The Scandinavian Front
The old illusion, already largely discredited between 1939 and 1945, that Scandinavia could stand apart from the main stream of European politics, is being transformed into an assumption that the four countries concerned are potentially the northern prong of the trident of Russian aggression. This assumption is regarded in Finland with dislike but with resignation. The Russian argument that there is need for a military assistance pact is a mere pretence, since Finland is already committed to give aid to Russia if she is ever attacked from the north-west. Any claim that there is a popular demand for closer association with Russia is so fantastic that it is not even made by the diminishing handful of Finnish Com- munists. The most enthusiastic statement in favour of a Russo- Finnish pact is the remark of the President of the Riksdag that to enter into negotiations is a matter of tact. In short the Finns have no option, but Russia will get no comfort from this lump of ice in her bosom. In Sweden there is more apprehension, which has not been diminished by a flying visit from the Finnish Communist Madame Kuusinen, and a growing hostility to Communists generally, but the explicit hope of neutrality has not yet been replaced by that tacit and morose resistance which is the national heritage of the Finns. It is only in Norway that the logical step towards full political and strategic association with the West is even contem- plated, and even there there are many misgivings. In Denmark discretion is carried to the point of silence, apart from the common agreement with the other Scandinavian countries to support the economic working committee of the 16 nations expecting Marshall aid and to form a closer northern economic union. Such an atti- tude appears paradoxical, but it cannot be overcome except by a boldness which only an effective Western Union could justify.
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