MECHANISM OF THE BALLOTA THE Horning Post has a great
many objections to Mr. GROTE'S Ballot Bill, but generously waives them all except one ; and that is, the inefficacy of the measure to secure its sole object—secrecy of votes.
" Our main objection to the ballot," says the Post, " is, not that it invests the elector with irresponsible power, to which he is not entitled so long as he virtually represents those not possessing the elective franchise—not that it is a cowardly, sneaking, disreputable, Whiggish nostrum—not that it renders a scrutiny impossible, because, if a had vote is detected after it has been given it cannot be ascertained from which candidate it should be deducted : but our main objection is this—that, if the Bill was passed to-morrow, it would remain a dead letter; and therefore the Legislature ought not to waste the public time en an abstract whim, which no one hardly beyond the walls of Parliament will and of the slightest use to him."
Secrecy, adds the Post, is out of the question; for the voter will tell how he voted. Softly, pill Post. The object of the Ballot is to enable a man to vote according to his own inclinations without dread of harm; and if harm would result to him from truly disclosing his vote, what security have you that he will tell the truth in reply to a question which uo human being has a right to ask him ? They who have no cause for concealing their votes may " tell," and tell,the truth, if they like; but as it will be impossible to discover whether they practice deception or not, the motive for making the inquiry will be wanting. The speedy con- sequence will be, that the objection which many urge against the Ballot—that it must tempt men to speak falsely—will disappear. The grand difficulty of the Ballot question has been, not that men would refuse to avail themselves of the security of secrecy, but how to devise such machinery as would give the voter ample protection, and prevent fraud sf every description. If the Morning Post had taken the trouble to examine the Ballot-box, of which it found an engraving and description in the Spectator last week, it would have perceived that this difficulty has been overcome. It would have perceived, moreover, that though an elector could secure a fortune by proving that he gave his vote for Mr. A. instead of Mr. B., the means of proof would be put en- tirely out of his power. In every possible way that ingenuity maid suggest, the Ballot-machinery, which Mr. GROTE is ready to nropose on the clenmittal of his bill, has been put to the test ; in eating ourselves seen it thoroughly tried, we do not hesitate is declare, that for its purpose it is perfect. Fraud is impossible. The operation of voting is made so simple, that the most stupid clodhopper could not fail in it—no, not even if he were unable to resit a word ; for then he might be told the order in which the names of the candidates were placed on the card, and stick his bodkin into first, seconct, or third, according to his own inclination. A blind man, with the like instruction, could do the same thing,
by groping for the holes on the index-bar. The very worst that could happen in this class of extreme cases is, that the voter would prick for candidates, and the determination would be by lot—a mode to which our gambling leuislators of the Upper Chamber evinced n partiality in one of their bills last session. We are well pleased to see the interest which this subject has excited. The extent of that interest is manifested by the sug- gestions of different modes of secret voting, which have been made
from numerous quarters. Not one plan has been offered, however, with which the persons who constructed Mr. GROTE'S Ballot-box
are not familiar ; not one to which there are not serious if not fatal objections; while not a single objection has been urged to Mr. Geors's plan which has not been rebutted by actual experiment.
Let us examine a few of the plans proposed ; carrying along with us, that we have to deal with some public officers, and with some voters, who will thwart the Ballot if they can, and pervert it, ilpossible, to corrupt use-. One newspaper sue:reset, that the elector should be permitted to give Isis vote in a privet.• room, by striking tint the manes on a votiag.eard of the candidates for whom he declines to vote. TO the adoption of this plan there are these impedituents, -•- • 1. How is the voter to get out of the room ? when can it be said that the act of voting has been completed t 2. How is the party to be prevented from doing injury to the voting-cards previously given? 3. How is it to be known that he has deposited the card so as to secure the secrecy of his vote, or deposited it properly ? 4. How is he to be prevented from bringing away the voting, card, as evidence in certain cases of not voting? 5. How is he to be prevented from bringing away the voting. card and selling it to some other voter, to be used when such other voter shall himself vote?
These are objections which we are sure have not been presented to the consideration of many persons who suggest self-registerirg dials, and many complex though ingenious contrivances, alter which enable the voter to get possession of the voting-card, and to commit, in consequence of his possession of it, many varieties of fraud.
Another plan is, that there shall be as many boxes as there are candidates, after the manner of ballot-voting at clubs, where every person votes bona fide, with most perfect sincerity, and feels no desire and really has no interest to commit fraud. Take, how- ever, this plan : suppose that there are three candidates and three boxes, and that it is the duty of some person to give a ball at each box to each elector, as is the practice at clubs, so that the elector may vote for or against each candidate, putting the ball he gives in favour of the candidate into the Ay side of each box, and when he votes against the candidate into the No side. This, it is said, would be simple, effective, and prevent fraud. But we say, that it would secure none of these advantages.
1. It would be necessary to inspect the voter after having taken one 'ball, in order to ascertain if he has really deposited it in the box. Otherwise, lie may take it to the next box, and with the second ball that is given him, put the two balls into the second box, either in favour of or against the second candidate,— that is, he would give two votes either for or against a candidate, when only entitled to give one vote. 2. The person giving the balls would, from the very character of the act, be able to give an elector more than his number of balls, or to give him balls before he comes to the poll-booth or ballotting-box.
3. A voter may carry away the balls given to him, and sell them to some other person to use when that other person gives his vote. This could only be prevented by inspecting each voter personally—and who would submit to such a process ? 4. Merely to secure the non-voting of electors suspected as likely to vote against a particular candidate, they may be bribed to bring away the balls without voting. They could not again present themselves to the officer who possesses the register of names ; their votes would be nullified, and no watching lest they should give an adverse vote would be needed. Non-voting in this way might serve many purposes.
The above objections, (and however trivial or farfetched in them- selves, they would be urged by our opponents,) in the whole or in part apply to every scheme that we find suggested in any quarter: not one of them applies to the method which we explained last week. That method prevents the voter from getting possession of any evidence of his voting or not voting ; it prevents any fraud on the part of any public officer; and it prevents collusion between any voters, or between a voter and the public officer.
The cost of the Ballot-boxes, if made in quantities, would not exceed a few shillings each ; and, looking at their practical power in disarming prejudice and making converts, it would he worth while for the Reformers in all parts of the country, to procure them, and form Ballet Clubs, for the purpose of practising the mode of secret voting,—which, we have a firm assurance, must ere long become a part of the law of elections.
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