officers and soldiers from their principal leaders. The inevitable consequence is to destroy all administration and all respon- sibility, and everything falls into confusion. It is a principle that companies of light infantry or of grenadiers should not be collected until on the eve of an action. Do your best, therefore, to keep your battalions and squadrons together • otherwise your army will lose all distinctness, and get into incalculable disorder."

A Siege better than a Botakrehnent.—" They have alarmed you unneces- sarily about this fortress of Gaeta. I do not see how the transport of thirty pieces of cannon with their ammunition will cost so much money. I am sorry that you do not make a regular siege ; a bombardment will cost you

more, and perhaps uselessly. Nothing is so expensive as a bombardment, i if it is kept up. A siege is much more certain.'

_Rationale of a Siege.—" Do not begin the fire upon Gaeta till you have plenty of guns in position, and have brought a great quantity of ammuni- tion to the park. Whatever they may tell you, believe that one fights with cannon as with fists. When once the fire is begun, the least want of am- munition renders what you have already done useless. You will not have Gaeta unless you besiege it regularly. * * * From all I hear about Gaeta, it appears that the Neapolitans have spiked four of your guns; that they succeeded in their sortie, and killed many of your French troops ; that be- fore that place the duty is not performed regularly ; and that your army makes war as if it consisted of recruits. I have told you a hundred times, that you should keep four brigadier-generals before Gaeta, as one ought always to pass twenty-four hours in the trenches, wrapped in his cloak ; and that you should have at least 6000 men there. I really cannot imagine what you do with your 40,000 men. You require a first-rate gene- ral to command before Gaeta : you have marshals and generals everywhere except where they should be. Since the world began, the reliefs in the trenches have never been made by daylight."

The following letter belongs to a later period, referring to Hill's surprise of Girard in the Peninsular war. It is curious as showing Napoleon's opinion as to the duties of light cavalry com- manders

NAPOLEON TO BERTHLER.

"Paris, Jan. 2, 1812.

"My Cousin—I wish you to write for me a report, which will be printed, on the correspondence respecting General Girard's affair. It seems that General Britche was posted on the side by which the enemy attacked ; that i

he was completely surprised, not in his bivouac, but in bed in a comfortable house, while the horses of his hussars were unsaddled. I will dictate this report to you. My object is to impress on the colonels and generals of light troops the general principle, that a colonel of ehasseurs or hussars who goes to bed, instead of. spending the nights in bivouac and in constant commu- nication with his main guard, deserves death. I think that /1Iarshal Mortier has some information on the subject. As my object is not merely to punish General Britche, but to excite the zeal of the whole light cavalry, this re- port must be vigorously drawn up."

The love of preeminence, or vanity, or what you will, that dis- hed Napoleon, comes out strongly in these volumes. He co d "bear, like the Turk, no brother near the throne." Jo- seph's Prime Minister, Rcederer, was an object of the Emperor's 'dislike, as being a philosopher and literary man. The true point of soreness in the following letter seems to be Joseph's unlucky comparison of himself to his Imperial brother.

• . St. Cloud, June 3,1806.

"My Brother—I could not put M. Rcederer's speech in the Moniteur,' because, in truth, it is nonsense. He speaks in the name of the Senate as he would do in a newspaper article. He compares me to Machiavelli. I never saw a speech with so little meaning in it, and on an occasion when so many good things might have been said. I also see some passages in your speech which you must allow me to think ill-judged. You compare the at- .tachment of the French to my person to that of the Neapolitans for you : that looks like a satire. Whatlove for you can have a people for whom you have done nothing ?—whom you govern by right of conquest with 40,000 or 50,000 foreigners ? In general, the less you speak of me and of France, directly or indirectly, in your state papers, the better it will be."

A. year later Joseph made another unsavoury comparison, in requesting distinctions for some of his soldiers, and ventur- ing to compare them with Napoleon's grand army, then engaged in the campaign whose opening exploit was the battle of Jena. It is a stalling picture of a war in winter.

"I refer you to Cmsar Berthier as to your comparison of the services of the army of Naples to those of the grand army. Neither the staff, nor the co- lonels, nor the other regimental officers, have taken their clothes off for the last two months, some not for four months, (I myself have been a fortnight without taking off my boots,) in the middle of snow and maid, without bread, wine, or brandy, living on potatoes and meat, making long marches and countermarches without any sort of comfort ; fighting with our bayonets frequently under grape-shot ; the wounded obliged to be removed in sledges, in the open air, to a distance of fifty leagues. To compare us with the army of Naples, making war in that beautiful country, where they have bread, wine, oil, linen, sheets to their beds, society, and even women, looks like an attempt at a joke. After having destroyed the Prussian monarchy, we are 'fighting against the remnant of the Prussians, against Russians, Cossacks, and Kalmucks, and the tribes of the North, who formerly conquered the Roman empire. We have war in all its fierceness and all its horrors."

Napoleon's utter indifference to truth is well known, and ap- pears in various places. Still it is strange to see him laying down falsehood as a regular principle of proceeding, when Joseph, at a later date and as of Spam, had been so imprudent as to publish the truth.

"Sch3nbrunn, Oct. 10, 1809.

