AUSTRIAN CROSSROADS
Commonwealth and Foreign
By JOHN GATEHOUSE
AUSTRIA is rapidly approaching the crossroads. One way leads to Habsburg ; the other to Hitler. It appears reason- ably certain, not only that a decision will shortly have to be taken, but also that these are the only two possible solutions.
Not that Austria is incapable of independent existence under a continuation of present conditions. The past few months have proved it. But she is being forced into making a choice by Germany. Her decision will be of vital impor- tance to the rest of Europe. Although the main interest in Central Europe has shifted to Czechoslovakia, the " problem of Austria " still remains a key-point in European affairs. If Austria chooses, or does not resist, the Anschluss,—full political and economic union between Germany and Austria —it means German hegemony in Central Europe. If, on the other hand, she opts for Otto, it may round the death- knell for German expansionist aspirations. This, coupled with the already considerable loss of German influence in the Balkans, would radically alter the present European situation.
The recent visit of Baron von Neurath to Vienna cannot be considered a success. Nor can it be said to have improved Germany's dances of Anschluss. Actually, very little is known of the results beyond a rather meaningless " improve- ment in cultural relations." It is obvious that the Habsburg restoration was discussed. It is equally obvious that Dr. Schuschnigg once again reminded Germany that by the July Agreement she must leave Austria to " mind her own business." The visit did, however, produce one definite result. It demonstrated Dr. Schuschnigg's fearlessness and firmness in dealing with Austrian Nazis. Nothing will prevent him from treating Austrian National-Socialism as an internal affair of Austria's. Nothing will prevail upon him to countenance any other party than the Vaterlaendische Front.
For this reason, the proposed Deutschsoziale Voiks- bund (German Social People's Union) will probably be still- born. It is _highly probable, moreover, that its would-be founder, the Minister of Public Security—curious anomaly !- Dr. Neustadter-Sturmer, will be removed from office. Both he and the Minister of the Interior, General Glaise-Horstenau, have of late hardly troubled to conceal their Nazi sympathies. There is no doubt that they will have to go, although if freed from Cabinet restraint, the danger exists that their subversive activities may be augmented. It is this constant pressure from within, assisted by continhed Press propaganda from without, which has made the futility of the July Agreement so painfully obvious to Dr. Schuschnigg. It is this which is accelerating the need for a decision. Germany does not intend—never for one moment intended—to relinquish her aims of " possessing Austria." Austria is not so sure that Nazism is the panacea for all ills.
In a restored Habsburg Germany sees the probable end of her ambition. That is why she fears restoration more than ever before. That is why, in a recent article in the Miincluter Neueste Nachrichten, it was stated that " the propaganda of the Legitimists in Austria is incompatible with the Agreement between. Germany and Austria." Yet, it is the main reason why Dr. Schuschnigg is permitting increased Monarchist propaganda ; because he must use some strong weapon to counteract the Nazi attack. That he should use Legitimism for this purpose is hardly surprising, for he is personally a wholehearted supporter of that cause. More- over, of late, the strength of it as a weapon has been increased by the adherence of considerable numbers of Socialists. Dr. Schuschnigg has been much troubled by his lack of success in his advances to the Left. Now he feels that it may be possible to co-operate with them through the Monarchy. If that actually were to take place—and there is no apparent reason why it should not—the Nazi cause in Austria would be virtually hopeless. The inde- pendence and stability of Austria would, on the other hand, thus cease to be in doubt and would become reality.
What are the chances of restoration ? In the past, the main body of opposition has come from without. Consider for a moment the present international attitude. In the first place the recent categoric affirmation of the non- imperialistic aims of the Austrian Legitimists has tended to relieve the minds of the Succession States. In view of the force of the Nazi campaign against her, Czechoslovakia now views restoration as a lesser evil than Anschluss. Jugoslavia's fears of Croat secession have sensibly diminished since Italy has become more friendly towards her. (In any case the Croats themselves have always aimed more at autonomy within the Jugoslav State than at separation.) Hungary has, rather naturally, never opposed the restoration movement. (It was only Admiral Horthy who resisted the Karlist putsches in 1921.) Polish opinion is that the re-establishment of the monarchy would ensure the independence of Austria— for Poland obviously more satisfactory than Anschluss. Rumanian opposition was never of great account; and its persistence need not be viewed with any alarm. Of the Western Powers, Italy has always been in favour in principle, and now, in view of her relations with Germany, confines herself to describing restoration as " an internal affair of Austria's." Anything which tends to reduce the power of Germany is acceptable to France—though she cralifies her support by adding, " as long as restoration does not lead to strife with the Little Entente." England is non-committal, but is believed to be in favour in principle.
From without, therefore, the opposition can be said to have measurably decreased, except from the Nazi quarter. From within, support has certainly increased. What is holding up the final step ? Apart from German antagonism, the Austrian Government is not yet unanimous, for the " pronounced Nationals " are opposed to the idea. Dr. Schuschnigg has said that he will make no experiments and that Otto may only " come in by the front door." If the " National " element is removed from the Cabinet, a further obstacle will have been removed from the " consum- mation of the form of the State " of the new Austria—that new Austria, which was recently so ably described in a leading Swiss paper as " not disavowing its German character, but desiring to emphasise its special South-German Catholic nature, not in the framework of an expansionist Greater Germany, but as a particular autonomous form of German existence ; a New Austria which accepts from the Old the tradition of a super-National mission and which, surrounded by raging Nationalism, would like to form the centre of Christian humanitarianism in the West."
But that new Austria is still in the future. The old Austria has the _crossroads before her, and her choice of ways may affect much more than her own destiny. Everything depends on whether she is allowed freedom of choice.
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