LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
SUBMARINE BOATS.
[TO THE EDITOR OF TIIE "SPECTATOR."]
SIR,—I am glad to see that you have allowed the question of submarine boats to be raised in your columns. The matter is one of the gravest importance, and there seems reason to fear that unless public opinion compels the Admiralty to act, nothing will be done in time to protect the country from what may be a terrible disaster. It should be clearly understood that the submarine boat is a mechanical appliance which con- flicts with no natural law. There is no doubt whatever that boats can be safely and certainly navigated under water. Whether the vessels that have hitherto been constructed in France and the United States satisfy all the requirements, is not clear, but their perfecting is merely a question of time. When the boat has been perfected, it will be a most formidable engine of maritime warfare. At the present moment a battle- ship has absolutely no defence against a submarine, and can only avoid destruction by going full speed in the direction in which the boat is not supposed to be. It is suggested by those who are in favour of doing nothing, that the submarine boat must always be so unseaworthy, and the danger of navigating it so great, that crews will never be found to take these vessels into action. This is an absolute delusion ; the whole experience of warfare is dead against it. As far back as the American Civil War submarine boats were tried ; one of them twice drowned her crew, a third crew was found without difficulty, and a ship was successfully sunk. Whatever the risks, crews will always be found. As a matter of fact, the risk will in all probability be far less than that run by the crew of a torpedo-boat. It is, perhaps, not generally known that the French are building a much larger number of sub- marines than are actually provided for in the public estimates. Moreover, the efforts of the French constructors are directed towards constructing boats which will steam on the surface of the water, and will only be submerged when necessary for the purpose of concealment or attack. Those who know the Channel well, and can therefore realise how narrow it is, and how short a time is required to pass from one coast to the other, will understand how dangerous and ubiquitous a flotilla of this kind may become. It is to be presumed that Mr. G-oschen spoke the views of the Admiralty when he stated that though careful attention was being paid to the question of submarine boats, nothing was being done by the Admiralty because, in the first place, the proper method of defence against them had not been ascer- tained ; and, in the second place, because the submarine was the weapon of the inferior Power. I sincerely trust that this official utterance will receive exactly the amount of attention which it deserves, and no more. The fact that the Admiralty sees little value in a weapon which has commended itself to
the French, to the United States Navy Departments and to the German naval authorities is natural enough; it is in exact
accordance with precedent. There is scarcely a single appli.
ance in respect of armour, armament, or engines now used in the British Navy that has not been borrowed from some other Navy after having been first laughed at, condemned, and declared on the highest possible authority to be useless. If it can be said that the view of the Admiralty affects the question at all, it must be regarded as strengthening the argument in favour of the new weapon, rather than as a scientific condemnation of it.
Of Mr. Goschen's misapplied catchword about "the weapon of the inferior Power," it is hard to speak seriously. What in the world has the supposed superiority of our Fleet in the matter of battleships and cruisers got to do with the question?
If our battleships and cruisers have no defence against a submarine boat, then the Navy which possesses these defenceless ships, and which cannot retaliate upon the ships of its opponent, is the weaker, and not the stronger, of the two parties engaged. There is a reply to the submarine boat in the hands of our enemies, and that is the submarine boat in the hands of our own sailors. It is conceivable that in time of war the existence of such vessels in the Channel on both sides might make the narrow waters untenable for sea- going men-of-war. It certainly would make them untenable for troopships. In such an event, we should at least be no worse off than our opponents ; and, as we have not the slightest intention of invading any foreign country, the ability to prevent a landing under any circumstances would be more in our favour than in the favour of any rival. In a word, the position in the Channel might come to be one of "stalemate." If, however, we are unprovided with the same weapons as our adversaries, it is much more likely to be a ques- tion of "checkmate," and it is not we who will be the winners. It must not be supposed, however, that if we take reasonable precautions we need lose our control of the sea. In narrow waters the submarine bola must become very formidable. In the open sea it is innocuous. Such ports as Liverpool, Glas- gow, Belfast, and probably Bristol and Cork, would have nothing to fear, and the Atlantic trade would continue to depend, as it does now, upon the protection of the Fleet. But this measure of security can only be obtained if the Admiralty will wake up. When that august body allowed us to get years behind our neighbours in the matter of guns, loading appliances, armour plating, powder, boilers, and many other particulars, it was mercifully given time to recover lost ground, and to adopt the methods which it had so systematically condemned. But in this case there will be no room for repentance, or at any rate for remedy. If the Admiralty does turn out to be wrong, as it usually does, the fact that A, B, or C can lay his hand on his heart and declare that "he alone is responsible," and that "his advisers have carefully considered the question," will profit us nothing. Therefore I trust that you will continue to exercise that public pressure which, as far as I know, is the only force which ever induces our naval and military departments to take effective action.—I am, Sir, Sm., [Our correspondent may rest assured that we have not the slightest intention of letting the subject drop.—ED. Spectator.]
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