5 MARCH 1887, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE APPROACH OF WAR.

WE cannot but believe that war is rapidly approaching. The German Parliament assembled on Thursday, and the speech from the Throne not only contains no reassuring word, but is based on the theory that Germany has only the "plenitude of her own strength" to defend her against attack. It is true the Government has still to pass its Military Bill, and may therefore be disinclined to reassure the Deputies ; but Prince Bismarck had before him the returns of the second elections, which show that a clear majority of the whole House is pledged to grant the Septennate. Under such circum- stances, the absence of any expression of confidence is most remarkable; and all other incidents are exceedingly disquieting. The Austrian Government continues its armaments with almost reckless haste. It is concentrating its cavalry in Galicia, a flat province nearly as large as Scotland, in which the huge masses of Russian horsemen could operate with effect, and it has informed the Hungarian Delegation, through Count Kalnoky, that although it desires peace, war might be upon the Dual Monarchy at a moment's notice. The Delegation, therefore, though sensitive about the difficult financial position of Hungary, voted £5,000,000 of extra money for the Army without debate. The Prince of Montenegro, who has no financial resources, has mobilised and armed 35,000 men, and is palpably waiting for some signal to act, either in Macedonia, or on behalf of the enemies of King Milano in Servia. That signal will, it is believed, be given by disturbances in Bulgaria ; and the facts indicate that orders to give it have already been secretly issued.

Let us suppose for a moment that the Czar has decided that he must, in his own interest and that of his nation, restore his ascendency in the Balkans by force, and consider what course he would be likely to adopt. Clearly, he would mass troops in Odessa, for a descent on Bourgas, and in Bessarabia for a passage across the Danube, thus threatening both divisions of Bulgaria ; and would accumulate an army on the Galician frontier to menace or attack Austria, if she interfered. Those are the pre- cise preparations which he is believed to have made, and which the Governor-General of Odessa, in the Order we quoted last week, obviously regarded as preludes to immediate war. He has not been censured for that Order, nor have the reckless agents of Russia in Western Europe ventured to offer the slightest explanation of its menacing tone. The Russian troops being ready, or nearly ready, it would be most convenient to the Russian Government, which, like every Government, prefers to tell its subjects that when it declares war it cannot help itself, if it were summoned by the Bulgarians, or if disorder in Bulgaria called for forcible repression. Well, the effort to produce that situa- tion is being made. It is not needful either to affirm or deny the endless stories of Russian " intrigue," some of which we may in fairness admit would not, if the intriguers were Englishmen, and the object the revindication of British prestige, strike English partisans as so exceedingly heinous. The patent and undenied facts are quite enough. There is a Russian party within the Bulgarian Army, as Prince Alexander him- self asserted in his heart-broken explanation ; and that party has clearly been told—either from St. Petersburg direct, or from the revolutionary head-quarters in Roumania—to put itself in motion. The signal being given, its leaders in Silistria, Rustchuk, and probably other places, rose in mutiny, seized those fortresses, and declared for "Russia and Bulgaria." On Saturday, February 26th, Colonel Kristeff, Commandant in Silistria, ordered his soldiers—hardly a thousand in number— to revolt, and about a third obeyed. The reservists of the town, however, who outnumbered the garrison by two to one, adhered to the Regents, as did the civil population ; the Regents them- selves acted with the energy and patriotism they have always displayed ; trustworthy regiments were moved from Sofia and Shumla upon Siliatria, and after a scene of fighting, still confused in detail, Colonel Kristeff was killed, and the revolt stamped out. Unfortunately, it was followed by another at Rustchuk, and probably a third at Shumla, and these two have not, up to the latest date, been unmistakably put down. We do not question that they will be put down, but except as proving the extraordinary aptitude of the Bulgarians for self-government, it does not much matter whether the Regents succeed or not. It is pretty clear that the Bulgarian Government, in order to be sure of Sofia, and to disperse their opponents, stationed their disaffected or doubtful battalions in the river fortresses, that the latter have received a signal to rise, and that as they rose on behalf of Russia, Russia cannot allow them to suffer seriously. The Czar, even if he does. not back the movement boldly and at once, must prohibit the punishment of the insurgents ; and as their pardon would dissolve the Army, the Regents must punish them. They cannot condone mutiny twice without extinction as ruling men ; and if they do not condone it, the " honour of the Czar," as he understands it, and his future pres- tige in the Balkans, will demand that he should at once, and by force, occupy Bulgaria. We can see no way out of that position, and read with no surprise that a Council of War has been called by the Czar to consider the means of occupation, and that the principal figure in it is General Gonrko, the victor of the Balkans in 1877. Nothing else was to be expected under the circumstances ; but then, that is war. The forcible occupation of Bulgaria is the one act to which the Austrian Chancellor has publicly stated that the Empire cannot submit.

There is, as we read the situation, just one contingency by which war may be averted. The Austrian Emperor may, instead of attacking Russia, declare that the circumstances are extreme, that the Russian march on Constantinople threatens the very existence of his Empire, that be has no ally in Balkan affairs, that he must obtain a material guarantee, and that consequently the armies of the Monarchy will occupy Salonica. That is, he may at the eleventh hour accept partition instead of war, as Maria Theresa did in Poland. That this project has tempted the Austrian Court is certain, and to a man like the Emperor Francis Joseph, always beaten in war, always re- covering himself by diplomacy, it must offer many attractions. That Turkey still dreads this plan is the only explanation we have ever seen of the otherwise preposterous accumulation of troops in Macedonia ; while we suspect it would not be wholly displeasing to Prince Bismarck. It would avoid war, leave France without an ally, and render Austria, perhaps for ever, dependent upon her alliance with Berlin. No such plot, for it would be a plot, would be revealed till the last moment, or, indeed, until the armies were in motion. This contingency, therefore, is conceivable ; but we do not believe that it will happen. The Hapsburgs have made friends with Hungary, and the Hungarians would never forgive the dynasty again. They would see that the Empire had become substantially Slav, that their own future had become hopeless, and that the Emperor must again revert to military rule. They hate Russia with an incurable hatred ; and with Russia seated for ever on both sides of the Danube, they would hold them- selves betrayed. That risk is greater in the eyes of the cautions Austrian statesmen than the risk of war, with the guarantee they have from Prince Bismarck that "Austria shall not cease to be a Great Power ;" and they will prefer to fight it out. Without some entirely new event, such as may entirely upset calculations, or some entirely new combination due to Prince Bismarck's immense audacity, we can only acknowledge sorrowfully that war approaches fast.