THE WEATHER AND THE WAR

By STRATEGICUS

10TH in Tunisia and in Russia the war is waiting on the a caprice of that incalculable combatant weather. In Tunisia w near Rommel came to achieving a great success, and how fully has failed, are now evident. That he has something in hand on at ance is certain. He captured or destroyed material that was al to our operations, and is difficult to transport across any but row seas. The loss he inflicted upon the Allied numerical frigth cannot be ignored ; but when the final account is cast up may be difficult to discover whether he has suffered relatively less. haps it is the airfields, now handed back but ploughed up, that v he the greatest damage. But he has fallen back after coming g thin an ace of disrupting the. Allied communications, and the te, acks in the north may well have been mainly designed to cover withdrawal. They have all been held, though the most serious, rected against Beja, looked very unpleasant for the moment, and e battle even now is not over.

What, then, has he gained? .It is certain that he saw and seized e chance of coming to grips with one of the armies threatening m before the other was ready. He has done some damage that a take time to repair. In fact, that was his main design ; and would be wilful blindness not to recognise that he has gained e one thing the enemy desires at the present moment—time. Pe ut how elastic that term is can well be grasped by glancing at

e position of the Eighth Army in the south. There are sugges- ons from the enemy side that Montgomery is beginning operations turn the Mareth position. We cannot know how trustworthy ey are, and we do not forget that when the Eighth Army delivered s decisive blow at Alamein Montgomery chose rather to strike at s opponent's strength than at his weakness.

The Eighth Army plan, whatever it may be, will certainly be ought out in full detail before any attempt is made to put it o execution ; and Montgomery will neither be rushed into ecipitate action nor dissuaded by the enemy from striking at his lected moment. But what a difference might be made by the eather. If only it were a friendly ally, and not a capricious eutral, it might almost revolutionise the- situation in front of Mont- ornery, since it is not only the Mareth line that he must cross, ut also that deceptive gap west of Gabes. This gap is largely ontrolled by the weather. A run of hot and dry weather would ake the marshy and lake barrier of little effect as an obstacle. he time has actually come for the weather to provide dry heat nstead of the rains that turn the tolerable track into an impassable arrier. Rommel has gained time, but, if it please the weather, t may not be a long respite ; and it is difficult to think that, if he .ere made to retire as hurriedly in Tunisia as he did over the mmensity of the African desert, he would not find an enemy he hought temporarily out of action on his flank. WI Ili

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It is in Russia, however, that the weather has intervened posi- ively. What has happened in the Donetz basin cannot be known n detail ; but its general purport is clear. On Tuesday the German ommunique was mentioning what had first been suggested by a German commentator on Saturday, that the fighting had been carried towards the neighbourhood of Izium. It cannot be said, with the knowledge at our disposal at present, that this seems at all unlikely. The Germans claim the capture of Lozovaya, Barven- kovo, Krasnoarmeisk and Kramatorskaya. If this claim is well founded it is clear that they have driven a wedge into the Russian positions where these were nearest the Dneiper bend. They were also nearest the last line leading from the Donetz bend to the Dnieper bend and temporary safety. The Germans have evidently thrown into this counter-attack a considerable weight of armour as well as a strong concentration of motorised infantry. It seems, indeed, that Hitler—or the German Staff—has realised that at all costs another debacle such as that which occurred at Stalingrad must be avoided.

There is an obvious tendency in all military operations for an army to become enmeshed in its own success. The Russians have achieved a number of impressive victories ; but. disorganised by their advance, they have not yet secured the communications which enable an army to preserve its impetus against.a growing resistance. The early thaw has bogged down their movement at the moment when they were cutting deeply into the German communications; but the enemy's loss has not yet become their gain, and, building on one or two local gains that gave them the use of important railways, the Germans appear to have developed a strong threat to the army which is thrusting towards the Dnieper. It is not clear how this battle will develop ; but it has relieved the Germans from the immediate threat to their withdrawal.

Whether it will save them in the end depends upon how far the thaw lasts and how far it extends. The movement of the Russian armies which have pressed through Sumi and Lebeden towards the south-east has apparently slackened. The positions about Poltava and Lgov, which stand on either side of the salient about Lebeden, are holding up the advance. At the same time, the news of the advance south of Lake Ilmen has come to hand, and it is suggested that with the liquidation of that threatening salient the battle is over. It is obvious that such operations as these cannot be under- taken without the accumulation of considerable forces. Although the particular operation has gone very smoothly, and achieved a remarkable success, that could not be anticipated, and the Russian Command had to make preparations for strong resistance. It is in this that, perhaps, one may find another explanation of the local recoil in the Donetz. The Russians are striking on a number of sectors, and they cannot be equally superior everywhere. If one were to believe the German reports it would be necessary to include several other sectors in the list of the zones of attack. The Russians are undoubtedly endeavouring to make the most of the time that remains to them -before the true and permanent thaw sets in. Is it possible they are attempting too much? That must be the question which the German Staff is asking, with a naturai tendency to find the answer in the affirmative.

A reformed calendar would not remove these difficulties. The weather must interfere with mass movements, and it is the great triumph of the Russian Staff to have overcome some of its worst trials. It is the mud that tends to immobilise movement more than any other condition, and this comes with rain and thaw in cold countries. A Russian general recently said that the Staff had made allowances for the thaw in their plans for the offensive. But it is very difficult to imagine any cont:vance or arrangement that will overcome the clogging effects of mud. In these days, when the tank and the self-propelled gun form the two aspects of the same tactics of attack, the mud can intervene with disastrous effect. It is in the dry weather alone that the tanks and tracked vehicles are not confined to the roads. It is in dry weather that all self-propelled vehicles come into their own. But what is a temporary check in Russia is a certain prevente;e elsewhere.

In Tunisia it is not von Arnim or Rommel who has intervened to prevent the Allied offensive so much as the rain. It is, again, not the lack of shipping, only or mainly, that has imposed so long a delay on the attempts to invade the European Continent. The winter tends to immobilise the aircraft which, not only in the preliminary bombing stage, but in the actual operations, must play so great a part. Visibility, absence of storm-weather, moderately calm seas—these govern operations which might do so much to make the almost intolerable pressure in Russia impossible to bear. At present the air-offensive has begun to expand to an enormous extent very early in the year. It will continue to expand to what in artillery corresponds to drum-fire, before the time comes to launch an invasion. But the rhythm and scope of that air-attack, and the possibility of the great shipping expedition which an invasion involves, depend to an extent which it is fatally easy to ignore upon weather conditions quite beyond our control. But that the event should fall soon is indicated with tiresome frequency by almost every report that comes from Russia. We must not strike separately if we wish to strike effectively. Synchronisation is the key to rapid and decisive success.