"M. le General Clarke—I wish you to write to the King of Spain to im- press upon him that nothing can be more contrary to the rules of war than to publish the strength of his army, either in orders of the day, in procla- mations, or in the newspapers; that when he has occasion to speak of his strength, he ought to render it formidable by exaggeration, doubling or treblin his numbers ; and that, on the other hand, when he mentions the • s of the enemy, he should diminish it by one-half or one-third ; that in war moral force is everything. * * * * The result of these announce- ments has been to lessen our reputation in Europe, by making people be- lieve that it rests on no foundation, and to give moral force to the enemy and weaken our own ; for, I say again, in war feeling and opinion are more than half of the reality. The art of great captains has always been to make their numbers appear very large. to the enemy, and to persuade their own boop of the enemy's great inferiority. This is the first time that a general has known to depreciate his own resources and to exalt those of the enemy. The private soldier does not judge ; but officers of sense, whose opinion is worth having, and who have knowledge and experience, pay little attention to orders of the day, or to proclamations. I trust that no more such blunders will be made, and that on no pretext whatever orders of the day or proclamations will be made tending to make known the real strength of my armies. I desire that all means, direct and indirect, be taken to spread the highest opinion of our numbers. The French troops which I have in Spain are twice as good, three times as good, as regards stea- diness, bravery, and even numbers, as those that I have in any other part of the world. When I conquered theAnatrians at Eckmiihl I was one to five, and yet my army fancied itself at least equal to the enemy; and even now, al- though wehave been so long in Germany, the enemy has no idea of our strength, and we try to make it out greater and greater every day. Far from owningthat at Wagram I had only 100,000 men, I try to prove that I had 220,000. Con- stantly, in my Italian campaigns, when I had only a handful of men, I exaggerated their numbers ; this served my purpose without diminishing my glory. The skill of my operations, including that of exaggerating my strength, was afterwards recognized by generals and intelligent officers. With paltry motives, petty vanities, and small passions, nothing great has ever been done. I hope, therefore, that faults so great and so mischievous will not be repeated in my army of Spain."

The correspondence relating to Spain is of great interest as re- gards the Peninsular war ; the character of the two brothers, and topics similar to those touched upon in our Neapolitan extracts, especially the corruptionwhich, from the peculiar circumstances of Spam' had reached a most extraordinary extent. The letters re- lating to the campaign of 1814 in France are a striking picture of the state of the country and the effects of war. France was iso exhausted, that when the National Guards were at last raised for the routine duties of Paris, and to protect the city against the proletaires, they could not be regularly armed, many having fowling-pieces, many nothing but pikes. The muskets were ex- hausted. Not the mere sufferings of war, for they were dis- re ed equally by Joseph and Napoleon, but its grinding re- sults upon property and people, are strikingly brought out. So also is the wonderful activity, vigour of mind, and strength of constitution, which Napoleon possessed. The fatigues of that memorable time when he beat Blucher and Swartzenberg in suc- cession, and Fortune shone upon him with her old brilliancy, did not subdue him, but it exhausted others. It was not his fault that he did no more : he had not the means. At " midnight " on the 9th of March, Joseph writes—" Your Majesty will see that throughout the empire there are only 7575 disposable men. There are no longer any in Paris." Two days later, Napoleon himself writes—" My Young Guard melts away like a snow-ball : the Old Guard is still in good order. My Horse Guard also disappears rapidly." What could common troops or raw conscripts do ? Yet amidst all Napoleon's fatigues and anxieties, and with more than epic greatness of fortunes at stake, he found time to write letters of business descending into and caring for everything even to the minutest details, nay even regulating matters of etiquette. There is, however, in Napoleon's a trace, and in Joseph's letters the dis- play, of an alarmed style—something hurried or tremulous. ' " And what, after all, was it for ?' philosophy may ask, though vainly. This is the life of precaution the conqueror must lead, according to the Emperor's advice to the King.

"St. Cloud, May 31, 1806.

"My Brother—Do not organize your guard so as to be under the control of a single commander ; nothing can be more dangerous. Sooner or later it would be necessary to retrace your steps, and it is better not to start in a wrong direction. I have told you already, and I repeat it that you place too much confidence in the Neapolitans. I say this especiall with reSpect to your kitchen and the guards of your person : lest you should be poisoned or assassinated, I make a point that you keep your French cooks, that you have your table attended to by your own servants, and that your 'leasehold be so arranged that you may be always guarded by Frenchmen. You have not been sufficiently acquainted with my private life to know how much, even in France, I have always kept mirelf under the guard of my motet

trusty and oldest soldiers. *

"No one should enter your room during the night except your aide-de- camp, who should sleep in the chamber that precedes your bedroom. Your door should be fastened inside, and you ought not to open it, even to our aide-de-camp, till you have recognized Ins voice ; he himself should not knock at your door till he has locked that of the room which he is in, to make sure of hieing alone, and of being followed by no one."

The selection, the translation, and the editing of this Corre- spondence, are entitled to great praise. The letters written by other persons than Napoleon are well chosen to throw a light upon the Emperor's epistles, or carry on the story. The translation is vivid, easy, and preserves an original air. The notes are useful, and the introductory information as to the then position of the writers prefixed to each chapter is necessary to readers who do not carry an acquaintance with the history of those times at their fingers' ends, and is moreover very well done—enough, and not too much.