IL Y AVAIT LA FRANCE
By D. W. BROGAN
THE character of the French Government is now beginning to appear. Under the cover of two great military reputa- tions the forces of class and personal selfishness, the forces of those who long ago despaired of France, of those who thought no cause worth fighting for, of those who fear the revolutionary consequences of a continuation of the war, playing on the temporary despair of the average Frenchman so deceived, so betrayed, by his political and military leaders, have decided to try the daring and despicable experiment of saving all but honour. The chances of even temporary success depend on the self-restraint and tact of Herr Hitler, on the degree to which he can postpone the most humiliating demands of the enemy whom the French hate more than they hat', the Germans and despise more than, for the moment, they despise themselves, the Italians.
But there are no chances of permanent success. The Petain Government may talk of moral regeneration, it may criticise, with justice, the weakness, the folly, the sloth of the old political parties, the enervation of the national morale, the mediocrity of the ideals preached by most French parties and leaders since 1918. But, as General de Gaulle has pointed out, the Marshal has his share in the military slackness of these years and ths: direct responsibility for the moral surrender of military honour falls on the soldiers. It may be true that Marshal Petain has dreams of restoring order, of using his military authority to tighten the slack fibre of French life, but not only is he too old, he now lacks the moral authority. Always pessimistic, he is not the man to succeed in a task that would require the energy and courage of a young and not discredited man. Nor can General Weygand replace him. The High Command of the French army has not and certainly does not deserve the prestige that would make a "national regeneration" possible.
Still less can it come from the politicians. The role of M. Pierre Laval is proof enough of that. M. Laval, it is true, is consistent. He was against war in 1914, in 1935, in 1939, in 1940. But his motives are not likely to be thought edifying when his accumulation of a great fortune in a few years in the service of the State is remembered. Moral regeneration from such a source is open to suspicion. M. Laval's career, its worldly wisdom, its practical sagacity, make' him an instrument, an intelligent instrument, of German or Italian policy, but France is not bemused enough to be taken in, to see in the Gauleiter anything more than that.
The Petain Government will try to turn French anger and French shame against us. It will, at first, have some success. But its success is bound to be limited. Even if all France, or the majority of Frenchmen, had no higher ideals than those of M. Laval or M. Deat (it is unfair to lump the two together, but for the moment they are allies or accomplices), the necessi- ties of the war, if we hold out, will force the Germans to strip France of that wealth, that internal security, that rest, that its present governors have foolishly thought to buy at such a price. The vision that may haunt some French minds of France as a willing partner in a Fascist Europe is baseless. Fascism needs some spiritual food, it needs the psychological support of patriotism. What can the Petain Government do to supply that need? Against it speaks the most varied patriotic tradition in Europe: Joan of Arc and Richelieu, Danton and Gambetta, Foch and Clemenceau. Even the Bourbon Restoration of 1814 and 1815 had more to offer French sentiment than that. Louis XVIII bore only the shadow of the great name, but there had been the great name.
The new Government can only appeal, and could only appeal even if its political members were more personally reputable than they are, to a mean and timid selfishness always present, indeed, in France, but always vanquished by the national spirit. And what that mean and timid spirit will save from the wreck depends on Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini, neither of them magnanimous, neither of them quite a free agent. Herr Hitler may very possibly turn from the mere property-owners' syndi- cate represented by M. Laval to such able Fascist demagogues as M. Doriot But as our resistance continues the action of the Petain Government will be seen for what it is, the resigna- tion of old-fashioned professional soldiers to the fortune of war, combined with the false sagacity of the political agents of all those sections of French opinion (on the Left and on the Right) which despaired of their country the moment that continued faith seemed likely to be costly.
These men, these sections of all classes in France, can build nothing ; their authority will more and more depend on direct German and Italian support. They will make their excuses ; Marshal Petain has dreams, so it is said, of " restoring order," of undoing the evil things done in the last twenty years. Such dreams haunted the mind of another and less distinguished Marshal. Bazaine, besieged in Metz, thought more of restoring order than of aiding the amateur armies that Gambetta was creating out of nothing. When he was court-martialled he defended his inaction on the ground that there was no legitimate authority in France to which he owed obedience. The Presi- dent of the Court was a Prince of the Blood, and it was to the Duc d'Aumale that it fell to give the answer to Marshal Bazaine and, in anticipation, to that other Marshal who has accepted for France a position of ignominy she has not known since the Treaty of Troyes. "Monsieur le marechal, ii y avait la France." There is France ; it is to that eternal France which we should appeal, to military honour as well as to the powerful rational case against this fantastic trust in Hitler and Mussolini. To that France through all adversity, and till the day of her resurrection, our friendship will perpetually be extended.
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