MAXWELL'S HINTS TO A SOLDIER ON SERVICE.
THE form or framework of Mr. Maxwell's Military Hints is that of letters of advice from a retired officer to a son in his teens, who has just received
a commission. The supposed veteran opens with reminiscences of the early part of the century, when he first joined the Army : comprising the state of Europe at the beginning of the Peninsular war—the composition, morale, and practices of the Army of that time, especially as regards drinking and duelling; against which the old soldier warns the young one, with sundry examples drawn from his own observation, and smack- ing of mess-room morality. The veteran then plunges in medias res ; taking the qualities necessary for an officer from a subaltern to a com- mander-in-chief, and illustrating them by innumerable anecdotes and descriptions. These, it is obvious, might be derived from the whole range of military history, and a few are occasionally drawn from remoter quarries ; but the late war is the grand storehouse of materials, and mostly the Peninsular campaigns. The engineering tactics of assault and defence are exhibited in the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, St. Sebas- tian, Burgos, Saragossa, and others. The strategy of retreat is handled in Massena's skilful withdrawal from Torres Vedras ; the disorderly re- tiring of Wellington's army from Burgos ; the masterly escape of Soultrafter the passage of the Douro ; and the disastrous retreat of Sir John Moore on Conmna, which last is severely censured. Waterloo and Barossa are the battles most completely presented ; for though many others are brought before the reader, it is partially, and with a view to illustrate some particular military quality in the commanding officer, dis- playing itself in some particular point. This characteristic, indeed, per- vades the other illustrations : they are complete for the purpose of showing courage, readiness, craft, and so forth, in action, but rarely complete accounts of the whole event.
The plan of this work was obviously very elastic and comprehen- sive; for it would have permitted the author to draw his examples from the whole range of ancient and modern history, and to embrace a critical description of the most masterly strategy, the most daring operations, and the most gallant actions of every age, forming a compendious view of the principles of warfare at once popular and scientific. Mr. Maxwell, how- ever, scarcely saw the capabilities of his own conception ; and was pro- bably deficient in the knowledge requisite to carry it into execution, as he certainly wants the critical faculty necessary to so large a work. We do not mean that high or purer criticism which indicates the general cha- racter of an operation in elucidating the principles which it contains, but the more attractive quality of Napier and Mitchell, which describes as well as judges. The cast of Mr. Maxwell's mind is strictly rhetorical : the flowers and flourishes of things divert him from their essentials ; and though his decisions may often be true, they are mostly obvious decisions common to everybody, or selections from others, not conclusions of his own. This idiosyncracy has prevented him from fully executing his own con- ception according to the limited, and, as it strikes us, imperfect boun- daries he had fixed to it. Compactness of plan and purpose, if it ever was thought of, is too constantly sacrificed to a mistaken idea of effects. Another source of imperfection appears to have originated in haste, not to say in carelessness. When Mr. Maxwell had conceived his design, he seems to have thrown it off in a hurry, rather than to have executed it ; and to have paid little attention to revision. To a man possessing mili- tary experience of some or perhaps many of the scenes described, and familiar with the literature of the subject, it was easy to seize upon the prominent incidents or operations; to state, though not always clearly or upon any methodical system, the principal military qualities they illus- trated; and then to give an account of the action, either by an original narrative, or, as is more frequently the case, by large quotations from his own works or those of other writers, some popular—as Napier, others more strictly professional. The inherent attraction of the events, and the interest our nature induces us to feel towards the exercise of skill and conduct displayed in the face of danger and death, excite the reader in favour of the subject ; and the military knowledge of Mr. Maxwell, which prevents him from falling into the theatrical errors of civilians' descrip- tion, imparts reality to the composition in spite of its florid style : but, taken altogether, Hints to a Soldier on Service is a piece of book- making. This critical characteristic does not detract from the readableness of the Work, except that those who have read much on the subject will find matter often presented with which they are already acquainted. We will select such samples'as are probably newest to the reader.
FOY'S PROMPTNESS.
Among the Generals whose oppressive conduct and tyrannical exactions had rendered them detestable to the Portuguese during Jnnot's occupation of Lisbon, Loison was the most feared and hated. From the loss of an arm, he had ac- quired the sobriquet of " the maneta " ; and by that name the very children were taught to dread and curse him. During a popular outbreak at Oporto, Foy fell into the hands of the infuriated populace; and the mob, mistaking him for Loison, called out " to murder the manta! " With amazing promptness, Foy threw both arms above his head; and the rabble, who a moment before had devoted the hated one to destruction, discovering their mistake, permitted the General to escape unharmed, when a moment's want of promptness would have consigned him to instant destruction.
