Russia, Germany and Rumania
Russia's ultimatum to Rumania and the march of her troops into Bessarabia and Bukovina recall her action when she occu- pied eastern Poland last September. Then she was implement- ing an agreement with Germany, but in a manner and at a moment not expected by her new-found ally nor congenial to her. The general understanding between the two Govern- malts may have envisaged the ultimate restoration of Bessarabia to Russia, but the last thing that Germany can desire is that the Balkans should be set aflame at the very moment when she proposes to concentrate her energies on Great Britain, or that Russia should be quietly establishing her power on the Danube close to the all-important oil-fields. The Soviet Government is certainly under no illusions about the benevolence of Germany, and knows that the complete success of Hitler would lead to the smashing of its influence in the Balkans, and that in the mean- while Italy will be seizing the opportunity to stake out claims of her own. But its action in Poland and in Bessarabia is pro- bably due to more than the desire to interpose territory between Russia and the might of Germany. An all-triumphant Germany would make short work of eastern Poland and Bessarabia. Stalin is putting spokes in the wheel to check that triumphant progress. And it is precisely at this moment, when Italy is making overtures to the anti-Communist elements in France, that the Moscow radio insists on the Red sympathies of the Rumanian people, and declares that whole army battalions with their officers tried to put themselves under Soviet protec- tion. Such propaganda may be calculated to play on many con- flicting fears and ambitions—the fears of Italians and of Rumanian Iron Guards, the ambitions of Hungarians and Bulgarians, to say nothing of the despair of Iron Guard victims.
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