TILE IMMINENT DEADLY BREACH.
"My attention," says Colonel Jones, who led the column to assault the breach at St. Sebastian, and was left there wounded on its repulse, "was a short time afterwards aroused by an exclamation from the soldier lying next to me—' Oh, they are murdering us all ! ' Upon looking up, I perceived a number of French. grenadiers, under a heavy fire of grape, sword in hand, stepping over the dead and stabbing the wounded. My comeamon was treated in the same manner: the sword withdrawn from his body, and, reeking with his blood, was raised to give me the coup de grace, when, fortunately, the uplifted arm was arrested by a smart little man, a Sergeant, who cried out, ' Oh, mon Colonel, etes-vous blesse ?' and immediately ordered some of his men to remove me into the town. They raised me in their arms, and carried me without the slightest difficulty up the breach, on. to the ramparts of the right flanking tower: here we were stopped by a Captain of the Grenadiers; who asked some questions, then kissed me, and desirsd the party to proceed to the hospital. On passing the embrasures of the high curtain, we were exposed to a very sharp musketry fire from the trenches; and here it was that we met the Governor and his Staff, in full-dress uniforms, hurrying to the breach. He asked me if I was badly wounded, and directed that proper care should be taken of me."
A fortunate mistake thus saved the subaltern; and a blue uniform and gold bullion epaulette indirectly became the means of his preservation.
WOUNDS AND SOUNDS.
Showers of grape-shot fell without intermission round the spot, [the ap- proaches at Burgos,] causing an incessant whizzing and rattling among the stones, and appeared at the moment to be carrying destruction through the ranks: but, except the necessity of instantly carrying off the wounded, on account of their sufferings it caused little interruption to the workmen. It was remarked here, as it had been on former occasions, that a wound from a grape-shot is less quietly borne than a wound from a round-shot or musketry. The latter is seldom known in the night, except from the falling of the individual; whereas the former not unfrequently draws forth loud lamentations.
ESCAPE ON BRENNIER.
In war, circumstances go far in effecting success and in producing disaster. Burgos proved invulnerable: two years before, Almeida, with every preparation for determined resistance, fell on the second day after Massena's fire was opened on it. By a fortunate shell, the grand magazine was exploded; and a place abundantly stored, well-garrisoned, and capable of holding out two months, in twenty-fotir hours was in the hands of the besiegers. A still stranger occurrence in the history of thus fortress succeeded. When in turn, Massena's tide of fortune ebbed, and he retired from Portugal, Almeida was known to be unprovisioned; and of course its fall was considered to be a certainty. In no one instance throughout the Peninsular campaign was a French Governor of a place of arms tried and found wanting; and with means, and sometimes with- out means, the spirit and the resources of these able soldiers appeared inex- haustible. Bremner, who commanded at Almeida, had been blockaded; but stilt, Massena, " the spoiled child of victory," was in the field, and he expected to be relieved. Strong as that confidence was, he left nothing to uncertainty. He carefully mined the works, and made every preparation by which he might, if ne- cessary, ruin the defences of the place. The heavy firing at Fuentes told him that a severe action had been fought. A day passed—no succour came • and during the night a French private reached the fortress, having with wonderful sagacity eluded the sentries and pi nets who were on duty. Tillet confirmed Bremner's
suspicions that Massena been repulsed, and that Almeida must consequently be abandoned.
A stupid General, who requested and unfortunately obtained the direction of
the investment of Almeida, permitted Brennier to escape. • • •
For two days Brennier continued his work of destruction; and it was effected with so much cleverness, that frequent explosions attracted no particular notice from the blockaders.
He ruined all the principal bastions, and kept up a constant fire of the artillery in a singul:s manner: for always he fired several grins at one moment, with very heavy chalets, placing one across the muzzle of another; so that while some shots.flew towar the besiegers, and a land explosion was heard, others destroyed
pieces without attracting notice.
At one o'clock on the morning of the 11th of May, the French Governor blew up his mines, and boldly issued from Almeida. The way was opened with the bayonet. The garrison fired but little-' and they appear to have marched between the bodies of troops posted to support the picquets ; and, in particular, could not have passed far from the right of the Queen's Regiment. Upon the first alarm, Brigadier-General Pack, who was at Malpartida, joined the picquets, and continued to follow and to fire upon the enemy, as a guide for the march of the other troops employed in the blockade; and Major-General Campbell marched from Malpartida with a part of the hrst battalion of the Thirty-sixth Regiment. But the enemy continued their march in a solid, com- pact body, without firing; and were well guided between the positions occupied by
our troops. •